| France: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | 67 |
| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | 75 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | |||||||
| 80a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Le nouvel observateur, Un proche de Sarkozy à la tête de la police, May 23, 2007, [ LINK ] Le Point, Bernard Squarcini, proche de Sarkozy, nommé à la tête de la DST, June 27, 2007, [ LINK ]; Police, le « spoil system » de Sarkozy, May 31, 2007, [ LINK ]
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| 80b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Senat, Projet de loi de finances pour 2007 : sécurité, [ LINK ]; Groupe UMP, Projet de loi de finances pour 2006 : missions sécurité, sécurité civile et administration générale et territoriale de l'Etat, [ LINK ];
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| 80c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: In cases in which investigations could become embarrassing for politicians, the efforts of the law enforcement are sometimes re-oriented (this can be done through the action or decisions of the public prosecutor) in ways which seem to favor the tranquillity of the politicians over the full investigation of the events. References: Le nouvel observateur, Un proche de Sarkozy à la tête de la police, May 23, 2007, [ LINK ] Le Point, Bernard Squarcini, proche de Sarkozy, nommé à la tête de la DST, June 27, 2007, [ LINK ]; Police, le « spoil system » de Sarkozy, May 31, 2007, [ LINK ] Halphen, Eric, Sept ans de solitude.
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| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 81a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Citizens can challenge police action by referring to an officer of higher rank, to the Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité ([ LINK ]), before a court of law or the ombudsman. The Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale investigates police action ([ LINK ]).
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| 81b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Alvaro Gil-Robles, commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the effective Respect for Human Rights in France, Council of Europe, February 2006, [ LINK ]
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| 81c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale, [ LINK ]
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| 81d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Alvaro Gil-Robles, commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the effective Respect for Human Rights in France, Council of Europe, February 2006, [ LINK ]
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| 81e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Penal Code, articles 121-1 to 122-8
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| 81f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Alvaro Gil-Robles, commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Effective Respect for Human Rights in France, Council of Europe, February 2006, [ LINK ]
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