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2007 Assessment

Egypt: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Egypt: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability
Indicators		Score
23	In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?	100
24	Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?	44
25	Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?	0
26	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?	50
27	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?	0
28	In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.	0

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

23: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, citizens can sue the government for infringement of their civil rights according to article 71 of the Egyptian Constitution. These issues can be resolve within a reasonable time period.

References: The Egyptian Constitution, article 71.

Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?

24a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the chief executive does not give reasons for his policy decisions unless required by the legislature, as guaranteed by articles 86 and 125 that give the legislature the authority to question the prime minister, his deputies and ministers. Also in response to press reports, the chief executive may give reasons. But the Egyptian Constitution does not enforce a decisive concept of monitoring governmental performance in relation to press investigations of government executives. It only states in article 107 that the press can freely practice its mission and express the attitudes and positions of the public opinion. Meanwhile, the constitution obligates the government executives to give reasons for their decisions and respond to press reports.

References: The web-site of the UNDP in Egypt; Articles 86, 125 and 107 of the Egyptian Constitution

24b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.

Score:

YES

Comments: According to article 68 of the Egyptian Constitution, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. That article states that no procedure or decision is inaccessible to the judiciary.

References: The Egyptian Constitution, article 68

24c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.

Score:

100

Comments: Article 68 of the Egyptian Constitution states that no executive acts or decisions are immune from the monitoring of the judiciary. Article 65 emphasizes the rule of law and the independence and immunity of the judiciary as a means for protecting rights and freedoms. But in practice, the Egyptian legislature ignored these principles and issued exceptional laws and regulations and entrusted several agencies for bringing the lawsuit, but these agencies do not go before the judiciary. During the emergency law, in effect since 1981, judiciary can not resolve all suits or review all actions of the executives. The actions and decisions of the Military Court, the Political Party Court or the High State Security Court are dealt with as part of the sovereignty actions that are not submitted to the monitoring of the judiciary.

References: The Human Rights Center for Helping Prisoners, Judicial Sentences- An Applied Study in Light of The Relationship between The Criminal Procedure Law and The Constitution, P 27.

24d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

Score:

100

Comments: Bureaucracy is well-established in Egypt. Everything is run centrally. In this atmosphere, the chief executive does not limit the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.

References: Center for Developing Country Studies and Research, Rule Style, in a symposium entitled "Good Governance", P. 16.

Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?

25a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, the executive authority is not submitted to criminal procedures. Article 85 of the constitution subdues the president of the republic to criminal procedures. That is, he can be prosecuted for crimes he commits. In a special court, legal proceedings and penalties must be established for prosecuting the president of the republic. If the president is found guilty, he must be dismissed and all other penalties must be implemented. Accusing the president of the government of great treason or any crime necessitates a suggestion by two thirds of the People's Assembly at least. The law prosecuting the president of the republic has not yet been issued, nor the president of the republic has been accused since the issuing of the Egyptian Constitution in 1971. The same applies to the head of the Ministers' Council (not a prime minister).

References: The Egyptian Constitution, articles 85, 137 and 160

25b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.

Score:

YES

Comments: Since the separation of the unity between Egypt and Syria and the abolition of all laws of the unity country, there is no law for prosecuting minister-level officials. Article 160 makes prosecuting ministers possible, but also in front of a special court that needs a law to specify its procedures and penalties. As in the case of the president of the republic, this law has not yet been issued. In many cases, ministers were prosecuted for their crimes after leaving office, according to criminal law. Among the ministers prosecuted were Mohey Idean Al-Ghareeb, minister of finance, Mostafa Al-Said, minister of economics and Abd-Al-Hameed Hassan, governor of Giza.

References: Nahdit Masr (Egypt Rise) Newspaper, Jan. 26-27, 2006. The Egyptian Constitution, articles 85, 137 and 160

Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?

26a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

Comments: All public servants and state employees in Egypt, including the president of the republic, head of the Ministers' Council, ministers, governorates, legislators are required to file asset disclosure forms in the beginning of their mandate in public service and review them every five years, so as change in one's wealth can be detected. Law no. 11/1968 for illegal profiting, amended by law no. 2/ 1977 (article 5) states that all employees and public servants, with no exception, are required to file asset disclosure forms showing their own properties, and the properties owened by their spouses and children.

References: The Egyptian Constitution, articles 85, 137 and 160

26b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

References: Nahdit Masr (Egypt rise) Newspaper, Jan. 26-27, 2006. The Egyptian Constitution, articles 85, 137 and 160

Peer Review Comments: According to the law, ministers must present a report that lists all the property they own before and during the time they occupy their positions in order to show to what extent they benefited from their job, but actually this law is not followed.

