| Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Legislative Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 29 | Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions? | 100 |
| 30 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature? | 54 |
| 31 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature? | 0 |
| 32 | Can citizens access legislative processes and documents? | 83 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 29 | Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to chapter four of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has the power to decide over the constitutionality of laws passed by congress when there are inconstitutionality demands made by citizens or by the government. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Cap. 4.
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| 29b: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature. | ||||||||
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Comments: The amount of bills that are reviewed by the Constitutional Court each year has increased substantially since 1991 as a reflection of an increased political independence of the Constitutional Court. Between 1991 and 2001 the court produced 2,923 rulings on constitutional review. The effectiveness of the Constitutional Court is such that it is sometimes criticized by sectors that consider it is acquiring power in legislative processes. As expressed by Cardenas et al, it is a consequence of the fact that after 1991 many issues became constitutional rights, and thus regulations on these matters have to be reviewed by the court. The court has produced profuse doctrine on a very wide range of matters. During the past year, some of the most noted rulings of the court were the conditions imposed on the Law of Peace and Justice, issued to reduce sentences for paramilitaries demobilized in a peace process initiated in 2003 and the depenalization of abortion. Since July 2007, there has been a controversy on the election of a new member of the court, for which the government initially sent a list of three conservative women. The move was criticized as a way to reduce the progressive spirit of the court, but especially because the elimination of the lists seemed to answer to the demands made by the conservative party to the president. In the end, two of the initial candidates quit the list and the government established a new one including the current Juridical Secretary of the Presidency in a very politicized and criticized decision. Thus, critics argue, the independence of the court can be weakened. The risks derived from this decision may lower the score of the indicator in the future. References: Cárdenas, Mauricio, Junguito, Roberto, Pachón, Mónica. 2006. Political Institutions, and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution Research Network Working Paper #R-508. Inter-American Development Bank. Revista Semana. 2007. La Corte de Uribe El Presidente ya no quiere quitarle poder a la Corte Constitucional, sino darle un rumbo más conservador. 07/28/2007 # 1317. Revista Semana. 2007. La categórica renuncia de las aspirantes a Magistrado de la Corte Constitucional desnuda una elección anunciada. August 14, 2007.
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| 29c: In law, are members of the national legislature subject to criminal proceedings? | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Constitution, all members of the legislature are subject to criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice, which is the only institution that can order a detention (art. 186 Constitution). As of July 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice was investigating 15 legislators accused of having links with illegal paramilitary groups, within a broad corruption scandal known as the "parapolitica." The legislators can lose their investiture (the privilege of being prosecuted only by the Supreme Court of Justice) for violating the regime of inhabilities and incompatibilities, for non-attendance to six plenary sessions in the same legislative period, for inadequate use of public funds and for influence peddling. Decisions on the lost of investiture are made by the Council of the State on Petition of the Direction of the corresponding chamber or of any citizen (art. 184). Between 1991 and 2003 there were 347 demands asking for a "lost of investiture," from which 42 were accepted and from them five referred to conflicts of interest. References: Constitucion Politica de Colombia 1991. Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes. Ley 144 de 1994. LEY 144 DE 1994 (julio 13) Diario Oficial No. 41.449., Julio 19 de 1994 "Por la cual se establece el procedimiento de pérdida de la investidura de los congresistas." Cepeda Ulloa, Fernando. 2003 . LA PERDIDA DE INVESTIDURA DE LOS CONGRESISTAS EN COLOMBIA: ANALISIS DE LA CAUSAL RELATIVA AL CONFLICTO DE INTERESES COMO INSTRUMENTO PARA LUCHAR CONTRA LA CORRUPCION. INFORME DE LA INVESTIGACION DIRIGIDA POR FERNANDO CEPEDA ULLOA PARA EL BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO OCTUBRE DE 2003.
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| 30 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, members of the national legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Law 5 of 1992, it is a duty of all legislators to present an asset disclosure declaration and a declaration of activities that may generate economic gain for them outside their position as legislators, when initiating their terms as legislators. References: Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes.
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| 30b: In law, there are restrictions for national legislators entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: The regime of inabilities and incompatibilities for legislators of the Constitution (art. 180) does not mention any restriction on private-sector employment after leaving the government, but only during and before being in office. However, the Law 734 of 2002 prohibits former public servants to give advice or representation on matters related to their previous responsibility within one year after leaving office, and also prohibits to influence or participate directly or indirectly on matters that used to be under their responsibility. The Law 5 of 1992 states that when a legislator has a direct interest in a legislative process because it can affect his wife or her husband, relatives, or associates, should declare impeded to vote and to participate in debates. And the law 144 of 1994 states that when legislators had been private-sector employees during the year before taking office, and the interests of those enterprises are involved in legislative processes, the legislators should declare impeded. Those restrictions about conflict of interest may prevent ex-legislators to influence their former colleagues, but there is no regulation on employment after leaving congress. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 180. Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes. Ley 144 de 1994. (julio 13) Diario Oficial No. 41.449., Julio 19 de 1994 "Por la cual se establece el procedimiento de pérdida de la investidura de los congresistas." LEY 734 DE 2002 (febrero 5) Diario Oficial No. 44.708 de 13 de febrero de 2002 "Por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico."
