| Qatar: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 26 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 0 |
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 44 |
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 0 |
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 0 |
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 0 |
| 31 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 0 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 26 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 26: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
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Comments: Law No. 7 (2007) that governs administrative disputes allows any individual who has been affected by a discriminatory administrative decision to file a claim with the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court (within the Court of First Instance) will hear cases concerning government infringements of citizen rights. However, according to Art. 3 of this law, although the law permits persons with civil grievances to seek redress in the court system, the majority of administrative decisions made by the executive authority are immune from judicial jurisdiction, as well as decisions made according to the laws governing private institutions and corporations and laws governing print and broadcast media. Also immune from judicial jurisdiction are decisions made according to Law 17 of 2002 for the Protection of Society, Arts. 1-2 of which permit the imprisonment of citizens for "crimes against public morals" for a period of two weeks to six months while awaiting trial. References: Article 3 of Law No. 1 (2007) regulating Administrative Disputes. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 27a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to a local academic, the chief executive, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, does not take questions from the media about policy decisions. In order to make a policy decision, however, the Emir issues an executive order, known as an Emiri Decree, whereby some level of justification is provided. Emiri Decrees are considered law. References: Interview with Majed Al-Ansari, Assistant Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University. Interview date and location: March 24, 2010 at Qatar University.
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| 27b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: Art. 8(1) of Law 7 (2007) concerning Administrative Disputes Settlement permits the creation of the Administrative Department of Appeals to review grievances concerning actions of the executive branch. These grievances can only be raised within 60 days by a party who is directly affected by the executive action in question. However, according to Article 3 of this same law, although persons with civil grievances are permitted to seek redress in the court system, the majority of administrative decisions made by the executive authority are immune from judicial jurisdiction. References: Article 8(1) of Law No. 7 (2007) regulating Administrative Disputes. Available at: [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: I think a Yes or No answer is difficult in this case, as clearly proven in the comments provided above. The decisions of the top executive of the country are not disputable, as well as the majority of decisions. This leaves a small room for judicial review.
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| 27c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: Aside from the many executive decisions outlined in Article 3 of Law No. 7 (2007) that are not subject to judicial jurisdiction, the actions of the Head of State (the Emir), his family and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) may be reviewed by the judiciary. In practice, however, BTI reports that, as Qatar is run by an autocratic system, it is "highly unlikely that a case against a member of the executive would be brought to court" (2009:8). It is crucial to note that the judiciary's reluctance to review the actions of the Emir are less a result of direct political interference and more due to the fact that the majority of judges in Qatar are foreign nationals. All foreigners working in Qatar are bound by the sponsor system, which restricts workers' freedom of movement and places them under the control of their Qatari employers/sponsors. The judges' expatriate status puts them in a delicate position and discourages them from fully implementing the court's mandate and jurisdiction over the executive for fear of having their residence permits revoked and being forced to leave the country. References: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010-Qatar Country Report (page 8). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009. Available at: [ LINK ] Interview with Majed Al-Ansari, Assistant Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University. Interview date and location: March 24, 2010 at Qatar University.
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| 27d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
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Comments: Executive orders, which are known as Emiri Decrees or Decisions, are one of the primary modes of legislative enactment. The Emir enacts these decrees regularly and their subject matter can range from organizing the Council of Ministers, to creating a Cultural District, to exempting the Qatar Telecommunications Company from custom duties, taxes and other fees. The context of Emiri Decrees is wide ranging, but rarely are they used to support patronage or nepotism. Although the Constitution sets out a more formal legislative process, in practice, the legislative body is still wholly comprised of Emiri-appointed members and this process is not strictly adhered to. It should be noted, however, that the legislative body (Majlis al-Shoura) does still enact laws and it does not appear that Emiri Decrees are designed specifically to circumvent constitutional or or legal requirements for legislative actions. References: Interview with Majed Al-Ansari, Assistant Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University. Interview date and location: March 24, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University.
Peer Review Comments: Clearly, the executive power (represented by the emir) uses executive orders broadly, mainly as there is no other legislative authority. The appointed consultative council remains to have an advisory role only, although the yet-to-implemented constitution furnishes for a separation of executive and legislative authorities.
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| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 28a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: The English translation of Article 64 reads: "The Emir is the head of State. His person shall be inviolable and he must be respected by all." The original Arabic term that has been translated into the English word "inviolable" actually holds much more legal significance. In an interview with Dr. Hassan al-Sayed, Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law and former Dean of the Law College of Qatar University (May 6, 2010), it was explained to me that this article is meant to be interpreted as a direct prohibition against holding the Emir accountable for his actions. All laws in Qatar are originally drafted in Arabic. The original Arabic version, and not their subsequent translations, are considered legally binding. References: Article 64 of the Constitution. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 28b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: Although Article 21 of Law 21 (2004) binds Ministers by the Penal Code, Article 12 of that same law states that ministers can only be prosecuted for crimes pertaining to national security, their general position or elections. Article 13 states that ministers can be tried by the Public Prosecutor, but only after the Emir approves a direct request from the Council of Ministers to do so. If the minister is a member of the Majlis al-Shura (legislature) and enjoys legislative immunity, the Council of Minister may request that the Emir (Head of State) lift this immunity. Executive approval should be in the form of an Emiri Decree (an Executive Order). References: Article 12 and 13 of Law 21 (2004) concerning the work of ministers. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: After reviewing the law regulating the State Audit Bureau, no such requirement could be found. Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges, or public officials. Article 17 of the Constitution states that "The financial emoluments of the Emir [the Head of State] as well as the funds allocated for gifts and assistance shall be determined by a resolution issued annually by the Emir." There are no laws pertaining to the disclosure of these assets. References: Law No. 5 of 1975, redefined by Law No. 4 of 1995, amended by Law No. 12 of 1999 creating and regulating the State Audit Bureau. See Article 17 of the Constitution for Financial Remuneration of the Head of State. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 29b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: After reviewing the law regulating the ministers and the State Audit Bureau, no such requirement could be found. Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges, or public officials. References: Law No. 21 of 2004 concerning Ministers. Available at: [ LINK ] Law No. 5 of 1975, redefined by Law No. 4 of 1995, amended by Law No. 12 of 1999 creating and regulating the State Audit Bureau.
