Peer Reviewer 1:
The first criticism towards Ortegas Government arose when he decided to manage the presidency of the republic from his former office at the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN- Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional). He used money of unknown origin to make changes and remodel the new offices of the president. He spent around US$2.5 million from the General Budget of the Republic for the presidential chamber, a sum that did not include repairs and remodeling.
Nevertheless, more upsetting was that he did not resign from his previous position of FSLN permanent secretary. This has been interpreted as an evident sign of government-party confusion.
Since he began to govern, Ortega has been aggressive towards independent journalism, and intolerant of his political adversaries. When some journalists dared criticized the acts of non-transparency, corruption and political intolerances, Ortega, in return, put pressure on media owners to cancel the contracts of some independent journalists who had exposed on their shows the actions of the government. One such example was the cancellation of The 10 in the Nation (El 10 en la Nación) show, hosted by Jaime Arellano. Pressures have been also put on Televicentro of Nicaragua, Channel 2, and other independent media outlets.
Ortega governs two parallel budgets one is official and legally approved by the National Assembly (Congress); the other comes from the cooperation with Venezuela, and values approximately US$500 million dollars. The Venezuela aid (ALBA-Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas) is not channeled under the supervision of the National Assembly, but is handled at President Ortegas discretion.
It is necessary to emphasize that the official international cooperation provides annual budgetary aid to Nicaragua by an amount of US$300 million from foreign countries, European Union, and others; however, this cooperation has been questioned by Ortega, due to the fact that several representatives are critical of his government.
Another relevant public incident has involved the transfer of monetary resources between the Official Budget to ALBA-Caruna through inadequate channels. The Competing Legislators of the National Assembly have questioned the minister of Finance, Alberto J. Guevara, who asked for US$19.7 million of the National Treasury to cancel a debt of State Energy Company (ENEL). The money eventually finished in the hands of ALBA- Caruna, a compatible private microfinance bank loyal to Daniel Ortega.
ALBA-Caruna handles at least 25 percent of the gains of Venezuelan petroleum imports. Through ALBA-Caruna, the government granted a US$29 million credit to the state firm GECSA for the purchase of energy; US$2.3 million were destined to another state firm, ENATREL; an additional US$3.3 million were intended for the state Transport Regulation Office INTRAMMA, to preserve the ticket price at to 2.5 córdobas (US$0.1); another US$2,3 million were destined for supporting agricultural production. ALBA-Caruna has thus turned from a modest cooperative of savings and credit into a super-ministry de facto of Ortegas Government.
Another situation worth mentioning involves the National Municipal Elections, which took place in November 2008, in 146 local municipalities. According to representatives of the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC-Partido Liberal Constitucionalista), the elections were completely non-transparent in about 30 percent of the locations. The PLC also accused FSLN of corruption and the Electoral Supreme Council (CSE- Consejo Supremo Electoral) of collusion, for refusing to allow an impartial vote-counting. The Catholic Church, private industrialists and national supervising organisms were not officially allowed to oversee elections. The Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua requested a revision of vote-counting to solve the generalized distrust of the population in the results of the elections
The countrys election watchdog organization Ethics and Transparency (E&T), which had been denied the right to observe the elections officially and thus did so from outside the voting places, called these elections the least transparent and most conflictive of our recent history. E&T participated in the process, without accreditation, with a network of 30,000 observers in the entire country. They claim in a report that in Managua, PLC candidate Eduardo Montealegre won by at least five points.
Courtney Robert, CEO of Ethical & Transparency, indicated that this report is based on information partly obtained by its observers and partly facilitated by public prosecutors of the Receiving Office of Votes (JRV.) Faults detected by E&T in its report include the expulsion of public prosecutors of the PLC, cancellation of votes, introduction or substitution of votes and acts by the JRV personnel, annulment of votes, early closing of several polling stations, intimidation of voters, deficiencies in the safekeeping of electoral materials. In addition, the report indicates that there were fundamental breaches of the law, such as placing electoral results in citizens view. According to the report, this occurred at least in 10 percent of the polling stations around the country.
Peer Reviewer 2:
The Reporter's Notebook accurately describes the situation in Nicaragua. Given the lack of transparency and accountability with the new government, the report describes fairly the political environment in the country. Corruption and clientelism remain the norm, and the Ortega government has made few positive efforts to handle the problem.
Peer Reviewer 3:
The Reporters Notebook is accurate and fair. However, some events that have greatly impacted peoples lives are ignored.
Probably at the top of the list are the irregularities surrounding the elections. Among the most controversial decisions of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE-Consejo Supremo Electoral) are the following: -setting a very tight electoral calendar, which left little time for opposition parties to organize; - reducing the time to introduce alliances by two months; - postponing the elections in the North Caribbean Coast, without a valid explanation; - invalidating a two-year-old assembly of one of the parties which, in effect, left the most important opposition candidate without a party; - eliminating two national and two regional parties, once again without solid reasons; - eliminating national and international electoral observers, after accepting their presence since February 1990.
Many considered the CSE decisions as signs of major fraud. It became clear that the ruling party had an obvious advantage as a result. After a narrow difference in the 2006 elections, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN- Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) was urged to show muscle and get a bigger percentage of the votes, no matter what it would take, including fraud. On the way, the ruling party showed its readiness to use violence and punish those that oppose or criticize its decisions, as well as to bend the law, taking advantage of the police if necessary.
This whole situation had a big impact in the lives of many, because it introduced fear after many years when freedom of press, of organization, of speech and of expression had not been questioned.
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