| Latvia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 88 |
| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 100 |
| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 88 |
| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 100 |
| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 50 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 23 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 23: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Constitution, everyone has the right to defend their rights and lawful interests in a fair court.According to judicial law, each person has the right to have court cases tried in accordance with the rules of legal procedure prescribed by law. References: The Constitution of Latvia. Sec. 92. [ LINK ] Law "On the Judiciary". Sec.1, Clause 4. Administrative Procedure Law.
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| 24 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 24a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Golubeva, M. Reinholde, I. Government Effectiveness and Accountability. Published in: Rozenvalds, J. How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy. LU Akademiskais apgads (2005). Ch.7. Pp. 99-109. [ LINK ] Nations in Transit 2007. Dreifelds, J. Latvia. Pp. 228, 234. ([ LINK ])
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| 24b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Constitution Court Law, the Constitutional Court shall review cases regarding: 1) compliance of laws with the Constitution; 2) compliance with the Constitution of international agreements signed or entered into by Latvia (even before the Saeima has confirmed the agreement ); 3) compliance of other normative acts or their parts with the legal norms (acts) of higher legal force; 4) compliance of other acts (with an exception of administrative acts) by the Saeima, the cabinet of ministers, the president, the chairperson of the Saeima and the prime minister with the law; 5) compliance of regulations by which the minister, authorized by the Cabinet of Ministers, has rescinded binding regulations issued by the Dome (Council) of a municipality with the law; 6) compliance of the national legal norms of Latvia with the international agreements entered into by Latvia, which are not contrary to the Constitution. References: Constitutional Court Law. Sec.16. Cases to be reviewed by the Constitutional Court.
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| 24c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: Since its establishment in 1996, the Constitutional Court has reviewed 32 regulations and ordinances of the Cabinet of Ministers. When found in conflict with the Constitution or other higher-ranking legal acts, regulations and ordinances have been voided. References: Cases of the Constitutional Court (including full texts of judgments) where regulations or ordinances of the Cabinet of Ministers have been disputed: [ LINK ] Melderis, N. Satversmes tiesas bridinajums "Warning from the Constitutional Court." Public policy portal Politika.lv. 04.03.2003. [ LINK ]
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| 24d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
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Comments: Since the renewal of Latvia's prewar Constitution in 1993, the use of its Section 81 has ben cotroversial. This article authorized the Cabinet of Ministers to adopt orders with the force of law in periods between the sessions of the Parliament. Although such orders lost their force unless subsequently approved by the legislature, they were often seen as a way for the executive to circumvent proper public scrutiny of proposed legal acts. The controversy culminated in the beginning of 2007 after the executive used these powers to adopt extremely controversial amendments to two laws that regulate national security issues. As the result, the Parliament excluded the Section 81 from the Constitution on March 5, 2007. References: Golubeva, M., Reinholde, I. Parvaldes strukturu efektivitate un atbildiba "The Effectiveness and Accountability of Governance Structures." Published in: Rozenvalds, J. (ed.) Cik demokratiska ir Latvija. Demokratijas monitorings 2005-2007. "How Democratic is Latvia. Monitoring of Democracy 2005-2007." Zinatne, 2007. P.53. Araja, D. Labot. Bet ne mirkla vajadzibai (Amend. But not for a Momentary Need, interview with a former president of the Constitutional Court Aivars Endzins). Public policy portal Politika.lv. 20.03.2007. [ LINK ] Jurista Vards "The Lawyer's Word," 20.03.2007. Juristi analize Valsts prezidentes ricibu un Satversmes 81.pantu (Lawyers Analise the Action of the President of State and Section 81 of the Constitution). [ LINK ] (for authorized users) Amendments to the Constitution of Latvia. 03.05.2007. Vestnesis, 17.05.2007.
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| 25 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 25a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: No immunity exists for the protection of the head of government against prosecution. The president of state may be subject to criminal liability if the Parliament consents thereto by a majority vote of not less than two-thirds. References: The Constitution of Latvia. Sec.54. [ LINK ]
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| 25b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: No immunities or other special legal protection exist against the prosecution of ministerial-level officials. References: The Constitution of Latvia.