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| 29c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws. Article 17 of the Constitution states that "The financial emoluments of the Emir [the Head of State] as well as the funds allocated for gifts and assistance shall be determined by a resolution issued annually by the Emir." There is no mention of their disclosure or specification regarding what is deemed appropriate. References: Article 17 of the Constitution. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 29d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
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Comments: After reviewing the law regulating the State Audit Bureau, no such requirement could be found. Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges, or public officials. References: Law No. 5 of 1975, redefined by Law No. 4 of 1995, amended by Law No. 12 of 1999 creating and regulating the State Audit Bureau.
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| 29e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: Although Law No. 21 (2004) stipulates that ministers cannot enter into private business during their tenure that may conflict with the interests of their work, it does not restrict them from entering the private sector after their tenure. It should be noted that Qatari citizens only make up roughly 13 percent of Qatar's total population, approximated at 1,800,000. As a result, Qatari people in power wear several different "hats." A Qatari may hold a government position while also sitting on the board of directors or serving as CEO of a private or semiprivate company. The financial and natural resource sectors are at the foundation of Qatari society, preventing any real restrictions on ministers' ability to enter into the private sector after their tenure. References: Law No. 21 of 2004 regulating the work of Ministers. Available at: [ LINK ]
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| 29f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: It should be noted that Qatari citizens only make up roughly 13 percent of Qatar's total population, approximated at 1,800,000. As a result, Qatari people in power wear several different "hats." A Qatari may hold a government position while also sitting on the board of directors or serving as CEO of a private or semiprivate company. The financial and natural resource sectors are at the foundation of Qatari society, preventing any restrictions on ministers' ability to enter into the private sector. References: Interview with Majed Al-Ansari, Assistant Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University. Interview date and location: March 24, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University.
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| 29g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws. References: U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2009 Qatar Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Published on March 11, 2010. Available at: [ LINK ]. Accessed on April 25, 2010. Interview with Majed Al-Ansari, Assistant Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University. Interview date and location: March 24, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University.
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| 29h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges or public officials. References: U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2009 Qatar Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Published on March 11, 2010. Available at: [ LINK ]. Accessed on April 25, 2010. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Ahmed Abdul Malik, Qatari Media Expert, Lecturer at Qatar University, and former Editor-in-Chief of Gulf Times and Al-Sharq Newspapers in Qatar. Interview date and location: April 28, 2010 in a public location.
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| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
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Comments: A review of the law regulating the State Audit Bureau did not reveal any such requirement. Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws, and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges or public officials. References: Law No. 5 of 1975, redefined by Law No. 4 of 1995, amended by Law No. 12 of 1999 creating and regulating the State Audit Bureau.
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| 30b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws, and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges or public officials. References: U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2009 Qatar Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Published on March 11, 2010. Available at: [ LINK ]. Accessed on April 25, 2010. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Ahmed Abdul Malik, Qatari Media Expert, Lecturer at Qatar University, and former Editor-in-Chief of Gulf Times and Al-Sharq Newspapers in Qatar. Interview date and location: April 28, 2010 in a public location.
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| 30c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws, and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges or public officials. References: U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2009 Qatar Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Published on March 11, 2010. Available at: [ LINK ]. Accessed on April 25, 2010. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Ahmed Abdul Malik, Qatari Media Expert, Lecturer at Qatar University, and former Editor-in-Chief of Gulf Times and Al-Sharq Newspapers in Qatar. Interview date and location: April 28, 2010 in a public location.
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| 30d: In practice, the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government are of high quality. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws and the State Audit Bureau is not mandated to audit the assets of government employees, judges or public officials. References: U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor - 2009 Qatar Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Published on March 11, 2010. Available at: [ LINK ]. Accessed on April 25, 2010. Interview with Dr. Basher Zaghloul, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law at the College of Law in Qatar University and Law Practitioner. Interview date and location: April 12, 2010 at Qatar University. Interview with Dr. Ahmed Abdul Malik, Qatari Media Expert, Lecturer at Qatar University, and former Editor-in-Chief of Gulf Times and Al-Sharq Newspapers in Qatar. Interview date and location: April 28, 2010 in a public location.
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| 31 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 31: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no ruling party in Qatar, but rather a ruling family led by the head of state the Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. The Emir's absolute power is uncontested and he appoints the prime minister, who is also a member of the ruling family (Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani), all other ministers, and the members of Qatar's legislative body (Majlis al-Shoura). References: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010-Qatar Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009. Available at: [ LINK ]
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