| Mexico: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 63 |
| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 100 |
| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 56 |
| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 0 |
| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 50 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 23: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Amparo suit regulated by Constitutional articles 103 and 107
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| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 24a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: The president gives a State of the Union address each year on September 1, but does not take questions or listen to the positions of the opposition parties. Press conferences are more presentations than a chance for dialogue with the press. After the State of the Union address, cabinet ministers need to appear before congress and answer tough questions, but this process is usually quite formulaic and is not covered extensively by the press.
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| 24b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Constitutional articles 103, 105 and 107 (Amparo and Constitutional controversies)
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| 24c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Supreme Court has become much more active over the last year. For instance, it has created three new special commissions to investigate possible human rights abuses by state governors. During the Fox administration, there were also various important cases in which the judiciary directly intervened (examples include the attempt to privatize the provision of electricity through an executive order, the ability of the president to veto the budget, the investigation of the alleged violations of the human rights of journalist Lydia Cacho by the governor of Puebla, and the case of Oscar Espinosa) References: [ LINK ] [ LINK ] [ LINK ] Regarding the Oscar Espinosa Villarreal case: [ LINK ] Budget veto case( [ LINK ] )
Peer Review Comments: More recently, Mexican legislators gave the green light to an investigation of former president Vicente Fox for allegedly illegally enriching himself during his six-year term in public office.
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| 24d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
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Comments: Executive orders and legal cases are used occasionally for crucial policy decisions (i.e. changing the internal structure and operations of the police, expropriations, privatization of electricity, refusal to obey orders of the Supreme Federal Auditor in the FOBAPROA case, etc.) References: [ LINK ] [ LINK ] [ LINK ]
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| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 25a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Constitutional Chapter 4 (Juicio Político), although the President can only be accused by the Senate (Constitutional articles 110 and 111)
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| 25b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Constitutional article 111
Peer Review Comments: Last fall, a federal court ruled on appeal that charges of genocide could be pressed ahead against former Mexican president Luis Echeverria in connection with the 1968 massacre of student demonstrators in Tlatelolco Square. At the time, Echeverria served as interior minister. In late November, he was placed under house arrest by a judge.
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| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 26a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos (article 36)
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| 26b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: See 26a
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| 26c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos (article 8. X) I
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| 26d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Asset disclosure forms are held and reviewed by the internal comptroller of each agency. There are no independent audits.
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| 26e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos (article 8.XII and article 9)
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| 26f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: The prohibition is only for one year and violation is only considered a minor administrative offense. The recent cases of Francisco Gil Díaz and Javier Arrigunaga demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this prohibition. References: [ LINK ] Irma E. Sandoval, "Corrupción Estructural", Reforma Newspaper, Suplemento Enfoque, May 13, 2007
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| 26g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos in article 89 explicitly states that public servants must report the receipt of gifts. Nevetheless, the annual reports and the Web page of the Internal Comptroller (SFP) do not include complete information on reported gifts. The recent case of Vicente Fox´s "Red Jeep" which was given to him when he was president, but was not formally registered under his name or reported in his assets declaration, is a recent indication of the problems in this area. References: www.funcionpublica.gob.mx
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| 26h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: There are no documented cases of prosecution or investigation based on review of asset disclosures.
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| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 27a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos (Art. 40) only permits access if explicitly authorized by the public servant Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental articles 3 fracc.XIV b), 4 fracc. I y II, 7, 9, 12
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| 27b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: Not even the president's asset declaration is public. Even when authorized by public servants, not all information is available. See, for example, IFAI resolution 48/06. References: www.presidencia.gob.mx [ LINK ] John M. Ackerman, El Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública: diseño, desempeño y sociedad civil, Cuadernos para la Democratización No.10, Universidad Veracruzana-CIESAS, 2007
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| 27c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: See 27b
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| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 28: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
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Comments: Independent studies of the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections demonstrated systematic intervention of the government in electoral politics. The problem is particularly strong at the level of state governments. References: [ LINK ] [ LINK ]" See also, Dictamen de Computo Final, Validez de la Elección Presidencial y Declaratoria de Presidente Electo (TEPJF, Sept. 5, 2006)
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