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2007 Assessment

Colombia: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Whistle-blowing Measures
Indicators   Score
45 Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)? 69
46 In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption? 100
47 In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective? 63

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

45 Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?
 
  45a: In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: There are no specific laws protecting whistle-blowers in the public sector, however the legal base for whistle-blower protection can be found in different legal documents. According to Law 734 of 2002, it is a duty of public servants to denounce disciplinary faults, crimes and contraventions, and to offer guarantees to public servants or citizens that report wrongdoing of public servants. Although there is no specific system of whistle-blowing protection for public servants reporting corruption, they can be covered by witness protection programs which are primarily directed to protect in penal processes and those involving human rights violations.

Law 104 of 1993 created the Program to Protect Witness, Victims, and Employees from the General Prosecutor´s Office (Fiscalía General). Law 241 of 1995 extended this protection to disciplinary processes in the Procuraduría (General Attorney´s Office). Currently the Program at the General Prosecutor´s Office is based on the law 418 of 1997, and its most recent extension, the law 1106 of 2006. The General Attorney´s Office program is not working but the General Attorney is very active in supporting and promoting other witness protection programs.

References: Ley 104 de 1993 (art. 63).

Ley 241 de 1995, Por la cual se prorroga la vigencia, se modifica y adiciona la Ley 104 de 1993. Art. 38

Procuraduria General de la Nación. RESOLUCION NÚMERO 28 (12 MAR. 1996) Por la cual se crea el Programa de protección a testigos, víctimas, intervinientes en el proceso disciplinario y funcionarios de la entidad.

Ley 418 de 1997, Diario Oficial No. 43.201 del 26 de diciembre de 1997, "Por la cual se consagran unos instrumentos para la búsqueda de la convivencia, la eficacia de la justicia y se dictan otras disposiciones."

LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico

LEY 782 DE 2002 (diciembre 23) Diario Oficial No. 45.043, de 23 de diciembre de 2002 Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la Ley 418 de 1997, prorrogada y modificada por la Ley 548 de 1999 y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones. Art. 26

Ley 1106 de 2006, publicada en el Diario Oficial No. 46.490 de 22 de diciembre de 2006, "Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la Ley 418 de 1997 prorrogada y modificada por las Leyes 548 de 1999 y 782 de 2002 y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones" art. 1

Peer Review Comments: It is a duty of public servants to denounce disciplinary faults and crimes, but no legal protections exist for public-sector whistle-blowers.

  45b: In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: Although there are witness protection programs in place, they don´t effectively cover public sector whistle-blowers and witnesses in corruption cases, but usually in cases regarding human rights violations. However, it is important to note that given the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia, protection to human rights defenders, whistle-blowers and witnesses means protection to those denouncing corruption cases.

In any case, public servants report that a major constraint for them to denounce corruption is the fear of retaliation. In a study conducted by the World Bank and the vice presidency of the Republica in 2002, the main reasons for public servants not to denounce corruption cases was identified as the lack of protection against possible reprisals and a lack of confidence in the mechanisms designed to investigate and sanction corruption cases. On the most recent evaluation of institutional performance made among public employees in 2005, public servants in most national level public institutions also report that they don´t denounce corruption, mostly because they fear retaliation.

Finally, the weakness of the systems to protect public sector whistle-blowers is reflected in the fact that the majority of effective corruption investigations are initiated by denouncements made by media reports. It is important to note that given the security situation in Colombia, the most common retaliations are related to personal security.

References: GTZ. 2005. ANEXO 1: TABLA DE SINTESIS (MEMORIA DE TRABAJO DE MARINO TADEO HENAO, DICIEMBRE, 2005) CONVENCION DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CONTRA LA CORRUPCION. [ LINK ]

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2004. El Control Social a la Administración pública en Colombia. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 8. Bogotá

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las diposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la Corrupción.

Vicepresidencia de la República, Banco Mundial. 2002. Corrupción, Desempeño institucional y Gobernabilidad en Colombia.

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional.

  45c: In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: There are no specific laws protecting whistle-blowers in the private sector, although there are general programs primarily directed to protect witnesses in penal processes and those involving human rights violations which may cover whistleblowers in corruption cases. According to Law 734 of 2002, it is a duty of public servants to denounce disciplinary faults, crimes and contraventions, and to offer guarantees to public servants or citizens that report wrongdoing of public servants. Thus, there are some procedures which can be extended to protect whistleblowers in the private sector although they are not specifically directed to them.

The Law 104 of 1993 created the Program to Protect Witness, Victims, and Employees from the General Prosecutor´s Office (Fiscalía General) which manages the investigation of corruption cases. The Law 241 of 1995 extended this protection to disciplinary processes of public servants in the Procuraduría (General Attorney´s Office). Currently the Program at the General Prosecutor´s Office is based on the law 418 of 1997, and its most recent extension, the law 1106 of 2006. The General Attorney´s Office program is not currently working but the General Attorney is very active in supporting and promoting other witness protection programs.

References: Ley 104 de 1993 (art. 63).

