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2007 Assessment

Egypt: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Egypt: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Whistle-blowing Measures
Indicators		Score
45	Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?	0
46	In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?	100
47	In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?	81

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?

45a: In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are not protected from recrimination or other negative consequences. Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus does not provide protection against recrimination or other negative consequences in case they inform responsible authorities of corruption crimes.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus.

45b: In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

100

Comments: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus imposes penalties on persons informing of corruption, whether they are civil servants of not, for telling lies lying corruption or what it calls bad intentions for illegal profiting, whether their informing resulted in legal proceedings or not. If their claims were not verified by investigation authorities, the penalty on people informing of corruption crimes, as stated in the above law, is no less than six month in prison and fines ranging from 100 to 500 pounds (US$18-90). This prevents citizens from informing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus of corruption cases for fear of being imprisoned, especially with the manipulation of asset disclosure records of civil servants. As mentioned in other places in this survey, it is the civil servants who write their asset disclosure records, and they are used to selling their properties on paper to their relatives, as a means for escaping such investigations. In addition, ownership of real estates in Egypt is often not registered in the proclamation apparatus, which makes it easy for corrupt civil servants to escape interrogations.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus.

45c: In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

YES

Comments: In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are not protected from recrimination or other negative consequences. Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the illegal profiting apparatus imposes penalties on persons informing of corruption, whether they are civil servants of not, for telling of lies lying corruption or what it calls bad intentions for illegal profiting, whether their informing results in legal proceedings or not. If their claims were not verified by investigation authorities, the penalty on people informing of corruption crimes, as stated in the above law, is no less than six month in prison and fines ranging from 100 to 500 pounds (US$18-90). This prevents citizens from informing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus of corruption cases for fear of being imprisoned, especially with the manipulation of asset disclosure records of civil servants.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus.

45d: In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

Score:

100

Comments: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus imposes penalties on persons informing of corruption, whether they are private sector employees of not, for telling lies lying corruption or what it calls bad intentions for illegal profiting, whether their informing resulted in legal proceedings or not. If their claims were not verified by investigation authorities, the penalty on people informing of corruption crimes, as stated in the above law, is no less than six month in prison and fines ranging from 100 to 500 pounds (US$18-90). This prevents citizens from informing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus of corruption cases for fear of being imprisoned, especially with the manipulation of asset disclosure records of civil servants.

References: Law no. 2/1977 for establishing the Illegal Profiting Apparatus.

In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

46: In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?

Score:

YES

Comments: In law, there is an internal mechanism through which civil servants can report corruption. Law no. 117/1958 establishes the Administrative Prosecution as a monitoring and investigating authority that is responsible for investigating administrative and financial crimes and authorized to send suspected civil servants to the Criminal Court. In addition this Administrative Prosecution has a professional, full time staff.

References: Law no. 117/1958 concerning establishing the administrative prosecution.

In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?

47a: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff. The 2002 annual report on administrative and financial corruption presented to the president of the Administrative Prosecution authority included about 73,000 cases, of which 43,000 were financial breach cases. These last breaches included violations in bids, auctions, storehouses and purchases, wasting public money, and taking state money illegally. Administrative violations constituted about 23,000 cases, ranging from ceasing work, faulty behavior, involving other paid employment without getting the permission of the specialized authority. Most important are the 10,000+ criminal cases: embezzling public money, facilitating the stealing of public money, bribes, forgery or using forged documents. The importance of the Administrative Prosecution is attested by the fact that the law gives it the authority to monitor and investigate all civil servants in all ministries and agencies and at all levels. It, therefore, has a massive professional, full-time staff.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics and Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 37-38.

47b: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.

Score:

100

Comments: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption - the Administrative Prosecution authority - receives regular funding like all other government agencies.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics and Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 37-38.

47c: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: Due to the very big number of investigated cases - about 75,000 cases every year in the 2002-2007 period - the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints in a relatively long time period. The number of cases exceeds the ability of the Administrative Prosecution authority.

References: The report of the president of the Administrative Prosecution authority, 2002.

47d: In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: When irregularities are discovered, the agency/entity is aggressive in investigating the government or in cooperating with other agencies\' investigations. <p>50 Score Criteria: The agency/entity starts investigations, but is limited in its effectiveness. The agency/entity may be slow to act, unwilling to take on politically powerful offenders, reluctant to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or occasionally unable to enforce its judgments. <p>0 Score Criteria: The agency/entity does not effectively investigate. The agency/entity may start investigations but not complete them, may refuse to cooperate with other investigative agencies, or may fail to detect offenders. The agency/entity may be partisan in its application of power.$

Comments: In practice, when necessary, the Administrative Prosecution authority (the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption) initiates investigations in administrative and financial crimes and converts the accused persons to the Criminal Court. In cases that do not deserve converting convicted civil servants to the court, the Administrative Prosecution authority gives authorized agencies in the department in which the civil servants work the authority to impose disciplinary penalties. Some governmental agencies developed a special disciplinary system under the pretext that this removes fear and reinforces performance. But this, in fact, overthrows the wardship of the Administrative Prosecution authority and provides space to corruption and misuse of civil service positions.

References: Saber Nail, Corruption And Marriage between Politics and Wealth, Al-Khamaseen publishing house, Cairo, PP. 37-38.