Appointment to the civil service below the level of the permanent secretary is managed by PSC, which declares its vision to be, "a partner in creating a non-partisan Public Service that offers quality service and holds the nation together for socio-economic growth."

See [ LINK ]

The other service commissions (judicial, police, prisons, etc.) have very similar visions.

References: Constitution of Kenya (Chapter VIII, Sections 106, 107, 108, 110, 111).

With respect to recruitment, the Directorate of Personnel Management's Public Service Recruitment and Training Policy (dated May 2005) declares that recruitment will be "undertaken on the basis of meritocracy and equity..."and that selection will be "transparent, ethical... by a Committee composed of persons with appropriate expertise and of high integrity."

See [ LINK ]

The Public Service Commission further declares its core values to be: meritocracy, reliability, team spirit, integrity, confidentiality and fairness.

References: Constitution of Kenya. Public Officers Ethics Act (Cap 203, Part III, Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20). Directorate of Personnel Management's Public Service Recruitment and Training Policy (dated May 2005).\ declares that recruitment will be [ LINK ] The Public Service Commission.

The other service commissions serve the same purposes for the other arms of the government, the judiciary, armed forces, police, teachers, etc.

References: Public Service Commission (PSC).

References: Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Section 64 (1), Subsection 4).

Peer Review Comments: Although Section 64(1) of the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act provides that conviction disqualifies an ex-officer from holding an appointed or elected office for ten years, there are a number of individuals who are voted into Parliament despite House Watchdog Public Investments and Public Accounts Committee recommendations that they be barred from holding any public office.

Sources: Parliamentary records, media reports (Daily Nation, Standard, People Daily, Kenya Times).

These gross powers at the top mean that officers with links to the president and his party are likely to be protected while those with links to other centers of power are vulnerable to witch-hunting. A deputy governor of the Central Bank was recently demoted because she queried shady procurements handled by people close to the president. She opted for retirement.

References: Constitution of Kenya (Chapter VIII). Constitution of Kenya (Chapter II/Part 2). Constitution of Kenya (Sections 24, 25).

References: After the 2002 defeat of the KANU government, many Kenyans hoped merit would be the keyword in employment during the NARC regime. While initially, this seemed to be the case, it was soon obvious that ethnic and sectarian loyalties had crept back into public appointments. This was most graphically manifest in the stand-offs over sharing cabinet portfolios among PNU and ODM leaders who formed the Grand Coalition born of the debacle that was the 2007 presidential election. But it has also been illustrated in the manner in which key civil service jobs have been shared out. For example, while the official retirement age to which the head of the civil service is subject is 55, he is into his mid-60s and shows no signs of stepping down.

Peer Review Comments: The Grand Coalition Government, signed into existence between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga in February, demonstrates how the political class shares out top jobs in the civil service to cronies, especially diplomatic missions abroad.

Sources: Media reports (Daily Nation, Sunday Nation, Standard, Kenya Times, People Daily, TV reports).

References: Nepotism, cronyism and other forms of corruption persist in appointments, promotions, etc., even if their extents might not be a glaring as in the previous Moi regime. The continuing tenure of an exceedingly overage head of civil service is evidence of this and sets the pattern for various other instances of such indiscretions.

Such is especially the case with appointments at the very top and the bottom of the service, which are based on political patronage. Appointments among technocrats in the middle of the service are more merit based, even if biases are still discernible. As the government of national unity was formed after 2005, it is obvious that the new arrivals would seek to bring in their own lieutenants to replace those in place.

Kenya's public sector performance contracts were launched in 1999 and have since been implemented in much of the public sector, the current debate being whether the judiciary and teaching professions should sign on.

References: Directorate of Personnel Management's "Public Service Recruitment and Training Policy" (Chapter 4) (May 2005).

References: "Pay Policy for the Public Service" (January 2006) (Section 3.8/71 (iii).

References: Public service recruitment malpractices into the 1970s led to a cessation of the publication of the annual staff list, which had summarized the full employment details of all civil servants. Currently, a source of such information is the ministerial estimates for personnel emoluments in the printed estimates of the budget, which show authorized and in-place officers. However, civil service censuses have revealed the existence of "ghost workers" beyond provisions.

More recently, PSC has undertaken to publish vacancies, interview short lists and the names of successful applicants for some but not all positions. However, there continue to be complaints about transparency in recruitment into the uniformed cadre whose numbers of vacancies and names of successful applicants are not always published.

References: Whether PSC is objective in the case of senior officers it handles depends on the nature of the complaint by or against the officer; but for the junior officers, departmental committees are unlikely to rule for a subordinate staffer (who can easily be transferred elsewhere) against a department head. Given that PSC officers are largely political appointees, officer cases with political under/overtones are unlikely to get an objective hearing. For the junior officers, departmental hearings are largely kangaroo courts without ceremony.

References: The timeliness of salary payments has improved from the years when payments to teachers could be as late as three months. However, problems persist among local authorities with narrow revenue bases. Nairobi city council workers often take to the streets in protest despite theirs being the authority with the largest revenue potential. Indeed, the Nairobi mayor declared the need to borrow money in early October (2008) because council revenues could not cover salaries.

Timeliness of payments is likely to improve as we move deeper into the performance contract era.

Since the law came into force, some officers have been affected. However, the government has appeared to be lenient in this respect. For example, two cabinet ministers who were stood down in the Anglo leasing scandal have been reinstated even before the cases against their alleged co-conspirator civil servants have been finalized. This suggests the cases against the civil servants are as good as shelved even if they are unlikely to return to work. Thus it would appear that where allegations are against civil servants alone, then their cases are dealt with expeditiously; but when their alleged misconduct touches politicians, then things become less clear cut.

References: Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003) (Section 64 (1)).

Peer Review Comments: The two cabinet ministers who were reinstated were never charged with any criminal offense, leave alone convicted. One of the cases that highlights that aspect is that of a former governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, Dr. Andrew Mulei. Though he enjoys security of tenure, he was suspended immediately after he was charged with a corruption offense (for which he was eventually cleared anyway).

References: Public Officers Ethics Act (Section 26) (Cap 4 of the Laws of Kenya).

References: Public Officers Ethics Act (2003) (Section 11 (1)). Public Officers Ethics Act (2003) ( Section 11 (3)). Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Section 42 (3)).

Peer Review Comments: This declaration of personal interest also applies to debates in Parliament and departmental committees of the House. However, not many Ministers of Parliament (MPs) do this. And when they do, the declaration is merely symbolic.

Source: Standing Orders.

References: Not only are there no such legal restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government, but serving public officers are allowed to have private sector interests, such as directorships. This freedom arises from a mid-1960s commission of inquiry, The Ndegwa Report, that argued that the cream of newly independent Kenya's educated elite were needed in both sectors. Much of Kenya's rampant corruption is blamed on the report. Indeed, many of the original civil servants who benefited from the provision are the main actors in contemporary politics.

Peer Review Comments: In some cases, civil servants who join the private sector on permanent engagement are required to sign the binding Official Secrets Act that forbids them from disclosing to any unauthorized persons such information they held while in Government office. This requirement lapses after at least three years.

Sources:Official Secrets Act, Public Service Regulations.

References: Public Officers Ethics Act (2003) (Section 10 (2)). Public Officers Ethics Act (2003) (Section 10 (3)), subsection (4)).

References: Public Officers Ethics Act (Sections 25, 29).

Peer Review Comments: Although there are disclosure requirements, such information is kept under lock and key.

Source: Media reports (Daily Nation, Standard, People Daily).

References: There are no such regulations. Former civil servants can go into the private sector at will, while many active civil servants have extensive private sector interests, especially because real civil service wages are so modest. Indeed, the private sector often head hunts the cream of the civil service.

References: As in other arms of the government, regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective are impossible to uphold, because the dividing line between gifts, hospitality and bribery is clouded by cultural values. Thus, officers resolving disputes will be entertained by either or both litigants, often to no one's consternation.

References: While it is common to read of judges removing themselves from cases where there is conflict of interest, there is no publicly accessible documentation of the extent to which this happens in the civil service. On the contrary, there are many overt instances where public officers push the interests of friends and relatives to the front of the queue, such as at police stations, immigration and customs departments, registrars' offices, etc. This is an expectation of the extended family system in Africa.

References: It is not clear what happens with the asset disclosure forms as their contents remain confidential to the commission to which the declaration was made. To date, a former cabinet minister remains before the courts three years after he challenged his constitutional right not to have to disclose how he acquired his wealth. That this case has taken so long to resolve suggests the government is not in a hurry to resolve it, as it might open a Pandora's box with respect to disclosure requirements.

References: Public Officers Ethics Act (Section 29 (1) to (3)).

References: The law imposes a heavy fine on anyone accessing such records, meaning that only an adventurous investigative journalist might dare do so. However, some assets of such officers can be tracked through agencies such as the land registry, company registry, etc.

References: Since citizens cannot access such information legally, the costs implied are not pertinent.