According to Article 71 of the Constitution, elections to bodies of state authority and bodies of local self-government are free and are held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot.

The President, People's Deputies, deputies of Parliament of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, city mayors and deputies of self-government bodies are elected under the following operative laws: On Election of the President of Ukraine (Sept. 8, 1997), On Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine (Sept. 24, 1997), On the Central Election Commission (Dec. 17, 1997), On Elections of People's Deputies of the Crimean Autonomous Republic (Feb. 19, 1998), On Elections of Deputies of Local Radas and Village, Township, and City Chairmen (Jan. 14, 1998), and On All-Ukraine and Local Referendums (July 3, 1999).

References: The Constitution of Ukraine from June, 28, 1996.

Problems with legislative support for early election

Legislative amendments on the snap election have cleared up some political controversies in organization of early election. In particular, it deals with publication of election documents, formation and work of election commissions, opening of party accounts, agitation etc. They have positively resolved issues of voting for election commission members, who will be put on voters' lists at polling stations they shall work for.

However, unfortunately, some legislative amendments have been adopted as a result of political trading off, which significantly complicated the organization of the election process or rendered execution of some procedures impossible. CVU treats implementation of the voter turnout threshold as a reactionary norm. There have been no problems with voter turnout at national elections, and the threshold may leave room for intentional election disruptions.

Also, the CVU sees no mechanisms for implementation of provisions on filing data on persons leaving Ukraine by the State Border Guard Service with election commissions. It is unclear how boarder guard agencies should inform constitutional election commission on such voters, as traveling passports do not contain the Patronymic and Address fields. Also, we do not know how election commissions will use such data. It only complicates and impedes the election process. If such provision is implemented, voters who come back to Ukraine in the last three days prior to the polling day inclusively will be restricted in suffrage, as they will be excluded form voters' lists.

Limitation of rights of voters, who stay abroad on the polling day, also makes up reactionary norm. Voting procedures for such voters were complicated significantly during 2006 election (they were required to appeal to diplomatic agencies in advance). Now, they should be registered by consular agencies in order to cast their votes. New amendments impose limitations on about 5 million voters.

The parliament has repealed the provision allowing invalidation of election results at individual polling station when an observer or a journalist is driven out. It allows them to throw out observers from a polling station and performs voting and vote tabulation without any control. Such technology was widely applied at the presidential election in 2004.

References: The Constitution of Ukraine from June, 28, 1996.

According to the poll, people were asked whether they would participate in the elections. 88 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer. And how many voters do we have -- 67 percent. It means that people were not given the possibility to express their political position."

"20 percent of votes were a falsification: false signatures, filling ballot-boxes with voting papers etc. Therefore I state that the Central Election Committee failed to organize the elections in a proper way and didn't give people a possibility to vote. There were 88 percent of potential voters, but only few could use their right to vote."

References: Interviews with Lyudmila Suprun, former MP

Peer Review Comments: All adult citizens can vote. There are reasonable provisions for overseas voters, detainees, and military personnel. However, few polling stations are accessible for persons with disabilities and there are no ballots in braille.

ENEMO observers noted numerous cases in which where citizens were voting outside of the polling booths or where families or friends voted in the same booth. This was, among other reasons, related to voters being unable to find an empty booth after receiving the ballots. Observers noted several cases when impatient voters marked their ballot outside the booth to save time. There seemed to be no pattern of forcing voters to violate the secrecy of the ballot. Nonetheless, it is vital for maintaining trust in the election system that voters mark their ballots in secret.

References: The OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine [ LINK ]

Ombudsman office in Ukraine CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTORAL RIGHTS OF THE UKRAINIAN CITIZENS [ LINK ]

Ukrainska Pravda "PM Voting To Be Secret" [ LINK ]

European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations International Observation Mission Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 2006

Peer Review Comments: The above criticisms are accurate but do not refer to the secrecy of the ballot, which is overwhelmingly provided. Instances of public voting have been witnessed in rural areas, universities, and among military personnel.

Background The Council had been basically paralyzed through political dissent for some time when the original resolution was issued calling early elections. The resolution revoking the elections was immediately appealed by the extreme right wing party VO Svoboda, which claimed very publicly that BYuT -- the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko -- wanted to cancel the elections because it was afraid that it would lose very badly. In the first weeks of March and basically until the day before the elections were due, it remained unclear whether they would take place. However, the Lviv Court of Appeal on March 14 upheld the original ruling of the Ternopil Regional District Administrative Court ordering that the elections be held.

Failure to respect rule of law and lack of stability remain the underlying problems that need to be solved.

Ukraine could have easily avoided a second pre-term election in two years. Zerkalo Nedeli's editor Yulia Mostovaya explained the reason why the president was so insistent on an election rather than a new coalition: it was the only sure way to get rid of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister. Frankly speaking, that is what all the fuss is really about.

