Peer Reviewer 1:
I generally agree with the report, except for the direct link the author proposes between the pension record scandal and corruption ("smell like corruption"). At present the missing records appear to be down to incompetence and bureaucratic arrogance rather than corruption. It would also have been interesting if the author had addressed the issue of corruption amongst opposition politicians. The leader of the opposition Ozawa is said to be a politician very much in the LDP mode -- i.e. involved in corruption -- and indeed was previously a member of the LDP. Some political analysts argue that corruption is endemic to the Japanese system as a whole. It seems likely that widespread public cynicism about political corruption is one of the reasons why the LDP has remained in power for so long, i.e. better the corrupt devil youve known for 50 years, than an equally corrupt but inexperienced opposition.
Secondly, this document concentrates primarily on corrupt links between politicians and bureaucrats. While this is certainly a pervasive and serious problem for governance in Japan, I believe several other forms of corruption impinge on the daily lives of Japanese people.
One that I have reported on personally is the power concentrated in the hands of Japan's major media corporations and their links with the LDP, ones that have been called corrupt. Japan's media conglomerates rely on government support for price-fixing in the newspaper industry. This was thrown into relief this November with the involvement of Yomiuri Shimbun Chairman Tsuneo Watanabe, in an attempted king-making deal between ruling and opposition parties. Not only did the Yomiuri remain largely silent about his involvement, but so did the other main dailies. With the press deliberately looking the other way, the fiasco mystified the Japanese public and foreign correspondents alike. This and other similar incidents strongly suggest that the Japanese media have a tendency to put their own interests before their duty to inform the public. More generally, this corruption is part of a cultural emphasis on ties of obligation in Japan, which often trumps considerations of journalistic integrity, morality, and legality. (One American-born journalist working in the Japanese media described Japan to me as being like a great big bath-house with everyone washing someone elses back. )
Other problems related to corruption in journalism have been widely reported by the Japanese weekly magazines, energetic but little-read small publications, and the foreign press. The press club system is still a powerful tool for government manipulation of the media. While there have been improvements, such as the new Freedom of Information Law, self-censorship and deference to the rich and powerful is endemic. One particularly worrying event was the libel suit brought against freelance journalist Hiro Ugaya by Oricon, a company that publishes music charts. Ugaya made comments to another reporter in a telephone interview suggesting that Oricon was fixing their charts. Oricon's response was to sue Ugaya directly for 50 million yen (US448,000). The case has largely been ignored by the Japanese media - a fact that implies a worrying lack of concern for freedom of the press and journalistic solidarity when it comes to those working outside major media organizations.
Peer Reviewer 2:
This article shows the clear Japanese social structure that has been ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The unprecedented defeat of LDP in the Upper House election in July was due to losing support in the provincial constituencies. Actually, continuous scandals, such as the J-Green and losing pension records were crucial damage for the LDP, however those were not fully the responsibility of Abes cabinet, but former Prime Minister Koizumis political asset. Why was there such severe criticism against Abes cabinet? Abes main political slogan was Changing the post-war regime, including abolishing some privileges for old media, such as TV stations and newspapers (one profitable system for newspaper companies is exemption from re-sale regulations. In general, its the same price for a copy in different places in Japan. It is reported that Abe intended to abolish the exemption.) Some members of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), who won against LDP, were involved in some big scandals, but media neglected them. They also stopped the continuous scandal exposure related to Abe after the elections. Abe was irrelevant for some bureaucrats, politicians and the media. If this notebook had more specific coverage in the field and interviewed certain persons who played an important role, it could have provided a more realistic picture of the situation.
In addition to the Amakudari system, there is sabotage from labor unions for the missing pension records. JICHIRO, All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, the biggest labor union, is a main supporter of the DPJ. The relationship between bureaucrats and labor unions gives both parties profit from the present conservative structures, which sometimes cause corruption.