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| 26 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 26a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: All public officials, from lower civil servants to heads of government and state, are required to submit declarations of income and assets annually. Most of the information submitted is published. References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials". Chapter IV, Declarations of Public Officials. [ LINK ]
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| 26b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: All public officials, from lower civil servants to heads of government and state ,are required to submit declarations of income and assets annually. Most of the information submitted is published. References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials". Chapter IV, Declarations of Public Officials. [ LINK ]
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| 26c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials." Articles 13 and 14. [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: this should be further codified and enforced.
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| 26d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials". Chapter V, Review of Violations and Verification of Facts. [ LINK ]
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| 26e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: Two statutory restrictions stay in force for two years after the heads of state and government and ministers leave respective offices: First, the president, prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, and ministers for special assignments, as well as their relatives, shall not be the shareholders, stockholders and partners of such commercial companies or ndividual merchants that receive orders for procurement for state and local government needs, state financial resources, state-guaranteed credits or state privatization fund resources, except the cases where they are granted as a result of an open competition. Second, all public officials are also prohibited for two years after leaving office from taking employment or obtaining shares of companies, regarding which the public officials have made decisions on procurement for state or local government needs, allocated state or local government resources and state or local government privatization fund resources or have performed supervision, control or punitive functions. References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials". Sec. 10.
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| 26f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: Official sources do not have any data on the violation of regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government, and ministers. References: Informativais zinojums "Par Korupcijas noversanas un apkarosanas biroja darbibu no 2006. gada 1. julija lidz 31.decembrim" (Informative report "On the Activities of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau from July 1 until Dec. 31, 2006). [ LINK ] Administrativie parkapumi korupcijas noversanas joma 2006.gada "Administrative Violations in the Area of Corruption Prevention". Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. 28.02.2007. [ LINK ]
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| 26g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Kalnins, V. Korupcijas mazinasana [Restricting of Corruption]. Published in: Rozenvalds, J. (ed.) Cik demokratiska ir Latvija. Demokratijas monitorings 2005-2007. "How Democratic is Latvia. Monitoring of Democracy 2005-2007. "Zinatne, 2007. P.63. Vai amatpersonas drikst piedalities sikas dzimsanas dienas svinibas? "May Public Officials Participate in a Posh Birthday Party?" LTV Panorama, 22.12.2005. [ LINK ]
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| 26h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: The State Revenue Service checks the submission and accuracy of public officials' declarations. In cases of doubt about whether the expenditure of a public official is commensurate with their official income, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau audits the case in cooperation with the State Revenue Service. In 2006, 354 public officials were penalized for a failure to submit declarations in due time or because of false data i (all in all 67,461 public officials were registered as of Jan. 1, 2007). Moreover, upon recommendation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, the State Revenue Service carried out tax audits of 47 public officials. No targeted audits of declarations of ministers are carried out. References: The State Revenue Service of the Republic of Latvia. Annual Report. 2006. P.42. [ LINK ] Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. Annual Report. 2006. Pp.14-15. [ LINK ]
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| 27 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 27a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials". Sec.26. [ LINK ]
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| 27b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no reports or studies about access to asset disclosure records because this access is very obvious. Section 26 of the law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials" provides legal grounds for public access to the publicly accessible parts of declarations of public officials. This Web site ([ LINK ]) allows any user to instantly access the publicly accessible parts of declarations of public officials (not for officials of security agencies), including those of heads of state and government. References: The following are not studies but references to a law and official Web site. Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials," Sec. 26. [ LINK ] Web site: [ LINK ]
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| 27c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no reports or studies about access to asset disclosure records because this access is very obvious. Section 26 of the law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials" provides legal grounds for public access to the publicly accessible parts of declarations of public officials. This Web site ([ LINK ]) allows any user to access the publicly accessible parts of declarations of public officials (not for officials of security agencies), including those of heads of state and government. Access is free of charge. References: The below are not studies but references to a law and official Web site. Law "On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials", Sec.26. [ LINK ] Website: [ LINK ]
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| 28 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 28: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Stafecka, L. Timofejevs, P. The Use of Administrative Resources in Election Campaign. Political Conflicts of Interest: Concept and Solutions. Published in: Kalnins, V. (ed.) Corruption °C. Report on Corruption and Anticorruption Policy in Latvia. 2005. First Semiannum. Pp.36-47. [ LINK ] Kazoka, I. Political Conflicts of Interest: Concept and Solutions. Published in: Kalnins, V. (ed.) Corruption °C. Report on Corruption and Anticorruption Policy in Latvia. 2005. Second Semiannum. Pp.61-75. [ LINK ]
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