The publication of the president's decree dissolving the Verkhovna Rada and resolutions from the Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers declaring this decree illegitimate have driven the political and legal situation in Ukraine to a dead end. The inactivity of the Constitutional Court makes it improbable that there might be an immediate review of the Constitutional appeal by deputies to determine the legitimacy of the president's decree.

Ignoring rule of law

This situation has arisen because all branches of government in Ukraine have been ignoring the principle of rule of law and the rules of honest political competition. This could be seen in the way the government failed to carry out the provisions of the Manifesto of National Unity that it had signed onto and the fact that all government representatives - including the president of Ukraine - failed to respect court rulings. This trend is also evident in the Verkhovna Rada's deliberate adoption of laws that were in clear violation of constitutional norms and even grossly violated the legislature's own rules of procedure and, finally, in the way that the coalition has been trying to expand its numbers to a constitutional majority in ways that are not allowed by the constitution.

All these actions have been cutting into the level of trust among Ukrainian voters in the institutions of government, continuing the cycle of legal nihilism and the scoffing of the law at all levels in Ukrainian society.

Rada -- no judge of constitutionality

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving the current legislature as is within his competence to do, as stated in Article 106 of the constitution. Until the Constitutional Court hands down a ruling as to the constitutionality of this decree, it must be carried out by all government bodies, their officials and elected officials on all the territory of Ukraine.

The Verkhovna Rada and government are not qualified or authorized to evaluate the constitutionality of a presidential action, as this is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Court. Any statements about the unconstitutionality of this decree and the impossibility of carrying it out amount to an usurpation of state power.

The conditions for resolving this political crisis are: -all government and administrative bodies must strictly observe all legal norms, while the law enforcement branch and defense forces must refrain from interfering in the political process and maintain law and order in the country; -the Verkhovna Rada and government must carry out in full all the measures declared in the presidential decree on the pre-term suspension of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada; -the Constitutional Court must render a ruling as soon as possible regarding the legitimacy of the presidential decree; -should the presidential decree be declared unconstitutional prior to the holding of a pre-term VR election, the election campaign must be immediately halted and the work of the Fifth Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada resumed in full force; -should the presidential decree be declared unconstitutional after the holding of pre-term elections, the results must be recognized and the Sixth Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada formed on that basis. In both instances, all political and moral responsibility for having taken an nconstitutional action shall lie with the president of Ukraine.

Re-elections will not resolve the problem of relations among the centers of power in Ukraine. The next coalition may be little different from the current one and it will, once again, have to deal with the same issues: first of all, the failure to uphold the principle of rule of law and respect for the law, the rejection of democratic mechanisms for conflict resolution and a consensual approach to consolidating interests.

Similar challenges will remain

Any future coalition will be faced with the same challenges - the lack of a comprehensible state policy and priorities in many spheres, the unreformed government bureaucracy and the lack of reform in the civil service. In this sense, re-elections will not remove any of the evident problems but only postpone their resolution.

Still, in a situation of political conflict, re-election allows politicians to turn for a mandate of trust to voters, the only source and bearer of power, and to confirm their rightness through the support of the population. Voters themselves are the final recourse for resolving conflicts and politicians must turn to them when they cannot resolve their conflicts in any other way.

References: International Center for Policy Studies, Kiev Whether the deadlock is ended by elections or not, failure to respect the rule of law and lack of stability remain the underlying problems that need to be solved [ LINK ]

Early Election in Ukraine: Dangerous Experiment Igor BURAKOVSKY (Director, Institute of Economic Studies and Political Consultations) Zerkalo nedeli # 38 (717) 11, Oct. 17, 2008

VALERIY PYSARENKO, a parliament member from BYuT faction

Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union [ LINK ]

Committee of Voters of Ukraine CVU expert assessment of possibility of holding the early election of Kiev city mayor and Kiev city council's deputies [ LINK ]

The provision of Article 10.1 of the Law of Ukraine "On political parties in Ukraine" on the necessity of support for the establishment of a political party by signatures of no less than 10,000 citizens of Ukraine is the guarantee of implementation of the constitutional fundamentals of the activity of one of the forms of public association and a guarantee of ensuring a real national status of a political force and equal possibilities for all political parties.

References: The Constitution of Ukraine from June, 28, 1996. Law on political parties in Ukraine

References: The Constitution of Ukraine from June, 28, 1996. Election law

References: National Institute for Strategic Studies; Political analyst Vadym Karasyov

If it is considered as totality of political parties which exist in the country independently of institutionalization form according to the current legislation (V. Jevdokimov) then there is a party system in Ukraine. But other scientific definitions in general give more extensive notion of the party system as a political space, which consists of political parties and regulates in a certain way the totality of relations of parties with each other and other components of the political system of society. Besides, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian parties do not meet criteria of classical parties which are: presence of manageable organization, penetrating the society, obtaining ideology, attracting potential supporters; and a leader personifying the party and exercising real guidance of it; efficient activity of this organization on asserting its members' and possible supporters' interests; sufficient quantity of supporters who legally support this organization with their actions.

As a result of historical and political development and first of all the state establishment by incomplete forming of a political nation, combination of too wide power authorities of the president by virtual prevalence of the majority election system, very specific parties and a party system were shaped in Ukraine. Its main differences from classical party systems is a big quantity of parties which are constantly being modified, dissociated, associated, reorganized, that caused extreme instability of the party system. Parties were organized from above and served mainly as democracy imitation. Their ideological foundations were constantly washed out, deviation from left national-democratic trend took place, the balance between ideology and regional belonging was shifted toward the latter. Especially these processes accelerated after the elections in 1998 when business representatives started actively participating in party building. This in turn caused the strengthening of influence of personal, financial-economic, regional-cultural and somewhat of ethic factors on the life of a party, that finally resulted in turning the party into a structure whose main function was promotion to power or keeping in power representatives of separate small and big financial-political groups -- thus virtually transforming them into components of this FPG or business-projects. Consequently there was structural weakness of most parties because their political activity had secondary meaning in conditions when for many parties personal leadership was decisive. For most Ukrainian parties, the absence of strategic behavior was typical. Parties did not usually pursue first of all long-term state goals, but narrow-corporative or even personal goals of individual leaders. The parties did not obtain wide social basis (sofa-like or made-up parties) and were internally divided into affinity groups. 

Overall, the general character of Ukrainian parties significantly differs from the idea of mass parties established in the West. If for the West a mass party is a party being widely supported by the society and accumulating different interests, in Ukraine mass character was achieved by hiring in a strict corporate structure employees-performers, who must have fulfilled orders from the center for hiring new members. As a rule, a membership in parties concurred with the work in groups related to one or another party. All this resulted in break-up of relations between parties and society and also between society and power. The important disadvantage of the party system in general and party building in particular is the absence of a serious scientifically provided program for party manpower training as a component of party building. Instead of this, a dominating tendency of the party building during last years was progressive growth of importance of political technologies and especially availability of media-resources.

Consequently, it is possible to talk conditionally about the party system in Ukraine on the current stage. In 2006, Ukrainian parties in classical and close to it meaning turned to secondary participants of the political process. Its real participants became FIG with their financial and media potential. The role of the parties was reduced to tools in the fight of FIG for the power and the following redistributing of country resources. Hence it is appropriate to classify the existing parties in Ukraine not by ideological but by functional features.

Three conditional groups can be outlined. The first consists of so called quasi-parties. Their typical feature is exploiting the rest of the left and national-democratic ideology. The biggest of them (CPU and SPU) have got acknowledged leaders and branchy network of organizations, but their ideology taken from the past does not attract new supporters. On condition that economic indexes improve and public well-being grows, the reduction of their social base is inevitable. The current elections proved this tendency -- a virtual failure of CPU and voices reduction by SPU in comparison with 2002, plus non-entry of the Block of Kostenko-Pljushch into Verkhovna Rada.

In the future, CPU and SPU will keep their heads above water only at the expense of new investment bosses, who in order not to incur additional costs would want to use a famous brand and ready infrastructure. This is extremely important for SPU, which after a well-known coalition maneuver lost a significant number of its supporters. According to results of sociological polls conducted at the end of 2006 by the private company R&B Group, a level of trust in SPU was only 2 percent. However CPU's indexes slightly improved and reached 4 percent. But it does not change the situation about left parties in general. The latest tendencies show CPU and SPU living their last days in a current form. In the grimmest scenario, they will disappear bit by bit from the political arena and will be replaced by tougher social-populist projects which will gamble on spirits not on interests.

Regarding extra-parliamentary parties of national-democratic direction, they will at best form a new right-oriented united political force. A very important part in this process plays the future fate of the block NSNU: whether it remains as such or whether it will finally split into two parts -- political and business. At worst, they will be kept out of the parliament.

The second group consists of parties which are components of the leading FIG. With left and national-democratic parties leaving in the past, two new poles of the party system are growing ripen: the Party of regions and BJuT, which aspires to the leading positions in the Western and Central Ukraine.

However, BJuT is still not self-determined ideologically. If in the Party of regions there are hesitations in choosing a model of liberal or socio-democratic principals with elements of pro-Russian geopolitical orientation, BJuT does not yet have a definite ideological orientation.

References: Prospects of development of party system in Ukraine Research and Branding Group [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: In practice, most individuals are able to run for office. There are some administrative impediments and substantial financial difficulties for an average citizen to run and it is almost impossible for him/her to win a political office of any consequence, though.

References: Parties, Parliamentary Opposition, And Majority in One Package Newpaper Den' [ LINK ]