Peer Reviewer 1:
The Reporters Notebook uses accurate facts to provide a very palpable description of the fight against corruption in Indonesia. However, it does not give a very good idea of the state and extent of corruption, nor of the forces at work for and against anti-corruption: why was the KPK established, and what did KPK come up against?; what is the role of business, the press, CSOs, and what was the impact of decentralization (wave of corruption since 2001)?; how significant is KPK vs. other anti-corruption institutions?
The report should also analyze the progress that Indonesia has made since it embarked on a reform agenda (including the fight against corruption) around 1998.
The Notebook doesnt reflect the strides made in freedom of expression, of the press, of associations, which helped reveal the extent of corruption, perhaps better than formal audit/oversight institutions.
The Notebooks argument that KPK faces challenges (material but also cover political challenges illustrated by the seeming immunity of SBY/Kalla circles) is relevant.
The first paragraph may be read as suggesting that corruption was imported through the Dutch administration, as if this was the time when history began. The author may want to revise this.
Peer Reviewer 2:
The Reporter's Notebook highlights KPKs role in eradicating corruption in Indonesia. However, there are some points which need to be addressed: - KPK has indeed been at the forefront of corruption eradication efforts within the last two years. However, KPK often chooses to take action mainly against those who commit high-level corruption cases and cause major losses to the country. Corruptors at lower levels, who abuse lower and therefore closer sectors to society (such as the administrative, health care and education sectors) are left untouched; - KPK has an important role in corruption eradication efforts at national level instead of local level, where it leaves a gap for NGOs to fill; - Oftentimes, KPK's actions are influenced by political forces, including media owners interests. Sometimes certain media outlets present news of corruption cases committed by officials who are disadvantageous to the respective media owner, while concealing corruption cases perpetrated by others who are on the media owner's side.
Peer Reviewer 3:
The Reporter's Notebook is quite good at highlighting the profile and performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in Indonesia. It presents the story behind KPK's actions in an accurate manner, and it provides insight into the commission's role in corruption eradication efforts. Data on KPK and others are well and accurately presented.
However, this report fails to illustrate the roots of corruption in Indonesia, and how it has become institutionalized. It provides only a brief history of this phenomenon, by portraying Suharto as one of many causes of corruption, but it does not sufficiently explain the relationship patterns between society, the government, businessmen and the military, which trigger and nurture plenty of corrupt practices. For example, the relationship among national and local governmental agencies since the decentralization era began in 2000 lacks attention as one serious cause of corruption. Likewise, the policy-making and licensing processes are also entrenched in corruption and should have been discussed more in-depth.
Overall, this report, which describes some highlights of the corruption eradication efforts in Indonesia, is good. In order to be balanced, however, more facts and real conditions of corruption, which every Indonesian faces and feels, need to be addressed.
Peer Reviewer 4:
There is no way to identify an exact time in which corruption began in Indonesia -- much less anywhere else. Corruption is widespread here, but it would be unfair to say it didn't exist until the Dutch colonial administration. It might be more accurate to phrase it like this: "it is not clear over what period of time systematic corruption began to emerge within the framework of a unified Indonesian state." This could be qualified with a reference to how the archipelago was ruled prior to the arrival of the Dutch and, perhaps, to what degree corrupt practices may have been in existence then. In any case, the blanket assertion that it is unknown when corruption first began to spread in the archipelago is somewhat misleading and erroneous.
With regard to Suharto, it is also worth mentioning that the coup that brought him to power was accompanied by an "anti-communist" purge that claimed at least 500,000 lives -- most likely many more, according to more than a few historians. In addition, Suharto relied heavily on Western aid -- in particular, millions of dollars worth of military aid from the U.S. This type of aid was a signature feature of the relationship between Washington and Jakarta for most of Suharto's reign.
One notable example took place in 1975, after Portuguese colonial officials left East Timor following a coup in Lisbon, and American officials -- Henry Kissinger included -- voiced concerns that the tiny island enclave could become another communist nation. In the context of the collapse of Saigon, Washington was more than happy to dole out extensive military aid and assistance to help in Indonesia's annexation of the nation.
After Indonesian forces overran Timorese defenses, a guerrilla resistance movement formed and staged hit-and-run attacks against Indonesian forces. In the end, more than 250,000 Timorese perished as a result of Indonesia's invasion and subsequent repressive occupation, which ended only in 2002. East Timor's independence was achieved following a UN referendum and international pressure.
Worth noting as well is the fact that, despite the abuses that took place under Suharto's rule, Indonesia's economy experienced significant growth and prosperity under his administration until its collapse as part of the 1998 Asian financial meltdown, which led to his ouster. In fact, the economy was in a free fall in the mid-1960s before he came to power. For this reason, he is still well thought of by many Indonesians, largely for the stability his New Order regime created. This was underscored in March 2008 when a civil court judge ordered that Spersemar -- a charitable foundation set up by Suharto -- pay US$110 million after the money was diverted to his family from a scholarship fund for underprivileged children. The judge cleared the late president, however, ruling that neither he nor his family were guilty of any wrongdoing in this case --although it is not clear how the judge came to this conclusion. And although prosecutors argued that the government should receive US$1 billion in damages, the judge dismissed the claim.
With regard to the "cancer of corruption" analogy, while one could argue that this is the case in Indonesia, corruption does not always spread as such in other countries -- particularly in industrial nations like the United States, where individual agencies or bodies may be corrupt but are policed through systematic government regulation and oversight as well as the news media. In Indonesia, while aggressive media routinely cover corruption and government malfeasance, they are woefully unable to fully undertake this task categorically with any degree of overall consistency. In addition, while there are internal mechanisms for oversight within the government, they are not adequate to keep corruption under control. The initials KKN -- which stand for corruption, collusion and nepotism -- have long been a part of the Indonesian vernacular when it comes to referring to graft and sweetheart deals across and within the public and private sectors. Indeed, this term is a never-ending source of jokes, dismay and, most often, resignation.
Overall, this is a good work when it comes to a general assessment of corruption in Indonesia, but it could use additional quotes from other ordinary Indonesians, who are also directly affected by corruption and neglect at the hands of the Indonesian state. Although Indonesia is far better off than many developing nations, it is certainly not without problems. In this Notebook, there is no reference to the human costs of repression of Indonesians at the hands of their government -- in particular under Suharto's reign.
Also unmentioned are the adverse -- and often perverse -- side effects of Indonesia's relationships with the West. (Notably, U.S. military aid without pre-condition, has at times reinforced both corruption within the ranks of the military by enforcing the status quo, while enabling human rights abuses. In 2001, for instance, U.S. President George W. Bush had his first post-9/11 presidential meeting with Megawati Sukarnoputri, not long before anti-American protests, supported by the government, erupted throughout the country. Over the strong objections of international human rights advocates, meanwhile, Washington subsequently proceeded to grant Indonesia several million dollars in military aid.)
This Notebook should also emphasize more clearly the more recent human rights abuses that have been generated by elements of the Indonesian security forces, who have benefited from U.S. aid directly and indirectly.
Global Integrity uses a