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2008 Assessment

Turkey: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Turkey: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Budget Processes
Indicators		Score
40	Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?	75
41	Can citizens access the national budgetary process?	50
42	Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?	100
43	Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?	33

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

40a: In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: 1982 Constitution Article 162 and 163: [ LINK ]

Law No. 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control Article 19: [ LINK ]

40b: In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings. <p>50 Score Criteria: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive\'s personal budget, or other expenses. <p>0 Score Criteria: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.$

Comments: It is argued that the government refers to a "hidden budget" from time to time. Article 24 of Law No. 5018 On Public Financial Control Article 24 ([ LINK ]) enables the government (prime minister) to use such resources for generally defined purposes without discussing exactly where the money will be used.

References: M. Kamil Mutluer, Butce Hukuku, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, 2005.

Seref Iba, Deputy Director, Department of Rules and Resolutions, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), September 2008.

Law No. 5018, Article 24.

40c: In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

Score:

100

Comments: The Plan and Budget Committee of the Grand National Assembly has little capacity to monitor the budget process. However, during the debates, members of the Assembly can initiate changes in consultation with the government. Reforms are needed to make the budgetary system more transparent and accountable.

References: M. Kamil Mutluer, Butce Hukuku, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, 2005.

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ]

Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

41a: In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

Score:

100

Comments: Article 161 of the constitution says that the budget law includes only budgetary provisions. However, the government added an article titled "provisions not to be enforced partially or fully." By means of this filter article, the government is entitled to enforce or not to enforce some provisions of other laws within the scope of annual budget laws. Many of these general provisions are vague and unidentifiable. This violates the legal systematic order and causes disputes. This procedure is also unconstitutional: The Constitutional Court annulled it and decided on a stay of execution of many of these "filter articles" upon the appeal of eligible actors (1982 Constitution, Article 148).

References: M. Kamil Mutluer, Butce Hukuku, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, 2005.

Seref Iba, TBMM Butce Maratonu ve Rekorlar Uzerine (On the TGNA Budget Marathon and Records), Yavuz Sabuncu'ya Armagan, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2005.

TESEV, Mali Saydamlik Izleme Raporu, II, [ LINK ]

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ]

1982 Constitution, Articles 148 and 161: [ LINK ]

41b: In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

Score:

100

Comments: It is not legal for citizens or CSOs to provide input to the budgeting process. However, public officers in charge of drafting budgetary items consider the needs of the people as a whole through several research projects.

A few influential non-governmental organizations may influence politicians or political parties that are represented in the parliament regarding the allocation of funds for their priorities in social and economic matters. However, there is no regular lobbying in this respect. Inclusion of the CSOs in lawmaking process is an important issue in upcoming parliamentary reform. In fact, the participatory model had been emphasized by the Emergency Action Plans of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments in 2003. However, there was no effective result.

References: M. Kamil Mutluer, Butce Hukuku, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, 2005.

TESEV, Mali Saydamlik Izleme Raporu II, [ LINK ]

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ]

41c: In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

Score:

100

Comments: According to the analytical budget approach, all budget items must be public and transparent. This is especially true for the investment budget. Current expenditures are allocated as general items.

References: M. Kamil Mutluer, Butce Hukuku, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, 2005.

TESEV, Mali Saydamlik Izleme Raporu, II, ://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/malisaydamlikrapor2son.pdf

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ]

Is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

42: In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

Score:

YES

Comments: The Plan and Budget Committee provides a certain degree of oversight over public expenditures as well.

Public funds are subject to control by the Audit Court on behalf of the Grand National Assembly. According to Article 165 of the 1982 Constitution, there is a legislative committee on State Economic Enterprises which controls the accounts of state economic enterprises only.

References: 1982 Constitution Articles 164 and 165: [ LINK ]

Law No. 832 on Audit Court, Article 28/A: [ LINK ].

Law No. 3346 on Supervision of the State Economic Enterprises and Funds by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, [ LINK ]

Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

43a: In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

Score:

100

Comments: Each department head in the central government is legally required to submit regular reports. However, these reports are not consistent and lack of details.

References: TESEV, Mali Saydamlik Izleme Raporu, II, ://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/malisaydamlikrapor2son.pdf

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ] Sevgi Korkut, Parlamenter Denetim Kapsaminda Kamu Iktisadi Tesebbuslerinin Denetimi: TBMM KIT Komisyonunun Denetim Proseduru ve KIT`lerin Denetiminde Gelecege Yonelik Ongoruler (Oversight of State Economic Enterprises Within the Scope of Parliamentary Oversight: Oversight Procedure of Commission on State Economic Enterprises of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and Prospects for the Oversight of SEE)www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2007/sayi6/parlamenter_denetim_kapsaminda.pdf

Law No. 5018 on Public Financial Control, [ LINK ]

43b: In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee -- including opposition party members -- are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee\'s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee. <p>50 Score Criteria: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members\' ability to shape the committee's activities. <p>0 Score Criteria: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.$

Comments: According to Article 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly, political parties are represented in the committees in proportion to the number of seats they control in the general assembly. By definition, the distribution of seats in the committees leads to a partisan setting and the majority of the government party( or parties) dominates in the committees.

Non-partisan, autonomous and integrated committee action is rare. For example, it consistently happens that committees act uniformly when a matter related to deputies arises.

References: TESEV, Mali Saydamlik Izleme Raporu, II, ://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/malisaydamlikrapor2son.pdf

2008 TEPAV Mali Izleme Haziran - Temmuz - Agustos Raporu, 04 Ekim 2008, [ LINK ]

Kemal Ozsemerci, Chief Auditor, Audit Court, September 2008.

Bulent Tarhan, Chief Inspector, Prime Ministry, September 2008.

Article 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly.

43c: In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Score:

100

Comments: The Parliamentary Plan and Budget Committee does not have any direct investigative powers in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). However, it may request documentation from the relevant ministry to clarify matters regarding financial irregularities.

Otherwise, any irregularity discovered by the committee may be further investigated by an "inquiry committee," especially if the case is significant enough or might cause a significant harm to the state and society. The general assembly of the TGNA decides whether to form an inquiry committee.

References: Kemal Ozsemerci, Chief Auditor, Audit Court, February 2008.

Bulent Tarhan, Chief Inspector, Prime Ministry, February 2008.