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2008 Assessment

Yemen: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Yemen: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: National Ombudsman
Indicators   Score
55 Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector? 100
56 Is the national ombudsman effective? 41
57 Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman? 17

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

55 Is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?
 
  55: In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: Law No. 39 primarily creates and stipulates the role of the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC).

Note that the President of the Republic, by law, is no longer chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council.

Note that COCA is under under the Office of the President of the Republic and reports to the director of the office.

References: Republican Decree of Law No 39, 1992, Concerning the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) (Not subject to Parliamentary approval)

Law No. 39, 2006, Concerning Combatting Corruption

Decree of the President of the Republic, Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, No. 3, 1996, Concerning the Establishment of the Public Property/Funds Courts

Law for the Establishment of Public Property Prosecution

56 Is the national ombudsman effective?
 
  56a: In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: The Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) is theoretically an independent entity that "carries out its duties with complete independence and neutrality without any interference from anyone or any entity, the latter of which is deemed to be a crime punishable by law and precedence."

The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) is still under the control of the president's office. It is the entity that is now more qualifies to undertake the investigative work on corruption.

References: Law No. 39, 2006, Concerning Combating Corruption

  56b: In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The judiciary has been known to take disciplinary measures against lax judges trying public property/funds cases, but moslty they are lower-level judges. The Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) has reported that it has "hundreds of cases," but no significant indictment of "heavy" corruption cases has materialized.

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56c: In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Article 11 states that membership in the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) may be rescinded if only the member commits a violation in the undertaking of his duties and only after after referral to the court by a majority vote of SCAAC members and a subsequent court ruling.

References: Anti-Corruption Law No. 39, 2000, Article 11

  56d: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC), the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA),and the Public Property Courts all have support staff, but they often lack adequate training.

References: [ LINK ]

Anti-Corruption Law No. 39, 2000

  56e: In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: With the nominations coming from the Consultative Assembly (all of whose members are appointed) and endorsed by a House of Representatives, where the ruling party is almost guaranteed am overwhelming majority, it is inconceivable to suggest that appointments to the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) can be totally free from political association. (The Chairman of SNACC is a member of the ruling party, the General People's Congress.) The same is true for the heads of the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) and the Public Property Court, and the chairman of the Judiciary Council. The senior positions within SNACC are bound to be politically inspired, even if not necessarily without compromise to professional and even ethical standards. One may ascertain that there are going to be certain elements of officialdom that will remain untouchable by any authority.

"COCA reported that between its creation in 1999 and 2005, it had investigated 518 official cases of corruption, of which 361 were filed with COCA in 2005, resulting in a loss to the treasury of $24.7 million (4.86 billion riyals). At year's end, of the 518 cases, 490 had been sent to the judiciary for action, while the remaining 28 cases were still under consideration."

A correction: COCA was actually created in 1974 in the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and redefined institutionally by Law No. 39, 1992 after unification of North and South Yemen in May 1990.

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56f: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) and the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) have autonomous budgets that are included in the General State Budgets. The Public Property Courts' budgets are included within the "autonomous" budgets of the Judiciary Branch.

References: [ LINK ]

Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 Budget (proposed)

  56g: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The first and second sources underscore the poor transparency existing in corruption-related cases.

"The Yemeni institutional infrastructures that are responsible for fighting and preventing corruption have been characterized by a serious crisis of responsibility. In addition, this framework faces many obstacles and a lack of transparency and accountability in its structure and level of administration. Building transparent and accountable institutions for preventing corruption is a fundamental starting point for developing good governance and fighting corruption in Yemen.

"The law requires a degree of transparency and public access to information, and the Press and Publications Law provides for journalists to have some access to government reports and information; however, in practice the government offered few procedures to ensure transparency. In August 2006, Parliament passed a law requiring public disclosure of government officials' assets, and the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) worked to implement this during the year. The government provided limited information on Internet sites; however, few citizens had access to the Internet."

