| Yemen: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 83 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | 42 |
| 84 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | 67 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 83 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | |||||||
| 83a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: Appointment to the most sensitive positions of the government are decided upon through patronage: "Yemens state-sponsored system of patronage undermines the subjection of the government to the popular will by overriding both the creation of strong institutions and the establishment of law and order. It is clear that without addressing some very basic issues of state-building to at least reduce the potency of the patronage system, there is a glass ceiling on the other types of reform that can be realistically achieved. From first source "Leadership of the military and security forces is in the hands of close relatives of President Saleh, including his son, his nephew and other relatives and extreme loyalists." There is no consideration of professional criteria in this vital area of governance. From second source
References: [ LINK ] - page 246
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| 83b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: If anyone has an adequate budget in Yemen, it would be the military and security organs. However, because there are so many security organs, it would help achievei better law enforcement if they were streamlined and if appropriations were allocated rationally. References: 2007 and 2008 budgets
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| 83c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: It is not political intervention with the police that is worrisome. It is police intervention of peaceful demonstrations and of demonstrations that they themselves sometimes instigate to impress upon the public the need for excessive police action to quell violent disturbances" or disguised suppression of human rights, freedom of peaceful assembly and free expression of opinion. The security apparatus is one and the same with government authorities, and neither faces any problem of intervention by the other.
References: [ LINK ]
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| 84 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 84a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action. | ||||||||
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Comments: The mechanism is the courts. "We filed that suit against Saleh as a corporation, Allawo Corporation. We accused the president of being behind the imprisonment of innocent citizens inside the political security apparatus. According to the law, he is the first person in charge of the Political Security Apparatus. Because the judge knew we were right and our case was strong, he didnt have the audacity and courage to adjudicate it. We were surprised when the judge ruled that Saleh is not responsible about the prisoner who spent a long time in the Political Security Prison, justifying his ruling that Saleh is too busy to know about such a case, even though the law sees him as the responsible person. If Saleh is too busy to be in charge of the prison, then put someone else in charge instead of embarrassing yourself with a useless ruling."
References: Law of Litigation No. 40, 2002, Chapter III, [ LINK ] Constitution of Yemen, Article 51 Law 12, 1994, Penal Code, Article 132 (2), [ LINK ]
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| 84b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: The second source, although somewhat old but still relevant, shows the governments rather slow pace to act on its international obligations in this regard: "Take measures to establish an effective, reliable and independent complaints system to undertake prompt and impartial investigations into allegations of ill-treatment or torture by police and other public officials, and punish the offenders." From Article 19 To date there no report existsof any action vis a vis complaints or lawsuits against any state security apparatus. To show the attitude of authorities toward complaints from citizens: "The assailants stayed outside Al Odainis house until 2 a.m. the next day. Despite being called for support, police did not come to the area until daybreak. After the first attack, Al Odaini had filed a complaint with both the local police and with security authorities, but no investigation took place.
References: [ LINK ] [ LINK ]&year=2005" target="_blank">[ LINK ] http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW0004/KW0108/
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| 84c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: For all intents and purposes, the Disciplinary Councils in the various branches of the armed forces and the security organs called for in the law are ineffective. It is unknown what, if any, corrective actions they have ever taken against corrupt or incompetent military personnel of any rank. The Law of Crimes and Penalties does not include members of the security apparatus and armed forces in its stipulations, according to the third source: "With some exceptions, members of the armed forces, the Ministry of Interior and security forces are not covered by this law." References: [ LINK ] Law No 67, 1991, Concerning Military and Security Service, [ LINK ] Law of Crimes and Penalties
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| 84d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no record of any systematic action taken against any military or security personnel for any breach of law or for corruption charges, except in the cases shown in the first two sources, which arose after loud protests from citizens or the international community. In the first case, the decision was passed by Al-Mahweet Primary Court. It ordered compensation for the deceased victim's heirs "out of their own pockets." It is not clear if they received any disciplinary sentence from the disciplinary council of their unit. References: [ LINK ]
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| 84e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: Chapter9 details the penalties that military and security personnel can be subjected to and the violations involved. However Law No. 6 of 2002 gives the president, also the commander in chief, and vice president immunity for most crimes except treason and sovereignty-related crimes. References: Law No 67, 1991, Concerning Military and Security Service, Chapter 9, [ LINK ] Penal Code 12, 1994 Anti-Corruption Law 39, 2006 Law No. 6, 1995, Prosecuting and Trying Senior Officials, [ LINK ] Law No. 6, 2002, Prosecuting and Trying Senior Officials
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| 84f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: The above cases refer to criminal proceerdings against security officers and personnel that did undergo criminal proceedings. It would still be very difficult, if not impossible, to undertake criminal proceedings against officers and personnel of the security apparatus (for example, prison officers who refuse to allow sick prisoners to obtain medical care), even though this kind of intolerable security action has been condemned internationally. References: [ LINK ]
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