| Mexico: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Anti-Corruption Agency | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 71 | In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption? | 100 |
| 72 | Is the anti-corruption agency effective? | 33 |
| 73 | Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency? | 25 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 71 | In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption? | |||||||
| 71: In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption? | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Secretaría de la Función Pública Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal (article 37)
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| 72 | Is the anti-corruption agency effective? | |||||||
| 72a: In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: This is a Cabinet official appointed by the President. References: Ley Organica de la Administración Pública Federal
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| 72b: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: This is entirely dependent on the President. See performance audit conducted by the Supreme Federal Auditor on the Secretaría de la Función Pública included in its "Informe de Resultados" corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004 (presented to congress in March 2006). References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at:[ LINK ] ASF, Informe de Resultados corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004
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| 72c: In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification. | ||||||||
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Comments: This is up to presidential discretion. Calderon's head of the Secretary of the Public Function has just stepped down after only ten months of service to pursue the chairmanship of the ruling, PAN, party. Political appointments are typical for the office. References: Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal Consitituional article 89
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| 72d: In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: "El servicio profesional de carrera (SPC), establecido por la Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP) en 2004 para garantizar "la legalidad, equidad y objetividad" en la contratación de servidores públicos en puestos técnico-directivos, obtuvo un desempeño de 508 puntos de un total de mil establecidos por la SFP, destaca la Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF) en el resumen ejecutivo de la Cuenta Pública 2005. Aun cuando el SPC se puso en marcha el 2 de abril de 2004, luego de que se publicó el reglamento de la ley respectiva, la ASF detectó que en 2005 diversos subsistemas no se echaron a andar. Cabe destacar que a finales de 2006, diputados de la 59 Legislatura cuestionaron el SPC porque no se licitó al Centro Nacional de Evaluación para la Educación Superior (Ceneval) la elaboración de los exámenes de ingreso al gobierno federal, y se detectó sólo en la SFP que más de 60 por ciento de los servidores que ingresaron provenían del estado de Chihuahua, de donde es originario su ex titular, Eduardo Romero."
References: [ LINK ] Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera
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| 72e: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff. | ||||||||
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Comments: Staff is significant but still insufficient. References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007
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| 72f: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007
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| 72g: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports. | ||||||||
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Comments: Reports are annual. References: www.funcionpublica.gob.mx Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007
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| 72h: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are systematic problems in actually punishing wrongdoing. See performance audit conducted by the Supreme Federal Auditor on the Secretaría de la Función Pública included in its "Informe de Resultados" corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004 (presented to congress in March 2006). References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007 ASF, Informe de Resultados corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004
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| 72i: In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations. | ||||||||
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Comments: It depends what is meant by "independently." All investigations are ultimately subject to presidential approval. The SFP has not been terribly proactive. References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007 ASF, Informe de Resultados corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004, performance audit conducted by the Supreme Federal Auditor on the Secretaría de la Función Pública included in its "Informe de Resultados" corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004 (presented to congress in March, 2006)
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| 73 | Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency? | |||||||
| 73a: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007 Performance audit conducted by the Supreme Federal Auditor on the Secretaría de la Función Pública included in its "Informe de Resultados" corresponding to the Cuenta Pública of 2004 (presented to congress in March 2006)
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| 73b: In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no anonymity or confidentiality clauses. References: Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Calderón & Corruption," paper presented at the conference on The State of Mexico´s Democracy, Yale University, May 1st, 2007. Available at: [ LINK ] John Ackerman & Irma Eréndira Sandoval, "Fiscalización Intraestatal y Protección de Programas Sociales en México: Teoría, Práctica y Propuestas," United Nations Development Program, Mexico City, Mexico, 2007 [ LINK ]
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