Peer Reviewer 1:
I would welcome clarification on the case where people had to pay money prior to receiving communion at Mass. All Sunday Masses in any Catholic church anywhere involve a collection about 10 minutes prior to Communion -- this is how chapels have always been maintained and from where clergy derive their living expenses (priests don't receive a salary, they are dependent on private donations, including Sunday collection.) Is the money being sought in this case in addition to the usual collection I outlined above, and linked directly to the receipt of Communion? If so, then this is unorthodox practice and can be reported directly to the Bishop either in Dili or Baucau, and the parishioners at the church can do this themselves.
Also, it is not an illegal fee for a 'catechist' to fix a baptism certificate -- at least depending on whether the catechist is a layperson with an alternate income or not. Usually these services do not have a mandatory fee as such, but again, to give an example, I attended my nephew's baptism some weeks ago, and the priest was given 50 for performing the ceremony. It is customary to do so, and is part and parcel of separation of church and state, as priests do not receive a salary. However the US$50 amount involved in the case mentioned in Timor Leste is exorbitant, given the average income level in the country, and if the catechist involved was a layperson with a regular income (even by local standards), then the charging of the fee is questionable.
The issue of cronyism and nepotism at top level could do with more mention. From 2002 to 2007, the FRETILIN-led government stuffed the civil service with supporters. Now, given that FRETILIN is in opposition, is there any clarity to be had on whether the new government has sought to plant its own supporters in the bureaucracy and remove FRETILIN-appointed incumbents?
The point made about Salsinha and the deeper implications for public perceptions of corruption and impunity is telling and perhaps deserves more analysis, elsewhere if appropriate. The same applies for the points made about people's tacit acceptance of corruption as fuel for continued sharp practice and graft.
Peer Reviewer 2:
The corruption examples presented in the report are trivial, and the author himself acknowledges this with the following comment: A more serious case occurred in early 2006. I find that some context is needed: the Fretilin government was in power from 2002 to June 2007. The following data refer to this government's period in office: the World Bank's Governance Matters 2007 indicators record a score of Control of Corruption of -0.11 and ranks Timor Leste at 43 percent, with 100 percent being the least corrupt. The Millennium Challenge Corporation rates this as a failing score because it is below the peer country median of 50 percent.
The Fretilin government was voted out and the new government took office on Aug. 6, 2007. This government, under former President Xanana Gusamo, came to office with a strong anti-corruption commitment, and it has already introduced a new procurement and auditing system with significant anti-corruption measures. (See IV Constitutional Government of East Timor delivers 2008 State Budget for Timor-Leste, REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR-LESTE MINISTÉRIO DAS FINANÇAS, Dili, 10 December, 2007)
Large scale corruption is not reported on. See the following articles for examples:
1. U.N. Finds Fraud, Mismanagement in Peacekeeping; The Washington Post, Dec. 18, 2007
...Singapore has also criticized the task force for allegedly trampling the rights of one of its nationals, Andrew Toh, a senior U.N. official who said he was denied access to legal counsel.
What bothers us is the task force itself seems to think it can be exempted from the same standard that it wants to apply to other people, said Singapore's U.N. ambassador, Vanu Gopala Menon.
Appleton maintains that there is no recognized right to counsel for internal investigations and that Toh never requested it. There was absolutely no transgression of due process rights, he said.
Toh is the target of a lengthy investigation into whether he improperly helped two Peruvian generals and a Canadian company, Skylink Aviation, secure a multimillion-dollar contract to lease two MI-26 Peruvian government helicopters for the U.N. mission in East Timor. The task force has been unable to prove that Toh accepted bribes, but it says it cannot close the case until it gets access to Skylink's Swiss bank account used in the helicopter deal.
Toh was recently demoted, fined two months' pay, and charged with misconduct for not fully cooperating with investigators and not complying with an obligation to disclose all of his financial holdings. They have taken 22 months to look into allegations of corruption, they've scoured the world, wasted thousands of man-hours, spent millions of dollars, and they are unable to find anything, Toh said.
2. Anti-Corruption Specialist Assists Provedors Office in Reviewing Cases (May 7, 2007)
USAID, through its partner Management Sciences for Development (MSD), recently enlisted the expertise of an anti-corruption investigation specialist to assist the Provedors Office in reviewing its backlog of cases for appropriate action and in the process improve the skills of the staff to conduct preliminary reviews. Technical assistance by Mr. Nasir Hadi, formerly with both the Human Rights and the Anti-Corruption Commissions of Malaysia, enabled the Office to conduct a preliminary evaluation of 30 cases in the anti-corruption and good governance units. The Provedor is an independent institution established by the Constitution with three mandates human rights, anti-corruption and good governance. USAID, through MSD, has supported the office since it was established in 2005.
http://timor-leste.usaid.gov/TimorLesteUpdates.htm
Peer Reviewer 3:
The author raises some very good examples of how ordinary citizens (and even foreign nationals) suffer from an unregulated workplace, whereby public servants and local authorities, including the Church, can charge fees for services. As there are no controls regarding the rates charged, and as many comply without complaining to a higher authority (probably in the name of expedience), such behaviors set bad precedents for the future and increase social disparities by placing a significant burden on a segment of the population. The author demonstrates very well how this burden on the average citizens takes its toll.
The report also touches upon other important examples of alleged corruption, but it would be useful if it explained in more detail the scope of abuses in the country. For example, the issues of protection racquets and high-level involvement in cross-boarder smuggling are quite serious, but it is unclear whether these are predominantly the actions of individuals who benefit from a slow and challenged legal system, or are systemic abuses within ministries and departments that reflect standard operating procedures.
Similarly, the report alludes to corruption, nepotism and collusion but mainly provides examples of corruption. It may be worth noting how these concepts are perceived within Timorese cultural norms. There seems to be a conflict between the desire, on the one hand, for post-independence Timor-Leste to be rid of what the author suggests were corrupt practices of the Indonesian system, and the societal pressures to aid and assist members of ones family.
Finally, I would distinguish between corruption cases where significant sums of money are siphoned into private hands and cases where poor public policy results in compensating behaviors. For example, local village leaders who charge administrative fees for services provided to their constituents, while not regulated and not authorized, could be considered a legitimate benefit for one who is elected to serve and perform certain functions but does not receive compensation for these efforts (salary) from the state. Furthermore, the state does not provide regular information to local authorities on allowable fee structures. Local authority behavior is therefore likely considered by those who charge fees to be an entitlement for service-delivery. Poor checks and balance systems contribute to abuses, as do decentralization policies that do not provide livelihoods to those performing services on behalf of the state.
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