26c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.

Score:

YES

Comments: In accordance with article 77 of law no. 47/1978 for state employees, public servants are not permitted to directly or indirectly accept gifts, rewards, commissions or advances in exchange for doing their duties.

References: Article 77 of law no. 47/1978 for state employees

26d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (ministers and heads of state and government). The Central Accounting Apparatus (established by law no. 144/1988) audits the asset disclosure forms of ministers and heads of state and government. In case any citizen informs of illegal profiting or unreasonable growth in the wealth of public servants, The Illegal Profiting Apparatus (established by law no. 62/1975) investigates the information and converts the case to the court.

References: Law no. 144/1988 for establishing the central accounting apparatus Law no. 62/1975 for establishing the illegal profiting apparatus

26e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.

Score:

YES

Comments: There are no legal restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers to enter the private sector after leaving the government. Article 81 of the constitution states that while being in office the president of the republic cannot practice free careers, commercial, financial or industrial work; buy or lease any of state proprieties; sell to state any of his proprieties; barter anything with the state. The same applies to ministers according to article 158 of the constitution. Thus the restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector apply only to their being in office. After leaving the government, they can freely enter the private sector.

References: The Egyptian Constitution, articles 81 and 158

26f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, there are no regulations for organizing post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers. The present government of Ahmed Nazef is mainly a government of businessmen. For example, the minister of Health, Hatim AlGabaly, is one of the biggest investors in medicine and hospital industries, the minister on Transportation, Mohamed Mansour, is the owner of a company that possesses more than 30 percent of taxi businesses, while Zoheir Garana, the minister of Tourism, is the owner of some of the biggest tourism businesses in Egypt.

References: Fagr (Dawn) newspaper, Jan. 23, 2006

26g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are not in effect as stated in item 14 of article 77 of law no. 47/1978. On the contrary, this and other laws pertaining to gifts and hospitality are completely ineffective. Thus, bribes and gifts of all kinds all widespread in Egypt.

References: Nahdit Masr (Egypt Rise) Newspaper, Jan. 26-27, 2006, P. 5.

26h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (ministers and above) are supposed to be audited. Ministers and members of the two legislative councils use two means to deceive the asset disclosures forms: either they duplicate their asset disclosures forms when entering office, so as to cover the wealth that will be added after the years in the ministry or legislature, or when leaving office they sell all the properties they got while being in office to their sons and wives. Moreover, auditing asset disclosures forms by the Central Accounting Apparatus is no longer effective or important, especially after the sentence of the Cassation Court in the suit against Minister Abd-Al-Hameed Hassan, governor of Giza governorate.

References: Sber Nail, Corruption- Marriage of Authority and Wealth, Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, P 120.

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?

27a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. Law no. 122/1975 amended by law 22/1983 concerning the preservation of official documents of state prevents citizens from accessing these documents.

References: Law no. 122/1975, amended by law 22/1983 on preserving official documents of state

27b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, citizens cannot access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within reasonable or unreasonable time period. Although Egypt signed all international agreements that guarantee free access of information, many domestic laws and practices hamper it. Law of the central apparatus for general mobilization and statistics, law of the central accounting apparatus, law no. 122/1975, amended by law 22/1983, law no. 256/1954, law no. 97/1995, and different monitoring agencies, such as the administrative prosecution and the Illegal Profiting Apparatus, prevent citizens from accessing the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at all, although they are subsidiary to the executive branch, not independent agencies.

References: Sber Nail Corruption- Marriage of Authority and Wealth, Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 17-30.

27c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.

Score:

100

References: Sber Nail Corruption- Marriage of Authority and Wealth, Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 17-30.

In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

28: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.

Score:

100

Comments: Despite the full monopoly of the ruling party in the Egyptian political system, this party is completely dependent on state agencies to the extent that it is now difficult to discriminate between this dominating party and the state's executive and security systems. There is a widespread attitude among state employees to join that party, sometimes by compulsion from heads of state and government, who are, at the same time, the head of the party. This make it difficult to separate the ruling political party from the state systems and agencies. This interference both handicapped the ruling NDP from natural growth and inflicted the state with practicing political discrimination and bias.

References: Amr Shobaki Political Parties and Presidential Elections, in Political Reform and Change in Egypt, a conference held on Nov. 12-22, 2006, The Human Rights Association for Helping Prisoners, Cairo.