References: There is no comparable "ombudsman" for the entire federal U.S. government. Instead, similar duties are "balkanized" throughout government, with inspectors general overseeing the performance of each federal agency, the GAO auditing budgetary matters, the OGE providing outreach and guidance for executive officials, each congressional chamber having its own ethics committee, judicial conduct guided by the Judicial Conference, and the Department of Justice responsible for overall investigation (FBI) and prosecution (Public Integrity Section) of government officials. See U.S. Response to OAS Questionnaire and Web sites of the various aforementioned entities.

References: The lack of a truly independent ombudsman requires a "no" rating here, especially as certain corruption entities (e.g., congressional ethics committees are well known for being influenced by political considerations). However, the U.S.'s "balkanized" anti-corruption structure does prove somewhat helpful in that competing agencies and governmental branches possess incentives to pinpoint corruption elsewhere.

The Justice Department's inspectors are investigating whether former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales lied to Congress. "Justice Dept. Probing Whether Gonzales Lied, Washington Post, August 31, 2007

References: With the exception of the GAO, whose head is appointed to a 15 year term, none of the entity heads enjoy true independence. Congressional ethics chairmen might be another exception, although their independence typically allows them to be an obstacle to anti-corruption efforts instead of a catalyst.

The Justice Department's inspectors general are also investigating whether former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales lied to Congress. "Justice Dept. Probing Whether Gonzales Lied, Washington Post, August 31, 2007

References: With the exception of the GAO, whose head is appointed to a 15 year term, none of the entity heads enjoy true independence. Congressional ethics chairmen might be another exception, although their independence typically allows them to be an obstacle to anti-corruption efforts instead of a catalyst.

References: The lack of resources is rarely an obstacle for U.S. agencies (e.g., HHS inspector general's office received $40 million in 2006); it is rather the lack of independence or political will. [ LINK ]

References: Despite examples of increased activity in 2007 among inspectors general, they are generally appointed for political reasons and have well established party ties. See, for example, the longstanding relationship between DOJ's chief of the Public Integrity Section and Bush's Secretary of Homeland Security in: "Chertoff's Wake: The DHS chief's coattails extend to the administration's highest levels," Legal Times, January 23, 2006.

Peer Review Comments: See recent revelations about Department of State inspector general and political loyalty.

References: See above. As with staffing, most corruption-related agencies receive relatively stable funding from year to year.

References: Practices at different agencies vary significantly, making this difficult to score. GAO and DOJ reports are widely available, for example, while congressional ethics reports are almost always confidential. The administration's increased attempts to classify information also hamper full disclosure. [ LINK ]

References: As discussed elsewhere, investigations of high-level officials are often hindered by jurisdictional or political obstacles, although exceptions in 2007 are notable.

References: "Aggressive" would not be the adjective to characterize most enforcement examples in the U.S., but enforcement does occur. One of the most high profile cases of the past few years has been the conviction of David H. Safavian, former chief of staff of the General Services Administration, who despite his political connections was convicted in June 2006 of obstruction and making false statements.

Additionally, former Ohio Congressman Robert Ney is serving a 30-month sentence in federal prison in Morgantown, W.Va., for performing official acts for Jack Abramoff's lobbying clients between 2001 and 2004 in exchange for luxury vacation trips, sporting tickets, campaign contributions, expensive meals and thousands of dollars in gambling chips. "Ney's Chief of Staff Wore Wire, Was Key To Boss's Conviction," Washington Post, August 13, 2007

Peer Review Comments: Nit-picking here, but I don't think that the ombudsman equivalents "imposed" the penalties in these cases as stated in question 53i: "In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders." But the "ombudsman"' investigations into David Safavian, former chief of staff of the General Services Administration, and Robert Ney, former Ohio congressman, did lead to court convictions.

References: As the section detailing the GAO notes, the majority of GAO recommendations are followed by congressional and executive officials. In some cases, agencies are empowered to act on their own. For example, the Department of Justice's FBI investigates and then turns over evidence to the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section to prosecute. [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: The URL [ LINK ] doesn't work for me.

References: Most corruption-related agencies provide "hotlines" to report malfeasance. See, for example, the FBI's "Tips" program at: [ LINK ]. However, an agency's willingness to act relies greatly on the activity reported and the person involved.

References: DOJ's Public Integrity Section, for example, provides annual reports to Congress. [ LINK ]

References: Reports are available online. [ LINK ]

References: Reports available online at: [ LINK ]