The stipulations in the pertinent legislation of these agencies and other related laws further reinforce the limitations to public access to most of the ombudsman agencies work.

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56h: In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Institutions that deal with corruption during the investigation: The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), Public Prosecution for Public Funs (public property cases), Supreme Judicial Council (for cases involving judges and prosecutors) and Ministry of Finance, for checks and control of finance affairs.

SNACC, according to the Anti-Corruption Law, is also empowered to initiate investigations of public property/corruption cases. It is most likely, however, that COCA will undertake the investigative work for SNACC, in view of COCAs experience and resources (specifically, qualified manpower). While the researchers personal experience with COCA demonstrates diligent investigative work and meaningful conclusions, the following would indeed present a problem in making the work as effective as it should be in terms of indictment, prosecution and penalization: The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), as an anti-corruption watchdog, in practice is not an independent body. It is answerable to the president and presents its report to Parliament once a year. It has been monitoring government revenues, spending, procurement and performance. But its reports are either not taken into account or are being used to blackmail government officials.

While SNACC has reported that many cases have been designated for its perusal, no reports yet exist of any major corruption cases being prosecuted or tried.

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56i: In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The judiciary has perhaps been the institution within which the most apparent corrupt or incompetent officials can be found: "According to Farwan, more than 42 Yemeni judges were investigated last year, some of whom were given oral notice while others were dismissed." From Yemen Times

"Only low-ranking officials have been prosecuted for corruption since the inception of the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA). The actual number of corruption cases was generally considered to be significantly higher than what was reported by COCA." From second source

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56j: In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), as an anti-corruption watchdog, in practice is not an independent body. It is answerable to the president and presents its report to Parliament once a year. It has been monitoring government revenues, spending, procurement and performance. But its reports are either not taken into account or are being used to blackmail government officials.

This is confirmed by other reports as well and personal experience:

"At year's end, of the 518 cases, 490 had been sent to the judiciary for action, while the remaining 28 cases were still under consideration. COCA's reports were given to Parliament but were not accessible to the general public. Only low-ranking officials have been prosecuted for corruption since COCA's inception."

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  56k: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The researcher reported a case to COCA, which was investigated appropriately.

The nuclear power case cited in second source was acted upon by the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) when it was raised by a newspaper editor in Mariib Press.

References: Personal Experience with the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA)

[ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

57 Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?
 
  57a: In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), as an anti-corruption watchdog, in practice is not an independent body. It is answerable to the president and presents its report to Parliament once a year. It has been monitoring government revenues, spending, procurement and performance. But its reports are either not taken into account or are being used to blackmail government officials.

This is confirmed by other reports as well and personal experience:

"At year's end, of the 518 cases, 490 had been sent to the judiciary for action, while the remaining 28 cases were still under consideration. COCA's reports were given to Parliament but were not accessible to the general public. Only low-ranking officials have been prosecuted for corruption since COCA's inception."

References: Law No. 39, 1992, Concerning the Central Organization of Control and Auditing (COCA), Articles 11, 13

  57b: In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: There is no stipulation for public access to COCO's reports. Their availability can sometimes depend on the possible political value of such access. However, many newspaper reports have referred to COCA reports, which apparently were provided by either COCA staff, concerned employees of the relevant entities, or other informal means.

"COCA's reports were rendered to Parliament but were not made accessible to the general public." From second source

The Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee (SNACC) has given general reports to the public, but its laws do not call for public access to its official reports and activities.

In any case, the reports that are made pulbic have not enlightened the public to any increased pressure on the widespread corruption prevalent in the government.

References: Law 39, 1992, Concerning the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) and the Bylaws thereof, [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

  57c: In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: With some reports now reaching the public, it is not yet clear how much of an impact they will have on enticing public involvement in anti-corruption measures. The reports do not go into the specifics of the corruption being investigated or prosecuted.

The anti-corruption laws and the Financial Disclosure Act do not allow for disclosure of details of anti-corruption cases or Financial Disclosure Declarations.

References: [ LINK ]

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