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2007 Assessment

Georgia: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Georgia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Whistle-blowing Measures
Indicators		Score
45	Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?	50
46	In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?	100
47	In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?	38

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

45a: In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Law on Organized Crime Georgian Criminal Procedure Code

Peer Review Comments: There is a draft law on whistle-blowers that is yet to be adopted. The provisions on "confidants" are in several different pieces of legislation. There is also an obligation to report corruption crimes (Article 376 Criminal Code; Article 7 of the law on inspector generals).

45b: In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

100

Comments: The legislation is rather new and it is too early to judge its effectiveness.

References: There have been no reports on negative consequences.

Peer Review Comments: What little regulation there is regarding whistle-blowers, it is drafted in such a way that it is easy to see how it will be ineffective. The fact that we have not had any whistle-blowing cases could be one of the indicators here. Culture probably has something to do with the fact that there are no whistle-blowers here, but another reason is that all bosses hire their friends and relatives to important positions.

See GRECO 2006 evaluation.

45c: In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Law on Organized Crime Georgian Criminal Procedure Code

Peer Review Comments: Tthere is no legislation on this. The Law on Organized Crime and the Georgian Criminal Procedure Code do not cover this.

45d: In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

100

Comments: The legislation is rather new, and it is too early to judge.

References: There have been no reports of negative consequences despite explicit private sector legal guarantees/protections in the existing legislation.

Peer Review Comments: There is no legislation, and the Law on Organized Crime and Georgian Criminal Procedure Code, referred to in the previous section, is not new.

In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

46: In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

Score:

YES

Comments: There is a hot-line of the Prosecutor General's Office; There are internal inspectorates in most of the state institutions where civil servants can report crimes of corruption.

References: Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia Law on Procuracy

Peer Review Comments: Most, if not all, of the inspector general's offices have a hotline number.

In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

47a: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

Score:

100

Comments: The non-independent inspector general system is prone to political influence and lacks the professional capacity to carry out its duties.

References: There have been no reports on the use of internal mechanisms against corruption.

Peer Review Comments: The inspector general's (IG) offices do not have enough staff, and the IG is dependent on the minister and his political will. See the law on the IG.

47b: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

Score:

100

Comments: Those institutions are under concerete ministries and departments. There are no reports about them having particular financial problems.

References: There have been no report on any problem.

Peer Review Comments: Based on the remarks that have been made by inspector generals (IGs) at a conference reviewing a draft law on IGs, it became clear that their departments do not always get adequate funding. Furthermore, they complained about the fact that since most of them are functioning under the ministry's administration, they have hard time with information leakage, as they have to provide details of why they need the funds, which in turn could (and does) lead to information leakage from finance and procurement departments.

47c: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: By law, there is a 30 day-procedure for reacting to any complaint. In many cases, however, the IG simply doesn't respond.

References: There have been no media reports. No studies or information is available.

47d: In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies\' investigations. <p>50 Score Criteria: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments. <p>0 Score Criteria: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.$

Comments: By law, they have the right to start investigation. Unfortunately it is difficult to provide examples, as internal inestigations or audit mechanisms are so ineffective that they only serve politial purposes. Actions start once interests are contradicting and punishment shall occur. The most recent example is that of the former minister of Defense, who has been proclaimed as one of the skeletons of the state building regardless of endless reports and alarms by both civil society and international community in Georgia because of corruption and human rights violations. Only now, when he decided to create an opposition party, the General Inspection of the Ministry of Defense has announced the opening of a case against the former minister and its transfer for further investigation to the General Prosecutor's Office.

References: Interview with the parliamentary secretary of the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, Besarion Abashidze See 2007 report of the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association on monitoring internal mechanisms and corruption: www.gyla.ge