Old media, like newspapers and televisions in Japan, are delaying their own reforming. As far as I know, newspaper companies have some malfunctions, such as lifetime employment, a seniority-based system, sexual prejudice and so on. New media, especially web journalism, criticize those old medias anachronistic structures. Media won against Abe it the Upper House election this time, but there is political confusion now. Media do not want to be a watchdog but want to just drive public opinions and stick to their own profit. Japanese people will not become more sensitive to corruption unless media change into a real watchdog.
Peer Reviewer 3:
Japanese citizens enjoy some of the best public services in the world. Any analysis of public integrity in Japan must start with the important perspective that the kinds of petty corruption common in many other parts of the world -- for example demands for illicit payments to get your child into school or to receive essential health treatment -- scarcely exist.
At the same time, as this article explains, Japan continues to suffer from serious medium- and high level corruption involving collusion between companies, bureaucrats and politicians over public procurement. The article focuses on the forestry and social insurance sectors: it would also be appropriate to look at the construction sector, which, in Japan as in many other countries, has been associated with many of the most egregious corruption cases.
The practice of dango --the formation of price-fixing cartels among the leading cartels -- has been particularly common among construction companies bidding for lucrative contracts in public works programs. The way that the system works, and it has truly been systemic, is that groups of companies collude with a politician or official who is willing to leak the maximum price that a government department is prepared to pay for a particular project. The cartel members then take turns to submit winning bids that are close to the official ceiling. Rather than being an exceptional practice, dango was for many decades the rule both at the local and at the national level. Often this is still the case. The Japan Citizens Ombudsman Association estimates that the practice cost the Japanese taxpayer as much as 660 billion yen (US$591 million) in 2006.
There is good news as well as bad news. Recent reforms designed to combat dango include tighter anti-cartel laws and new legislation to protect whistleblowers in both the public and the private sectors. These have had some impact. According to the Citizens Ombudsman Association, the bid-ceiling ratio in public works contacts (i.e. the ratio the winning bid and the governments maximum budget) declined from an average of 95 percent to 75percent in some prefectures in 2006 compared with the previous year, resulting in major savings for the government. The fact that scandals such as the J-Green affair discussed in the article are being brought out into the open arguably is itself a sign of progress. At least the cases are being investigated rather than simply ignored.
However, as the article also makes clear, there are still major gaps in government accountability. To cite a recent example, a Board of Audit report submitted to Prime Minister Yakuo Fududa in November 2007 reported that, despite the risks of corruption, government agencies awarded as many as 80,000 discretionary contracts worth 1.3 trillion yen (US$11.6 billion) in fiscal year 2006.
The question then arises why levels of public accountability are so low and whether recent political changes will lead to a more far-reaching reform program.
There were many factors behind the LDPs defeat and the subsequent resignation in September 2007 of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Public anger at the governments apparent incompetence in its management of pension records was certainly one of them. Even more importantly, there was a widespread sense that the structural reforms introduced under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) had brought losers --notably in the rural areas -- as well as winners, and that the benefits of Japans recent economic recovery also have been poorly distributed.
However, this does not necessarily amount to a deep-seated reaction against the corrupt practices that have been part of Japanese public life for decades. Many of the LDPs opponents and conservative elements within the party would like a return to the former practice of sponsoring major public works with limited accountability as a means of building up support in the regions. From an international perspective the surprising point is not that Japanese taxpayers complain at the way their money is spent, but that they do not complain more.
The conclusion for now is that, however unevenly, the administrative reform process will continue, and that in the long run this will lead to more accountability and less corruption. Progress will be slow and uneven, but it is increasingly apparent that there is no other choice. In an era of fiscal constraint, the government is less and less able to afford the wastage associated with past malpractice.
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Finally, Id like to point out two details (which can be addressed through editing):
- The conventional English-language initials of the main opposition party are DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) rather than DJP .
- The chronology in the third paragraph is perhaps a little unclear. Toshikatsu Matsuoka committed suicide on May 28, 2007. He had been embroiled in two controversies. One involved allegations concerning his expense claims for utility fees at his parliamentary office where utility costs are free: he had been due to appear before a parliamentary committee to answer the claims on the day that he died. The other involved the long-running bid-rigging scandal discussed in this piece.
