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2008 Assessment

Yemen: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Yemen: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Judicial Accountability
Indicators		Score
36	Are judges appointed fairly?	8
37	Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?	46
38	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?	14
39	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?	0

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are judges appointed fairly?

36a: In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

Score:

YES

Comments: Assignment of judges is done by judicial authorities. The minister nominates, and the appointments are endorsed by the Supreme Judicial Authority. Appointments are not endorsed by the Legislative Branch. Some argue that the law needs to be amended to reflect some recent changes, such as the removal of the president from the Supreme Judicial Council and the need for greater checks and balances among the three branches of government.

References: Constitution of the Republic (amended 2001)

Law of Judiical Authority, Chapter IV, Section i, Articles 57-64, [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: Appointing a national-level judge is made by a republican decree after the Minister of Justice nominates him or her at the approval of the Supreme Judicial Council. The president is no longer within the Supreme Judicial Council, per a new amendment made in 2006.

36b: In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting national-level judges.

Score:

100

Comments: The criteria rest on academic credentials; little attention is given to experience. With the removal of the president from the Supreme Judicial Council, the law requires a presidential decree for most senior judicial appointments.

"The Constitution provides for an autonomous judiciary and independent judges; however, a weak judiciary was severely hampered by corruption and Executive Branch interference.

Many litigants maintained, and the government acknowledged, that a judge's social ties and, occasionally, bribery influenced verdicts. Many judges were poorly trained, and some were closely associated with the ruling party. The judiciary was hampered further by the government's frequent reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal members at times threatened and harassed members of the judiciary." From second source

References: Judicial Authority Law No. 1, 1991, Article 57

[ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: The Ministry of Justice has embarked on a strategy to improve the judicial system. The strategy, which will run until 2015, aims at selecting professional judges. Selecting a national-level judge will be made after considerable evaluation by the Ministry of Justice.

36c: In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

Score:

YES

Comments: There is no confirmation procedure for the appointment of judges.

References: Law of Judicial Authority No. 1, 1990

Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

37a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

YES

Comments: Because of the religous ramifications associated with the judiciary, reasons are usually given for decisions.

References: Law of Judicial Authority No. 1, 1990

Law of Judicial Litigation (Proceedings)

37b: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

100

Comments: Notwithstanding the reasoning behind them, court rulings are often incoherent and lack a harmonious approach to meting out justice. Indications of executive interference are clear in many cases.

References: [ LINK ]

[ LINK ]

37c: In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

Score:

YES

Comments: The Supreme Judicial Council is the disciplinary agency and the overrseer of all judicial activities.

References: Law of Judicial Authority, Chapter V, Sections i-iii

37d: In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

Score:

YES

Comments: Even after removal of the president from the chairmanship of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), its membership is subject to executive appointment (presidential decree) either to members' employment position or their membership on the SJC.

References: Law of Judicial Authority, Chapter V, Sections i-iii

37e: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations -- or participates fully with cooperating agencies\' investigations -- into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power. 50 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power. 0 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies\' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.$

Comments: The law designates the Judicial Inspection Authority as the investigator, either on its own initiation or by instruction from the Supreme Judicial Council. The authority then recommends the appropriate disciplinary action to the council.

References: Law of Judicial Authority, Chapter IV, Section v

37f: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Score:

100

Comments: This s done by a subcommittee of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) called the Judicial Accountability Council, which is made up of three SJC members or three judges, after referral by the SJC.

"When the accountability council finds that a judge has committed a clear violation and has clear-cut evidence, the council will take legal action against him. From second source

The process is complex and involves too many boards or sections of the ministry, or the SJC and could be subject to political influence. A judge was actually penalized for meting out judgment against a big government official and in favor of a citizen over a land dispute: "Zaidi judge Mohammed Luqman was sentenced to 10 years in prison after ruling against one of Salehs political cronies." From Amnesty

References: Law of Judicial Authority, Chapter V, Section iii

[ LINK ]

www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2083.cfm

[ LINK ]

Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

38a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Financial Disclosure Act, 2006, Article 4, [ LINK ]

38b: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: No legal stipulations govern gifts and hospitality.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

38c: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: No legal stipulations exist. Review of Asset Disclosure Declarations is confirmed by the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

38d: In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

Score:

YES

$Scoring Criteria :: YES: A YES score is earned if there are regulations restricting national-level judges\' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government that would present a conflict of interest, including positions that directly seek to influence their former government colleagues. NO: A NO score is earned if no such restrictions exist.$

Comments: One of the tasks of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee is to look into employment regulations for post-retirement civil servants.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

38e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: There are no explicit legal stipulations.

One of the tasks of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee is to look into employment regulations for post-retirement civil servants.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

38f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: There are no specific legal stipulations to regulate this.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

38g: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Score:

100

Comments: No independent audits take place, as only the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Agency and "other investigative agencies" can review the declarations.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

39a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: Only the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee and other "investigative" agencies have the authority to review Disclosure of Assets Forms.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act

39b: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: Only the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee and other "investigative" agencies have the authority to review Disclosure of Assets Forms.

References: and other "investigative" agencies.

39c: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

Score:

100

Comments: Citizens have no right to access such information. Only the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Committee and other "investigative" agencies have the authority to review Disclosure of Assets Forms.

References: Judicial Authority Law

Anti-Corruption Law

Financial Disclosure Act