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2007 Assessment

Egypt: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Egypt: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Anti-Corruption Agency
Indicators		Score
71	In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?	100
72	Is the anti-corruption agency effective?	42
73	Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?	13

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

71: In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?

Score:

YES

Comments: There is group of agencies with a legal mandate to address corruption: 76 The Administrative Monitoring Authority: it is a government authority that follows the president of the republic and in entrusted with fighting corruption in government agencies. The members of this authority have the status of judiciary arrest officers. The basic weakness of this authority is the lack of the political will. For example, the approval of the president of the republic is a condition for this authority to arrest a civil servant during work time. 77 The Central Auditing Apparatus. By virtue of law no. 129 /1960, the Central Auditing Apparatus was established with the general aim of financially and administratively monitoring civil service agencies, companies and banks in which there is a public money portion. In the amending law no. 144/1988, the aim of the apparatus was to monitor the money of the state and civil servants and helping the legislature in practicing its monitoring role. After it had been subordinated to the legislature in the 1960 law, it came to be subordinated d to the president of the republic in 1988 law. 78 The Illegal Profiting Apparatus: law no. 2/1977 for organizing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus, on which the law called "where did you get that money from" or the illegal profiting law is based, gives this apparatus the authority to regularly demand, monitor and check asset disclosure records of civil servants. These records can include the properties of one's spouse and children. 79 The Administrative Prosecution: an internal mechanism through which civil servants can report corruption. Law no. 117/1958 establishes the Administrative Prosecution as a monitoring and investigating authority that is responsible for investigating administrative and financial crimes and is authorized to send suspected civil servants to the Criminal Court. It has a professional, full time staff. 80 There are other agencies with a legal mandate to address corruption, such as the public money investigations which follows the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Public Money Prosecution which follows the Attorney General.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics And Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 37-38;

Law no. 144/ 1988 establishing the Central Auditing Apparatus, the official newspaper, issue 23, Nov. 9, 1988;

Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus;

Law no. 117/1958 on establishing the Administrative Prosecution;

Article 208 of the criminal procedures law concerning the Public Money Prosecution.

Is the anti-corruption agency effective?

72a: In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

Score:

YES

Comments: 81 The Central Auditing Apparatus follows the president of the republic and this in itself is a very strong form of political interference. 82 The Administrative Monitoring Authority follows the president of the republic and thisin itself is a very strong form of political interference. 83 The Administrative Prosecution Apparatus follows the minister of Justice, part of the executive branch, and this in itself is a very strong form of political interference. 84 The Illegal Profiting Apparatus, due to the legal defects in its law on imposing penalties on informers who cannot prove their accusations of civil servants, is ineffective in combating corruption.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics And Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 37-38;

Law no. 144/ 1988 establishing the Central Auditing Apparatus, the official newspaper, issue 23, Nov. 9, 1988;

Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus;

Law no. 117/1958 on establishing the Administrative Prosecution;

72b: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.

Score:

100

Comments: All anti-corruption agencies are administratively subordinate either to the president of the republic, the minister of Justice or the minister of the Interior. Appointments of these agencies are also made by the executive branch. This ultimate subordination to the executive branch makes the heads and members of these agencies only seek to satisfy executive officials. In many cases these agencies cannot take acts or initiate investigations, unless they obtain a prior consent of the president of the republic. Activating these agencies from time to time in covering some corruption issues is intentionally manipulated in the framework of conflicts of interests, as to be an indication of the role of the government in fighting corruption. Although legal proceedings are taken in some corruption cases there is a widespread popular realization that "fat cats" or big heads in making corruption are still immune from accountability.

References: Dr. Ahmed Al-Sawy, Fighting Corruption: The First Step for Reform a paper delivered to the "Horizons of Political Reform" symposium Ibn-Roshd center, Cairo, Nov. 29-30, 2005

72c: In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification.

Score:

100

Comments: The president of the republic is the one who appoints, removes or extends the service of the head of the Central Auditing Apparatus and the Administrative Monitoring Authority. For example, when Hitler Tantawy (an ex-military general) was appointed as head of the Central Accounting Apparatus, several corruption cases have been uncovered, the most important of which was that of the undersecretary of the (strong) minister of Agriculture (Youssof Waly). Soon afterward, Tantawy was dismissed.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics And Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 23-25;

72d: In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria.

