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2007 Assessment

Egypt: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Egypt: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Judicial Accountability
Indicators		Score
33	Are judges appointed fairly?	8
34	Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?	71
35	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?	36
36	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?	0

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are judges appointed fairly?

33a: In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

Score:

YES

Comments: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judiciary power states that there is no transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges. This law gives the minister of Justice the power to select several national-level judges. The general prosecution is also subordinated to the minister of Justice. Taking in consideration that the minister of Justice is part of the executive branch that is subordinated to the president of the republic, then all these nominations are subordinated to the executive branch, namely the president of the republic. The Supreme jJdiciary Council has the power to appoint the head of the Court of Cassation, the general attorney and all judges and prosecutors, as well as to move, delegate and transfer them in accordance to general and abstract regulations developed by the council itself.

References: Naser Amin, Towards a Judicial Reform in Egypt, The Arab Center for the Independence of Judiciary and Defense, P. 5.

33b: In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

Score:

100

Comments: There are no certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges. This motivated the Egyptian judges movement from 2005 until now to work for changing the judiciary power law no. 46/1972 for obtaining the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the judges by the constitution. The gap between law texts and reality is so wide, to the extent that it eliminates the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, on April 15, 2005, the general assembly of judges of Alexandria emphasized the need for a new law for the judicial branch that frees judges from the hegemony of the executive branch. Among the most important changes needed in law are extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Judiciary Council, abolishing the Supreme Council for judicial agencies, restricting the role of the minister of Justice to administrative matters and not selecting court heads, appropriating a separate budget for judges, moving judicial inspection from the Ministry of Justice to the Supreme Judiciary Council, and the approval of the Supreme Judiciary Council of the nomination by the president of the republic of the general attorney, the general lawyer and all members of the general prosecution. The General Assembly of Judges' Club a syndicate organization for the judges - supported all these demands.

References: The Report of the National Campaign for Monitoring the Parliamentary Elections 2005, edited by Waheed Abd-Al-Majeed, The Human Rights Center for Helping Prisoners, 2006, P. 75.

33c: In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

Score:

YES

Comments: In accordance with law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power, only the Supreme Council for judicial agencies, presided by the president of the republic, has the power to confirm national-level judges. Then it is the president of the republic, represented in his minister of Justice, who nominates and confirms the process of appointing judges.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

34a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

YES

Comments: According to law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions. No court decision is issued without an appeal paper that contains the reasons and justifications of the decision.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

34b: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions. No court decision is issued without an appeal paper that contains the reasons and justifications of the decision. Citizens can access the reasons and justifications of the decision within a month after paying reasonable fees. Citizens can obtain a copy of the decision with its reasons and justifications for implementing the decision. Citizens can also take their appeal to a court of higher degree to get better decisions in a certain time period.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

34c: In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

Score:

YES

Comments: The Judicial Inspection Committee appointed by the minister of the Justice, himself part of the executive branch, is the agency entrusted with making inquiries and investigations in case there are complaints against judges.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

34d: In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

Score:

YES

Comments: The Judicial Inspection Committee is not protected from political interference. According to law no. 46/1972, that committee is formed by the minister of Justice, who is at the same time part of the executive branch, and often a member of the ruling NDP party. The committee is also a judicial agency that follows the Supreme Council for judicial agencies presided by the president of the republic, who is at the same time the head of the executive branch.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

34e: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations -- or participates fully with cooperating agencies\' investigations -- into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power. <p>50 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power. <p>0 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies\' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.$

Comments: In practice, when necessary, the Judicial Disciplinary Agency or its equivalent mechanism initiate investigations. The most famous example is that of judges Mahmoud Miki and Hesham Basttawisy. The Judicial Inspection Committee referred those two judges to the discipline committee in preparation for dismissing them because of their leading role in the judge's movement calling for true independence of the judiciary. Those two judges were part of a lager movement by the Judges' Club that held several conferences calling for a new law for the judiciary, with an emphasis on its independence from the executive power. The executive branch, represented by the minister of Justice, pushed the Judicial Inspection Committee to deliver their issue to the discipline committee in preparation for dismissing them. But the judges' solidarity with those two judges protected them. The committee freed Mahmoud Miki of charge and reproved Hesham Basttawisy.

References: The Report of the National Campaign for Monitoring the Parliamentary Elections 2005, edited by Waheed Abd-Al-Majeed, The Human Rights Center for Helping Prisoners, 2006, P. 75-85

34f: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Score:

100

Comments: When necessary, the Judicial Inspection Committee imposes penalties on offenders such as the reprove penalty imposed on the judge Hesham Basttawisy mentioned in the answer to the previous question. It can also impose administrative penalties. When the offence necessitates dismissing the judge, the committee hands the issue to the Supreme Council of Judicial Agencies for a decision.

References: Law no. 46/1972 organizing the judicial power

Peer Review Comments: The reviews of judges takes place in unannounced secret sessions.

Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

35a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

Comments: Like the public servants, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file asset disclosure forms. All public servants and state employees in Egypt, including the president of the republic, head of the Ministers' Council, ministers, governorates, legislators are required to file asset disclosure forms in the beginning of their mandate in public service and review them every five years, so as change in one's wealth can be detected. Law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting, amended by law no. 2/ 1977 (article 5) states that all employees and public servants, with no exception, are required to file asset disclosure forms showing their own properties, and the properties owened by their spouses and children.

References: Law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting Law no. 2/1977 for illegal profiting, article 5.

35b: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: Item 14 of article 77 of law no. 47/1978 for state employees prohibits members of the national-level judiciary from taking gifts, hospitality, commissions or advances from people to whom they deliver state services.

References: Law no. 47/1978 for state employees (article 77, item 14)

35c: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, there are no requirements for independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary. The only the asset disclosure form required of all state employees is the one according to law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting. Regular auditing is made by the Illegal Profiting Apparatus that is subordinated to the president of the republic. This apparatus is required to investigate the complaints raised by citizens pertaining to unreasonable and unjustifiable increase in one's wealth, including members of the national-level judiciary. If the investigations do not confirm the allegations, the citizen who made them is sentenced to two years in prison.

References: Law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting

35d: In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, there are no restrictions for national-level judges to enter the private sector after leaving the government. But item 8 of article 77 of law no. 47/1978 for state employees prohibits ex-state employees from disclosing information that is considered secret in their former state jobs.

References: Law no. 47/1978 for state employees (article 77, item 14)

35e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, there are no regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges. State employees in Egypt often retire early, before the assigned age (60), to work in the private sector or have their own businesses, benefiting from the networks they built while working in the government.

References: Law no. 47/ 1978 for state employees (article 77, item 14)

35f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, there are no regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. Item 14 of article 77 of law no. 47/1978 for state employees prohibits members of the national-level judiciary from taking gifts, hospitality, commissions or advances from people to whom they deliver state services. But this rule is not always applicable in practice.

References: Law no. 47/1978 for state employees (article 77, item 14)

35g: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are not audited. Only the asset disclosure forms required of all state employees according to law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting is also required of judges. However, even the regular auditing of the illegal profiting apparatus is no longer serious. This apparatus is required to investigate the complaints raised by citizens pertaining to unreasonable and unjustifiable increase in one's wealth, including members of the national-level judiciary. If the allegations are not confirmed, the citizen who made them is sentenced to two years in prison.

References: Law no. 11/ 1968 for illegal profiting

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

36a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary. Law no. 121/1975, amended by law no. 472/1989 for preserving official documents of the state, punishment law no. 58 and its amendments, law no. 29/1982, law no. 199/1983, law no. 93/1995 all restrict the freedom of information. The asset disclosure records of all state employees are considered official documents that can not be disclosed to citizens.

References: Presidential decree no. 472/1979 for preserving state official documents and organizing their publication and use; Law no. 121/1975, amended by law no. 472/1989 for preserving official documents of the state

36b: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, citizens cannot access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable or unreasonable time period. All governmental agencies are committed not to give citizens access to official documents. Law no. 121/ 1975, amended by law no. 472/1989 and law of the central apparatus for general mobilization and statistics (article 10) consider asset disclosure records official documents that must be kept from citizens.

References: Law of the central apparatus for general mobilization and statistics, article 10; Presidential decree no. 472/1979 for preserving state official documents and organizing their publication and use; Law no. 121/1975, amended by law no. 472/1989 for preserving official documents of the state

36c: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, citizens cannot access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable or unreasonable cost.

References: Presidential decree no. 472/1979 for preserving state official documents and organizing their publication and use; Law no. 121/1975, amended by law 472/ 1979; Law no. 35/1960 organizing the central apparatus for general mobilization and statistics (article 10 on preventing publication)