| Turkey: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 83 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | 67 |
| 84 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | 54 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 83 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | |||||||
| 83a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: A general aptitude test must be taken in order to be eligible for public service. However, oral exams are open to (political) patronage/clientilism. It is widely shared view held by by many, including the government-party supporters, that many of the recent appointments lack professional qualifications. References: Kayhan Mutlu, "Problems of Nepotism and Favouritism in the Police Organization in Turkey," International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 23 (3), 2000, 38-89. "Bürokratlarin atanma taktigi" (Promotion Tactics of Bureaucrats), Patronlar Dunyasi, [ LINK ] "Kamu Personeli Kanun Tasarisi Taslagi Ile Ilgili Degerlendirme" (Evaluation on the Draft law on Public Personnel),kayaum.politics.ankara.edu.tr/KAYAUMgorusu.doc TESEV, "Kamu Personel Yönetimi Reformu (Sorunlar - Öneriler)" (Reform of Public Personnel Management), [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: Recently, the appointments of judges are very much politicized.
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| 83b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: This year (2008) total allocation for public order and security services increased up to 13,375,000 new Turkish liras (US$8.5 million) as being the fifth largest budget. Compared to last year (2007) total budget allocation increased about 1 million new Turkish liras (US$641,930). References: General Directorate of Budget and Financial Control, 2008 Report on Budgetary Realizations Central Government (Y1l1 Merkezi Yönetim Bütçe Gerçekle_meleri ve Beklentiler Raporu,Temmuz 2008), [ LINK ]
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| 83c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: Law enforcement agencies basically consist of the police, the gendarmerie and the coast guard, all of which are affiliated with the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The Department of Security, namely police, is especially open to political influence by means of appointments, promotions and assignments. References: A. Gani Yildirim, Polis-Politikaci Iliskisi Üzerine Bir Arastirmanin Düsündürdükleri, Cagin Polisi Dergisi, 1. [ LINK ] Kayhan Mutlu, "Problems of Nepotism and Favouritism in the Police Organization in Turkey," International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 23 (3), 2000, 38-89. Prof. Dr. 0briahim Cerrah, Police Academy, Ankara, November 2008.
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| 84 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 84a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Ethics Council is the only mechanism for citizen complaints about police actions. It is affiliated with the Prime Ministry and has limited resources. According to law, it has investigative functions over the actions of superior civil servants but they are not carried out consistently. Parliamentary commissions can only make inquiries on the complaints and report them to the parliament. Therefore, I can say there is no truly effective and independent complaint mechanism. The Ombudsman Law is not yet in effect. However, in addition to the Ethics Council, there exists a Petition Committee of the Grand National Assembly. Scholarly works and non-governmental organization reports emphasize that these mechanisms are not very effective. References: Ethics Council for Public Service, Law No. 5176 on the Establishment of the Ethics Council for Public Service and Amendment to Some Laws: [ LINK ] 1982 Constitution, Article 74, and Law 3071 on the Right to Petition: [ LINK ] Human Rights Committee of the Grand National Assembly, Law 3686: [ LINK ] Fatih Karaosmanoglu, Güvenlik Güclerinin Demokratik Hesap Verebilirligi ve Avrupa Insan Haklari Mahkemesinin Satik v. Türkiye Karari, [ LINK ] Türkiye - Uluslararasi Af Örgütü Genel Sekreteri Irene Khan baskanliginda bir heyetin Türkiye Ziyareti nedeniyle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Basbakanina Bilgi Notu, Subat 2004, [ LINK ]
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| 84b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: Due to heavy workload and insufficient personnel, responding to complaints and petitions regarding law enforcement may take more than a year. References: Polisler de saniklardan sikayetçi, [ LINK ] Omer Faruk Osmaneminagaoglu, Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor, September 2008. Atilla Sav, member of Ankara Bar Association, September 2008.
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| 84c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to Law No. 657 and other special laws, public officers can be subject to the investigation and the discipline mechanisms of their agencies and prosecuted by public prosecutor with the permission of the relevant superior in cases of violation of corruption-related laws. References: Law No. 657 on Public Servants, Articles 124-145, [ LINK ] Law No. 2803 on the Organization, Duties and Responsibilities of the Gendermarie, Articles 15-17, [ LINK ] Law No. 5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime Law, Article 19, [ LINK ]
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| 84d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: At the request of a superior or in response to complaints by citizens, disciplinary authorities, with the support of inspectors, conduct an investigation into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. An internal auditor prepares routine performance reports. References: A. Gani Yildirim, "Polis-Politikaci Iliskisi Üzerine Bir Arastirmanin Düsündürdükleri," Cagin Polisi Dergisi, 1. Kayhan Mutlu, "Problems of Nepotism and Favoritism in The Police Organization in Turkey," International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 23 (3), 2000, 38-89. Omer Faruk Osmaneminagaoglu, Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor, Ankara, May 2008. Bulent Tarhan, Chief Inspector, Prime Ministry, Ankara, September 2008.
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| 84e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to Law 657, public servants, including law enforcement officers, can be investigated with the permission of their superior authority. Provisions of the Law No. 5065 contradict those in Law No. 657. References: Law 657 on Public Servants, Articles 10-13: [ LINK ] Law 4483 on the Trial of Public Servants and Other Public Employees, Article 3: [ LINK ] Law 5237 on Penal Law, various articles, [ LINK ] Law No. 5065 Concerning Ratification of Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption: [ LINK ] Law No. 5065.
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| 84f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public opinion surveys of the incidence of bribery among police and other law enforcement officials provide enough evidence to support the given score. References: Semdinli Report of the Human Rights Investigation Committee of the Grand National Assembly, [ LINK ].
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