Score:

100

Comments: In all anti-corruption agencies appointments are based on professional criteria. These agencies carefully select members and provide them with continuous training and preparation programs to raise their abilities and better performance. These agencies have strict regulations and moral codes that should be followed by all members. They also have internal monitoring and disciplinary codes for their members. New recruits are subjected to attentive monitoring for a full year before being fixed in their jobs. They also have transparent accountability rules for their members. However, the heads of these agencies are politically appointed. This last defect is strong enough to waste the potentialities of anti-corruption agencies.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics And Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 23-25;

72e: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the anti-corruption agencies have a professional, full-time staff. They are selected according to specific professional standards. Good reputation, honesty, impartiality and competence are all prerequisites in new members. Members, new and old, are subjected to continuous training programs aiming at improving their performance in fighting corruption.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics And Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 23-25;

72f: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The agency (or agencies) has a predictable source of funding that is fairly consistent from year to year. Political considerations are not a major factor in determining agency funding. <p>50 Score Criteria: The agency (or agencies) has a regular source of funding, but may be pressured by cuts, or threats of cuts to the agency budget. Political considerations have an effect on agency funding. <p>0 Score Criteria: The agency\'s funding sources are unreliable. Funding may be removed arbitrarily or as retaliation for agency actions.$

Comments: Like all civil service agencies, the anti-corruption agencies receives regular funding from the government.

References: Law no. 1444/1988 organizing the Central Auditing Apparatus; Law no. 2/1977 organizing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus; Law no. 117/1958 organizing the Administrative Prosecution Authority; Article 208 of the criminal procedures law concerning the Public Money Prosecution.

72g: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public reports.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the anti-corruption agencies make regular public reports, but these reports are not available to citizens. For example, reports of the Central Auditing Apparatus are only delivered to the president of the republic and the legislature.

References: Negad Al-Boraiy, Egyptian Visions on Corruption The Center for Political Research, Cairo University, 2002.

72h: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the anti-corruption agencies have sufficient powers to carry out their mandate. All these agencies have the judicial arrest status, which means that they are authorized to issue arrest orders without returning to the general prosecution. They are also authorized to initiate investigations. But their subordination to the executive branch restricts their effectiveness in combating corruption.

References: Law no. 144/1988; Law no. 2/1977; Law no. 117/1958 Article 208 of the criminal procedures law

72i: In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations.

Score:

100

Comments: Although most anti-corruption agencies can initiate investigations, they must first obtain the consent of the president of the republic or of the executive agencies to which they are subordinated. For example, the Central Auditing Apparatus has to get the approval of the president of the republic before initiating investigations, the Public Money Prosecution has to get the approval of the Attorney General or the minister of Justice, and the Public Money Investigations Authority has to get the approval of the minister of the Interior.

References: Law no. 144/1988; Law no. 2/1977; Law no. 117/1958 Article 208 of the criminal procedures law

Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?

73a: In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the only anti-corruption agency that is authorized to receive and act on complaints is the Illegal Profiting Apparatus as it has a separate office for examining complaints. It can also require the assistance of the Administrative Monitoring Authority to examine complaints by citizens. If the investigations prove that there is certainly illegal profiting crime, the apparatus converts the case to the specialized Criminal Court. If the violation is no more than an administrative one, the apparatus returns the case to the agency in which the civil servant works to impose an administrative penalty upon him/her.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus.

73b: In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, citizens cannot complain to the anti-corruption agency (the Illegal Profiting Apparatus) without fear of recrimination. Law no. 2/ 1977 for establishing the apparatus imposes penalties on claimants - no less than six month in prison and fines from 100 to 500 pounds (US$18-90) if their claims are not proven to be true. Due to the manipulation of the asset disclosure records of civil servants, the persons accused can often prove their innocence. This prevents citizens from informing the apparatus of corruption cases, for fear of being imprisoned.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus