| Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Civil Service Regulations | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 41 | Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff? | 100 |
| 42 | Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective? | 61 |
| 43 | Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants? | 71 |
| 44 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants? | 0 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 41 | Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff? | |||||||
| 41a: In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service. | ||||||||
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Comments: The law 909 of 2004 on Civil Service regulates civil service and establishes that merit is one of the main principles on the functioning of civil service. It means that professional and personal qualities are the main substantial elements in the selection processes for public servants. According to the Constitution, impartiality and the preeminence of general interest are key principles in the functioning of civil service. The Constitution also prohibits the use of party affiliation as a determinant of the selection, promotion or removal of public servants. (art. 125) References: Ley 909 de 2004, por la cual se expiden normas que regulan el empleo público, la carrera administrativa, gerencia pública y se dictan otras disposiciones. Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art. 125.
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| 41b: In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Constitution, public servants cannot appoint relatives unless the relatives participate in competitive selection processes. There are competitive selection processes for members of civil service. Some posts are free of appointment and dismissal. This group includes managerial staff in agencies of the executive and posts of "confidence" which perform advising and essential functions to managerial levels. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 126
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| 41c: In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to article 130 of the Constitution, there is a National Civil Service Commission which has the mandate to administer and oversee the civil service. The Law 909 of 2004 establishes that such Commission is independent of the branches of public power. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 130 Ley 909 de 2004, por la cual se expiden normas que regulan el empleo público, la carrera administrativa, gerencia pública y se dictan otras disposiciones.
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| 41d: In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment. | ||||||||
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Comments: In 2003 President Alvaro Uribe presented a referendum on 15 issues that ranged from economic reforms to changes in the composition of the Senate. The only point approved in that referendum referred to the "political death of corrupts" which was then translated into a Constitutional reform that included as a constitutional norm the mandate to inhibit as public servants all persons who had been convicted, at any time, for offenses against public patrimony. According to the Law 909 of 2004, the following inihibits public employment: a prison sentence lasting more than four years, except in case of political offenses; more than three disciplinary sanctions four years prior to the employment; to have a penal or disciplinary sanction in force when the employment is related to that sanction; to have a sanction for fiscal responsibility over five years before getting the employment, although this ceases when the employee pays back the General Audit Office (Contraloria). References: LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico. El Congreso de Colombia.
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| 42 | Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective? | |||||||
| 42a: In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: In practice, there are frequent cases in which public servants act according to political interest, this is especially the case in the regions where local political chiefs have notable influence on appointments and try to influence public servants in their decisions. At the national level, the political independence of public servants has increased with the laws that have been issued to modernize civil service. While employees that enter though a competitive process cannot be fired without justification, employees of "free appointment and removal" (managerial levels and their advisors) can be removed without relevant justification. In this case it is more likely to encounter un-appealed, politically motivated firings. All employees that enter civil service through competitive process can only be fired following a deficient performance evaluation. In any case, a firing decision can be appealed. In fact, the problem is that it is easier to get into the civil service than to get out, and in several cases servants with low performance remain in service due to the lack of serious evaluation. In recent years, systems of evaluation have been improved but they are still deficient. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El sistema nacional de Integridad en Colombia. Análisis y Resultados del eStudio de Caos. Cuadernos de Transparencia #4. Bogotá Interview with Fernando Grillo. Director of the Administrative Department for Civil Service DAFP. 14 July 2005. Bogotá
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| 42b: In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: At the local level, political considerations have influence on appointments to civil service,. It is important to note that in recent years there have been some efforts made to professionalize civil service and these are specially noted in national level institutions. According to a recent study by According to Francisco Longo, the civil service in Colombia is among the top four within Latin American countries, and above the Latin American average, in regards to the use of merit as a crucial consideration in civil service appointments. Evaluations are more formal requirements, rather than tools to measure real performance of employees. According to a recent evaluation of the Administrative Department for Civil Service based on performance evaluations, less than 1 percent of employees in civil service show low performance. This clearly shows the lack of accuracy of evaluations, as the widespread perception is that under-performance is considerably high. In the case of employees of free appointment and removal, party affiliation can be clear, even though they have merits for the post. With the new law on civil service and the creation of the National Commission for the Civil Service, there has been an increase in the number of entities reporting information on their personnel in order to nurture a national database on the civil service. These advances may help make meritocracy and control on civil servants more effective. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia: Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Bogotá Longo, Francisco. 2005. Diagnostico institucional comparado de sistemas de servicio civil. Interview with Fernando Grillo. Director of the Administrative Department for Civil Service DAFP. 14 July2005. Bogotá Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. 2006. Informe de Rendicion de Cuentas Sector Funcion Publica 2005-2006
Peer Review Comments: Appointments and professional assessments often are based on political considerations. Individuals appointed often have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, or other biases. Individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties.
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| 42c: In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. | ||||||||
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Comments: Nepotism, cronyism and patronage are legally discouraged but in practice, citizens are not very confident in the competitive processes of selection. They consider political recommendations and familiar relations important. With the legal reforms conducted in recent years, nepotism has been reduced, but it is still influential in civil service. However, according to a recent survey conducted by the DANE among civil servants, political considerations appear to have more influence on appointments than personal considerations. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia: Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Bogotá Longo, Francisco. 2005. Diagnostico institucional comparado de sistemas de servicio civil.
Peer Review Comments: Nepotism, cronyism, and patronage very often are accepted principles in the hiring, firing, and promotion of civil servants.
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| 42d: In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to a recent study by Francisco Longo, there are deficiencies in civil service information systems, thus it is difficult to identify how cohesive job descriptions are with current responsibilities. However, Colombia is one of the countries in Latin America where job descriptions are more detailed, to the point that these restrictions can create excessive inflexibilities for job mobility. References: Longo, Francisco. 2005. Diagnostico institucional comparado de sistemas de servicio civil.
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| 42e: In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small faction of total pay. | ||||||||
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Comments: Salaries are not a management tool, and thus bonuses linked to performance are a small percentage of salary. However with "prima técnica" (technical bonuses), managers and advisors in managerial levels can get up to 50 percent of their total pay according to their academic training, or on the basis of their performance. In the first case (advanced academic training) the bonuses become part of the total pay, but in the second it is not considered part of the total pay. For general staff, there are other bonuses that may represent a significant share of the total pay such as representation expenses, antiquity bonuses, transportation bonuses and travel expenses. References: Longo, Francisco. 2005. Diagnostico institucional comparado de sistemas de servicio civil. Interview with Fernando Grillo, Director of the Administrative Department for Civil Service DAFP. June 2005. Bogotá.
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| 42f: In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled. | ||||||||
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Comments: Although the government publishes the number of positions available when competitions are open, in general there is a lack of coherent information on current civil servants and employment needs. There has been an effort to solve this problem while creating the Sistema Unico de Información de Personal (SUIP--Centralized System on Personnel Information) which provides updated information on openings and recruitments. According to the Administrative Department of Civil service, the SUIP has information on 223 entities, from an expected total of 300 reporting entities between 2004 and 2008. The advances made on the information system allowed the DAFP to make the first report on the characterization of civil service in 2005. References: Longo, Francisco. 2005. Diagnostico institucional comparado de sistemas de servicio civil. Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública. 2006. Informe de Rendicion de Cuentas Sector Funcion Publica 2005-2006
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| 42g: In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: The National Commission for Civil Service (CNSC) is legally independent and autonomous from power branches, however it just recently began regular work (after reforms), thus it is difficult to evaluate its effectiveness. According to the most recent evaluation of work presented by the CNSC to Congress, it was reported that all complaints regarding competitive processes in 2005-2006 were answered in a timely manner. During the first three months in 2007 NCSC received 2,564 complaints. However, at the same time the CNSC reported that between 2005-2006 it received 508 "tutelage actions" (instrument to protect basic rights) and the agency was not prepared and did not have enough staff to answer such a high number of petitions. There are some fears that the CNSC might not be effective as there is an overlap of functions with the Administrative Department for Civil Service attached to the Presidency of the Republic (DAFP), and the CNSC can rely on the DAFP to conduct its work. The biggest inefficiencies of the CNSC are derived from the fact that it lacks enough personnel to conduct investigations in a timely and efficient way. References: Comisión Nacional del Servicio Civil. 2007. Informe a las Comisiones Séptimas del Congreso. de la República.
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| 42h: In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time. | ||||||||
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Comments: In general salaries are paid on time and there are no substantial reports of delays in payments over the past year. However, some unions report payment delays in state enterprises, mostly those that are undergoing restructuring processes. References: Organización Internacional del Trabajo OIT. 2006 Comentarios formulados por la Comisión de Expertos en Aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones (des 1990) Convenio sobre la protección del salario, 1949 (núm. 95) Colombia (ratificación: 1963) CEACR 2006/77a reunió, [ LINK ]
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| 42i: In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is a System of Information of public servants, which among other functions is aimed at detecting inabilities and incompatibilities, such as those derived from previous convictions. However, there is no exact information on how efficient this tool has been in detecting civil servants with these restrictions. The most effective tool to make sure than those convicted for corruption do not get into civil service again is made through the system of disciplinary antecedents issued by the General Attorney´s Office (Procuraduria General de la Nación). This certification is required to be contracted or to make contracts with the state. The General Attorney´s Office reports than in 2006 there were 1,600,000 petitions for disciplinary antecedents, three times the number in 2006, which reflects more interest and practical action preventing those convicted for corruption to get into the civil service again. References: Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las dosposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Procuraduría General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social Procuraduría.
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| 43 | Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants? | |||||||
| 43a: In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their personal interests may be affected. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is a detailed regime trying to prevent conflicts of interest. The Law 734 of 2002, or Disciplinary Code for Civil Servants states that a public servant cannot become creditor or debtor of someone interested in his office business and should recuse from policy decisions when there is a direct interest for himself, his relatives or his business partners. In general, public servants should recuse from policy decisions when there is a conflict between the particular and the general interest. Additionally, the Procurement Statute includes personal or economic interest as a reason for public servants to recuse from procurement decisions. References: LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico LEY 80 DE 1993 (octubre 28) por la cual se expide el Estatuto General de Contratación de la Administración Pública
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| 43b: In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no restrictions on employment in the private sector after leaving office. However, the Law 734 of 2002 prohibits former public servants to give advice or representation on matters related to their previous responsibility within one year after leaving office. It also prohibits them from influencing or participating directly or indirectly on matters that used to be their responsibility. References: LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico
Peer Review Comments: These restrictions (ihabilidades) are, however, arguably too short.
Peer Review Comments: Such restrictions do not exist. Although a broad array of inabilities and incompatibilities exist for public servants, no specific regulations restrict civil servants' ability to take positions in the private sector after leaving government jobs. This is the case, assuming those positions would not present a conflict of interest, such as a position that directly sought to influence former government colleagues.
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| 43c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Constitution expressly prohibits the acceptance of posts, honors and hospitality from foreign governments and international entities (art. 129). The Law 734 of 2002 makes a general prohibition for public servants to directly or indirectly accept gifts, hospitality and any kind of benefits. References: LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Art. 129
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| 43d: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for civil servants are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no system to monitor the activities of public servants after leaving office. In fact, there is a widespread perception that there is a "revolving door" between the public and the private sector. References: LEY 734 DE 2002. (febrero 5). por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico Misas Arango, Gabriel. 2005. La Lucha Anticorrupción en Colombia, teorías, prácticas y estrategias Contraloría General de la República, Bogotá.
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| 43e: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: Public employees frequently receive gifts and hospitality, although the perception is that bribing and petty corruption has decreased in recent years. However, it is still a tool to facilitate administrative procedures, to access to public services and, in most cases, to facilitate or render favorable procurement decisions. According to a recent survey about corruption among entrepreneurs, about 31.8 percent and 24.2 percent of respondents thought bribing is used very frequently or with certain frequency in procurement processes and to obtain licenses-permissions respectively. Among common citizens, according to the bribing barometer conducted by Transparency International, only 15 percent of common citizens surveyed declared to have payed bribes over the past year. In general, Colombia is the Latin American country where the perceptions about the existence of corruption in day-to-day transactions have improved the most. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2202. El sistema nacional de integridad: Resultados y Análisis del Estudio de Caso. Cuadernos de Transaprencia # 4. Bogotá. Confecámaras.2004. Encuesta Probidad III. Encuesta Empresarial sobre Corrupción y Probidad en el Secotr Público. Transparency International. 2006. Informe sobre el Barómetro Global de la Corrupción de Transparency International 2006 Corporación Latinobarometro 2005.
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| 43f: In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting personal interests are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: Although recently there has been an improvement in terms of regulations preventing conflicts of interest, it is still widely perceived that civil servants participate and influence policy decisions where their personal interest may be involved. It is important to note that according to a recent survey conducted by the DANE among public employees, the perception that personal interests affect policy decisions is smaller than the perception that these decisions are influenced by political considerations, for example in the case of procurement. The Procuraduria General de la Nación (General Attorney´s Office) reports that 3,802 civil servants were sanctioned for disciplinary faults in 2006. Presumably, some of these sanctions refer to conflicts of interests, and increased sanctions have helped reduce the extent of conflicts of interest. However, statistics are not desegregated enough to determine the real extent of sanctions against conflicts of interest. Finally, it is interesting to note that according to a recent survey on perceptions of democracy, only a fifth of those surveyed consider using personal considerations as a corrupt act in policy decisions such as appointments. References: DANE. 2006. ENCUESTA AMBIENTE Y DESEMPEÑO INSTITUCIONAL 2005. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Procuraduría General de la Nación. 2007. Balance Social Procuraduria 2006. Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Sellingson, Mitchell. 2007. La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia. Vanderbilt University.
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| 44 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants? | |||||||
| 44a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no specific provisions for citizens to access the asset disclosure forms of civil servants. Citizens can use the right of petition included in the Constitution (art. 23) to request those records but they might be difficult to access given habeas data restrictions. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art. 20, 23
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| 44b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: Asset disclosure forms are only available for the General Attorney´s Office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity and the National Registry´s Office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court, citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In general, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of civil servants. There can also be opposition to disclose asset disclosure forms to the public as this information can be used by criminals to threaten civil servants with kidnapping by ransom or extortion. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 15 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá
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| 44c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: Asset disclosure forms are only available for the General Attorney´s Office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity and the National Registry´s Office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court, citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In general, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of civil servants. There can also be opposition to disclose asset disclosure forms to the public as this information can be used by criminals to threaten civil servants with kidnapping by ransom or extortion. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 15 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá
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