Ley 241 de 1995, Por la cual se prorroga la vigencia, se modifica y adiciona la Ley 104 de 1993. Art. 38

Procuraduria General de la Nación. RESOLUCION NÚMERO 28 (12 MAR. 1996) Por la cual se crea el Programa de protección a testigos, víctimas, intervinientes en el proceso disciplinario y funcionarios de la entidad.

Ley 418 de 1997, Diario Oficial No. 43.201 del 26 de diciembre de 1997, "Por la cual se consagran unos instrumentos para la búsqueda de la convivencia, la eficacia de la justicia y se dictan otras disposiciones."

LEY 782 DE 2002 (diciembre 23) Diario Oficial No. 45.043, de 23 de diciembre de 2002 Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la Ley 418 de 1997, prorrogada y modificada por la Ley 548 de 1999 y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones. Art. 26

Ley 1106 de 2006, publicada en el Diario Oficial No. 46.490 de 22 de diciembre de 2006, "Por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la Ley 418 de 1997 prorrogada y modificada por las Leyes 548 de 1999 y 782 de 2002 y se modifican algunas de sus disposiciones" art. 1

Peer Review Comments: No legal protections exist for private-sector whistle-blowers.

  45d: In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: There are no formal programs or laws to protect private sector whistle-blowers in corruption cases. However there is a general program of witness protection and private sector whistleblowers can recur to this program to look for their own protection. The majority of effective corruption investigations are initiated by denouncements made by particulars or media reports, and it may suggest that there are better incentives for private individuals than for public employees to denounce. It is important to note that given the security situation in Colombia, the most common retaliations are related to personal security than with retaliations such as losing a job or a relocation to less prominent positions. There are no available reports about cases of retaliation against whistleblower protection. Yet, it is important to note that there is still an important ground to cover in order to extend to the private sector regulations to prevent and combat corruption basically focused in the public sector. Aditionally, the sistem of witness protection in still susceptible of being more efficient and more explicitly extended to corruption cases. Given the situation of armed conflict in Colombia, protection is usually given to witnesses in cases related to human rights violations.

References: GTZ. 2005. ANEXO 1: TABLA DE SINTESIS (MEMORIA DE TRABAJO DE MARINO TADEO HENAO, DICIEMBRE, 2005) CONVENCION DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS CONTRA LA CORRUPCION. [ LINK ]

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2004. El Control Social a la Administración pública en Colombia. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 8. Bogotá

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la Corrupción.

46 In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?
 
  46: In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments: Civil servants can report corruption cases using the same mechanisms available for citizens in general. They can report to the General Attorney, the Ombudsman, the General Prosecutor, the Presidential Program against corruption and the internal control offices in each entity. Most entities have free phone lines or internet reporting mechanisms. According to Law 190 of 1995, each public entity shall create a free phone line for citizens to report recommendations, denouncements or critics related to the service offered by the respective institution. According to the same law each entity shall report the main complaints and their resolution every three months to the Citizen Commission for the Fight Against Corruption .

References: Ley 190 of 1995. (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa. art. 53

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El Sistema Nacional de Integridad. Análisis y Resultados del Estudio de Caso.

47 In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?
 
  47a: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: As there is no exclusive mechanism for civil servants to report corruption, the score given on this indicator is derived from the performance of the general reporting mechanisms that receive information from any citizen. It is important to note also, that although no specific statistics are available, it is believed that reports of corruption generated in public servants are less common than reports generated in common citizens.

The most important mechanisms for reporting public sector corruption are those located at the Presidential Anti-corruption Program, the General Attorney´s Office, the Supreme Audit Institution and the General Prosecutor´s Office. The existence of these mechanisms has strengthened a culture of denouncement and as reported by the Presidential Anti-corruption Program in 2004, those mechanisms have increased the number of reported corruption cases. In general, despite some personnel weaknesses, important reports received are usually acted upon with efficiency. An increasing number of denouncements may require more staff, and it has led the heads of the above mentioned agencies to focus their follow-up efforts in high level corruption cases.

The reporting mechanism of the Presidential Anti-corruption Program has personnel (one person usually) that continuously monitors the cases reported and directs denouncements to the appropriate agencies. However, according to the Director of the Program most relevant, denouncements are sent directly to him rather than reported through the phone line and thus sometimes it is a waste of time monitoring the phone line.

The General Attorney´s office (Procuraduria) reported that in 2006 it received 500,000 documents reporting irregularities or offenses. From that universe, 31 percent were directed for disciplinary processes and 22 percent for preventive processes. By law, the institution has an office exclusively dedicated to attend the reports made through the phone line or email.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 18 2007. Bogotá.

Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

  47b: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: As there is no exclusive mechanism for civil servants to report corruption, the score given on this indicator is derived from the performance of the general reporting mechanisms that receive information from any citizen. It is also important to note that although no specific statistics are available, it is believed that reports of corruption generated in public servants are less common than reports generated from common citizens.

