| Ukraine: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 63 |
| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 50 |
| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 38 |
| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 92 |
| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 0 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 23: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Human rights and citizens' freedoms are protected by the Constitution and any infringement can be challenged through the court. Everyone is guaranteed the right to challenge in court any decisions, actions or failure to act by bodies of state power, local self-government and civil servants. Everyone has the right to appeal for protection of his/her rights and freedoms to the ombudsman. After exhausting all domestic legal remedies, everyone has the right to appeal for the protection of his or her rights and freedoms to relevant international judicial institutions or relevant international organizations to which Ukraine is a member or a participant. According to the Constitution, everyone has the right to compensation, at the expense of national or local government, for material and/or moral damages inflicted by unlawful decisions, actions or failure or authorities to act. References: Art. 55, 56, Constitution of Ukraine
|
||||||||
| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 24a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: In practice, the chief executive rarely or almost never give reasons for their policy decisions. References: www.pravda.com.ua
|
||||||||
| 24b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Civil Processal Code of Ukraine, Art. 248 Law "On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine" (1996), Art.61
|
||||||||
| 24c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Interview with independent experts
|
||||||||
| 24d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Interviews with representative of ministry of economy
|
||||||||
| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 25a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The president enjoys the right of immunity during his/her term of authority. The president may be removed from office only by two-thirds of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) through the procedure of impeachment in the event that he/she commits state treason or another gross crime. But this process is not clear and very complicated. References: Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 105; Art. 111
|
||||||||
| 25b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There is no regulation in Ukrainian law that gives ministerial-level officials any immunity from prosecution. But in practice there are no cases when ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. References: Constitution of Ukraine Art. 24
|
||||||||
| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 26a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The president is required to file an asset disclosure form. References: Law "On Civil Service," Art.6 Law "On Fighting Corruption," Art.13
|
||||||||
| 26b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: All top officials (rank 1 and 2) are required to file asset disclosure forms. References: Law "On Civil Service," Art.6 Law "On Fighting Corruption," Art.13
|
||||||||
| 26c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There is no direct regulation concerning gifts and hospitality for the executive. The Law on Fighting Against Corruption says only that any gift or award gained illegally is a corrupt action. References: Law "On Fighting Corruption" (1995), Art.1
|
||||||||
| 26d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law "On Civil Service"
|
||||||||
| 26e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There are only restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector when they are appointed the government position. References: Interview with member of Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine
|
||||||||
| 26f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There is no restriction in the law. References: Interviews with MP Levchenko K. Kiev. Aug. 4, 2007
|
||||||||
| 26g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Interview with MP of Ukraine
|
||||||||
| 26h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: They are never audited. References: Interviews with MP Levchenko K. Kiev. Aug. 4, 2007
Peer Review Comments: Some journalists come up with semi-investigative pieces detailing the inconsistencies in such disclosures and their disconnection with reality. However, such articles usually only elicit smiles and shrugs from the public accustomed to rampant corruption, meaning to say: and what else did you expect?
|
||||||||
| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 27a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The law does not demand the head of state to make information about his/her assets available for public information on a regular basis. The law "On Election of the President of Ukraine" requires asset disclosure of a presidential candidate ("a presidential candidate's declaration of assets and income received in the previous year") to be submitted to the Central Election Commission (CEC) in package with a formal application for registration as a candidate for the race. The accuracy of the information provided in the declaration can be verified by the State Taxation Administration at the order of the CEC. If the information is found to be deliberately distorted or false, the CEC denies the candidate's registration. If the distortions are found after the official registration, the CEC has five days to request that the Supreme Court of Ukraine to abolish the registration. If the Supreme Court rules to abolish the candidate's registration, the court must initiate a criminal investigation into the matter. The CEC publishes declarations of all presidential candidates in the state's official newspapers, the "Holos Ukrainy" and the "Uriadvovyi Kurrier," within three days of their submission. References: The Law "On Election of the President of Ukraine" Art. 22, Art. 29
Peer Review Comments: President Yushchenko initiated a practice of yearly disclosures of assets by major government officials. However, figures provided in these public disclosures are sometimes questionable if not plainly ridiculous, often underrepresenting the actual assets.
|
||||||||
| 27b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Official site of the President of Ukraine www.prisident.gov.ua
Peer Review Comments: Hard to provide a judgement based on the available data.
|
||||||||
| 27c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Public access to the asset disclosure records of the head of state is free of charge. References: www.president.gov.ua
Peer Review Comments: Ministers' disclosure records are often published in the media, including online media
|
||||||||
| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 28: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Interview with member of opposition party Interview of Ukrainian politologiest [ LINK ] "Ukraine: totalitarian way of development as alternative of democracy" [ LINK ] "Expert ploitical project" [ LINK ] Vasil' Kremenets interview to newspaper "Day"
Peer Review Comments: The practice of using government funds and resources to support party (or individuals within a party) is widespread, but a considerable degree of continuity among civil servants in ministries and the presidential secretariat means that state interests are not entirely merged with party interests. Also it is important to note that parties themselves are poorly developed and comprise heterogeneous interests, that floor-crossing is common and political loyalties fickle, so the extent we can ascribe agency to parties is somewhat limited.
|
||||||||



