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2007 Assessment

Vanuatu: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Vanuatu: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: National Ombudsman
Indicators   Score
52 In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector? 100
53 Is the national ombudsman effective? 73
54 Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman? 100

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

52 In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?
 
  52: In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments:

References: Ombudsman Commission - Constitution, Articles 61-65 Ombudsman Act

53 Is the national ombudsman effective?
 
  53a: In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments:

References: Constitution, Article 65 (Ombudsman Not Subject to Direction or Control) Ombudsman Act

  53b: In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The current ombudsman is slow to investigate alleged wrongdoing or allegations of corruption against powerful politicians and associates and, as such, it could be concluded that there is political influence in the Ombudsman's Office.

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Private Sector Executive www.paclii.org/journals/JSPL/1997/1.html

Peer Review Comments: "After 15 years of independence the Vanuatu government gave effect to articles 61-65 of the constitution and passed an the Ombudsman Act of 1995 (Republic of Vanuatu, 1980 & 1995). Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson was appointed first Ombudsman. The Ombudsman commenced work immediately and between 1996 and 2000 published almost 80 reports (Hill, 2001:13). These were controversial reports, implicating Vanuatu politicians, officials and alleged foreign investors with the misuse of power, corruption, fraud, nepotism and repeated violations of the Leadership Code (Crossland, 2000). In one case involving the cyclone Betsy relief fund, the Ombudsman's office demonstrated that the then prime minister Maxime Carlot Korman had transferred US$1.1 million set aside for cyclone relief into his own personal bank accounts, including those held offshore in Singapore and Malaysia (Republic of Vanuatu, Ombudsman's office, 1996). The Ombudsman made a number of recommendations, including that the case should be referred to the police and or the public prosecutor and funds be forfeited to the state. None of these recommendations were carried out.

The Vanuatu Ombudsman's office faced sustained external pressure from parties named in complaints to frustrate investigations. For example, parties under investigation made attempts in the Supreme Court to block publication of reports (Crossland, 2000: 9-10). These were unsuccessful but did delay release, in one case by six months, by which time public controversy had subsided. There were threats and intimidation against the office, but with independent funding from the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Vanuatu government (whose members and the affiliated administrative machinery of state were the main subjects of investigations, reports and recommendations) was limited in the pressure it could exert on the office. However, in 1998 the government exercised the ultimate pressure against the Ombudsman: It repealed the Ombudsman's Act (1998). Ombudsman Patterson continued to operate on the grounds that the Constitution provided for that capacity.

This was short-lived. In 1998 the Vanuatu government passed a new act. This introduced a number of changes to the 1995 act. Staff employment was regulated by the Public Service, eliminating their independence that the 1995 legislation had enshrined (Hill, 2001: 7). Allegations of criminal misconduct could not be made without asserting the offense and providing supporting evidence. The new act has removed the minimal enforcement powers the Ombudsman originally had. A new ombudsman was appointed in 1999. Since 2000 the number of reports has declined substantially. The Ombudsman's reports must also be given to the public prosecutor and when uncovering allegations of criminal misconduct, must also be lodged with the Commissioner of Police (Cain & Jowitt, 2004: 23). To date there have been no prosecutions as a result of the act.

In the case of the Vanuatu Ombudsman, the office started out with an active program of hearing complaints, investigating them and releasing reports and recommendations. Political leaders and public officials were routinely exposed for malpractice. Consequently these same political leaders, quickly began to exert pressure on the Ombudsmans office, beginning with threats and intimidation and moving to court actions challenging the ability of the office to release findings. Then the Ombudsman Act itself was repealed. When the Ombudsman refused to vacate the post, a new law was passed finally removing the office holder who had so publicly rebuked and exposed the malpractices the leadership. The law itself was altered in an exercise of external pressure on the ombudsmens independence." (Source Regulating Responsively for Oversight Institutions in the Pacific, State Society and Governane in Melanesia, 2006).

  53c: In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: In 1998 the Ombudsman Act was repealed in order to remove Ombudsman Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson.

  53d: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office Representative

Peer Review Comments: There are some staffing constraints (lack of staff) and this limits capacity.

  53e: In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: It is also a requirement of the law. (This is from the Ombudsman Office.)

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: Appointments are usually based on professional qualifications, but there maybe personal loyalties, family connections or other biases.

  53f: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The Ombudsman Office funding comes from the government budget.

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

  53g: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: Reports have sometimes been delayed and incomplete since 1999.

  53h: In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The ombudsman investigates when it receives complaints, and the government funds those investigative activities. The ombudsman can theoretically launch its own investigations but such authority has rarely been exercised.

References: Ombudsman Office Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M.

Peer Review Comments: The Ombudsman will initiate investigations when it receives complaints, but since 1999 has been slow to start investigations on its own initiative.

  53i: In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: The ombudsman's functions does not include imposing penalties. It makes recommendations that are to be enforced by the courts, public prosecutor and president of the Republic.

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office www.paclii.org/journals/JSPL/1997/1.html

  53j: In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies).
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Very little action is taken over the ombudsman's recommendations.

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office www.paclii.org/journals/JSPL/1997/1.html

  53k: In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: The Ombudsman acts on complaints, but even simple issues may take more than two months to resolve.

54 Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?
 
  54a: In law, citizens can access reports of the ombudsman(s).
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: Daily Post - It is only available in urban centers. Ombudsman office - On USP website and in the Ombudsman office

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

  54b: In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Ombudsman office - "One can access at own pace and time."

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: There have been increased delays in making reports publicly available since 1999.

  54c: In practice, citizens can access the reports of the ombudsman(s) at a reasonable cost.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Ombudsman office - Cost is 100 vt for a copy.

References: Daily Post Chief Editor Kierry M. Ombudsman Office

Peer Review Comments: Many reports are also available free online.

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