The most important mechanisms for reporting public sector corruption are those located at the Presidential Anti-corruption Program, the General Attorney´s Office, the Supreme Audit Institution and the General Prosecutor´s Office. It is important to note that these mechanisms are general, not only for civil servants to report. The existence of these mechanisms has strengthened a culture of denouncement and, as reported by the Presidential Anti-corruption Program in 2004, those mechanisms had increased the number of reported corruption cases There is no specific budget allocation for these types of mechanisms in general, but their funding is reliable and included within the general budget of the specific institution. The funding for these mechanisms might not be affected by political considerations as much as by efficiency or budgetary considerations. In general, important reports received are usually acted upon with efficiency, but an increasing number of denouncements may increasingly require more resources, and it has led the heads of the above mentioned agencies to focus their follow-up efforts in high level corruption cases.

The Presidential Anti-corruption Program in general has limited budget, however its director believes that is is possible to work with the available resources by focusing on the most relevant cases.

There is no specific information on the available resources for the reporting mechanism at the General Attorney´s Office, but the number of reports testifies to the relevance of this mechanism. The General Attorney´s office reported that in 2006 it received 500,000 documents reporting irregularities or offenses. From that universe, 31 percent were directed for disciplinary processes and 22 percent for preventive processes. According to the 2005 Institutional Performance Survey of public servants, employees in the General Attorney´s Office believe that resources are the weakest component of institutional performance and that there are not enough resources to fulfill the mandate of the institution. This is the response of 37.4 percent of respondents in the General Attorneys Office. However, there is a specific office attending to complaints received through the phone line or email.

References: DANE. 2006. Encuesta Desempeño y Ambiente institutional Procuraduria General de la Nación.

Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 18 2007. Bogotá

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

  47c: In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: As there is no exclusive mechanism for civil servants to report corruption, the score given on this indicator is derived from the performance of the general reporting mechanisms that receive information from any citizen. It is important to note also, that although no specific statistics are available, it is believed that reports of corruption generated in public servants are less common than reports generated in common citizens.

In general the perception is that when denouncements are made, they are quickly directed into investigation when relevant. What is more difficult to determine in a reliable way is how much time it will take to solve the case. The Procuraduria has relieved the congestion of processes over the past five years, which means that there is more efficiency in acting on complaints. However, it is important to note that available statistics do not show the average time that takes a process by type of offense or how many processes denounced by civil servants became effectively investigated. The number of files under process went from 63,688 in 2000 to 34,498 in 2006, showing the advances in acting upon cases.

Regarding the Presidential Anti-corruption Program, when a complaint is considered relevant, the Program acts quickly in submitting it to the agency that may have the mandate to investigate and sanction the specific case. In that case it is not clear how much time the respective institution may take to complete an investigation. Although most institutions have made efforts in recent years to act quickly on complaints, there are delays and backlogs. The Director of the anti-corruption agency reports that most of the complaints made through the reporting mechanism are not relevant to the interests of the agency and therefore are quickly dismissed.

It is important to note that according to a recent survey on the perception of democracy in Colombia, the Procuraduria, with a specific mandate to investigate corruption, is better perceived by citizens than the judiciary. In general, however, citizens believe that the main obstacle to protecting rights is the fact that investigations are slow.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program July 18 2007. Bogotá

Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Sellingson, Mitchell. 2007. La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia. Vanderbilt University.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

  47d: In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments: As there is no exclusive mechanism for civil servants to report corruption, the score given on this indicator is derived from the performance of the general reporting mechanisms that receive information from any citizen. It is important to note also, that although no specific statistics are available, it is believed that reports of corruption generated in public servants are less common than reports generated in common citizens.

The perception is that more investigations increasingly derive from denouncements made through reporting mechanisms. It is important to note that answers to denouncements can be more easily carried out at the national than at the local level. In fact, in order to look for more efficiency in case solution, national level reporting mechanisms have focused in managerial and high level corruption, probably leaving behind important cases at the local level. According to a recent survey on perceptions of democracy in Colombia, the Procuraduria, with an specific mandate to investigate corruption, is better perceived by citizens than the judiciary. In general, however, citizens believe that the main obstacle to protect rights is the fact that investigations are slow.

The Presidential Anti-corruption Program does not have power to initiate investigations, but over the past year under the new director it has been very active in collaborating with intelligence agencies and judiciary institutions to work on high level corruption cases, most of them related to irregular procurement.

The General Attorney´s office does have power to initiate investigations and it does. However, as in the case of the Anti-corruption Program, the General Attorney has decided to focus active investigation on cases of managerial and high level corruption. In 2006 it received 500,000 documents reporting irregularities or offenses. From that universe, 31 percent were directed for disciplinary processes and 22 percent for preventive processes.

In general the perception is that when denouncements are made, they are quickly directed into investigation when relevant. What is more difficult to determine in a reliable way is how much time it will take to solve the case. The Procuraduria has relieved the congestion of processes over the past five years, which means that there is more efficiency in acting on complaints. However, it is important to note that available statistics do not show the average time that takes a process by type of offense or how many processes denounced by civil servants became effectively investigated. The number of files under process went from 63,688 in 2000 to 34,498 in 2006, showing the advances in acting upon cases.

References: Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director of Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 18 2007. Bogotá

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2202. El sistema nacional de integridad, Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 4. Bogotá.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

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