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| 30c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national legislature. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Constitution states that public servants cannot accept gifts, hospitality and honors from foreign governments or international institutions without previous authorization from the government. The law 734 of 2002, which refers to the disciplinary code for public servants, forbids them to receive or ask for gifts from users or employees who may have an interest on their performance, and the Law 190 of 1995 introduces influence peddling as a criminal offence. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia. Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Bogotá. Ley 734 de 2002 "Por la cual se reforma el Codigo Unico Disciplinario."
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| 30d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national legislature. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no formal requirement for the independent audit of asset disclosure forms. The Law 190 of 1995 only states that this information has to be always in the personnel offices of each entity and it is a requirement for public servants to fill this form out in order to take office. The Decree 2232 of 1995 establishes that the responsbility to review asset disclosure forms is in the hands of the chief of personnel in each government entity, but there is no specific regulation for legislators. The chief of personnel has to review every six months the veracity of declarations using a random selection method. The Administrative Department for Civil Service has created software called SIDEC to file and monitor asset disclosure forms but there are no statistics on the follow up to the asset disclosure forms. References: Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. . DECRETO NUMERO 2232 DE 1995. DIARIO OFICIAL. AÑO CXXXI. N. 42152. 18, DICIEMBRE, 1995 "por medio del cual se reglamenta la Ley 190 de 1995 en materia de declaración de bienes y rentas e informe de actividad económica y así como el sistema de quejas y reclamos."
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| 30e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national legislators are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: There are no restrictions on private-sector employment after leaving office. Conflicts of interest of this type may be prevented through other regulations preventing conflicts of interest. In any case, there are many deficiencies in the other regulations governing conflicts of interests. For example, a recent study by the Corporation Transparency for Colombia has determined that there are many informal meetings between interest groups and legislators in order to agree on decisions and there is no public registry of those meetings. Additionally, regulations to declare impediments during the discussion of legislative projects are not totally clear and in practice legislators participate in debates even when they have declared to have impediments. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes. Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2005. Riesgos de incidencia indebida de intereses particulares en la formación de leyes. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 10. Bogotá.
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| 30f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to national legislators are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: In practice, the regime of inabilities and incompatibilities may work as a restriction on receiving gifts to the extent that legislators should declare impeded to vote and discuss projects when a direct private interest from them is involved. Although the inabilities and incompatibilities regime works, there are some restrictions on its effectiveness. For example, there are many informal meetings between interest groups and legislators in order to agree on decisions and there is no public registry of those meetings. Additionally, regulations to declare impediments during the discussion of legislative projects are not totally clear and in practice legislators participate in debates even when they have declared to have impediments. In general, although there are legal frameworks to prevent conflicts of interests, there are still weaknesses in the detection of those conflicts and in the coordination of the institutions that have a responsibility in controlling and preventing conflicts of interest. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia. Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 4. Bogotá. Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2005. Riesgos de incidencia indebida de intereses particulares en la formación de leyes. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 10. Bogotá. Transparency International. Integridad Pública en América Latina: ¿Contribuye el marco legal latinoamericano a que los funcionarios sean íntegros? ¿Coincide la práctica con la ley?. www.transparency.org/content/download/17926/242560
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| 30g: In practice, national legislative branch asset disclosures are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: The asset disclosure forms of the legislative are audited but there is no mechanism or procedure to ensure regular auditing. As analyzed by the Corporation Transparency for Colombia, there are different limitations in effectively auditing asset disclosure forms. First, habeas data regulations and the public order situation by which citizens can be victim of kidnapping by ransom make difficult a real disclosure. Second, it is difficult to monitor increases in assets, because they are hidden behind practices such as money laundering, foreign accounts, and the use of legal entities to hide real assets. Additionally, in many cases information is not reliable. According to the most recent index of transparency in public institutions done by the Corporation Transparency for Colombia, the congress, and specifically the lower chamber, is among the institutions where a stronger effort in transparency has to be made. These problems still exist even though the Law 190 of 1995 obliges all public servants to declare their participation in private affairs as well as foreign accounts, loans and credits, etc. There is no formal requirement for the independent audit of asset disclosure forms. The Law 190 of 1995 only states that this information has to be always in the personnel offices of each entity and is a requirement for taking office. The Decree 2232 of 1995 establishes that the responsibility to review asset disclosure forms is in the hands of the chief of personnel in each government entity, but there is no specific regulation regarding legislators. It is stated that the chief of personnel has to review every six months the veracity of declarations using a random selection method. The Administrative Department for Civil Service has created software called SIDEC to file and monitor asset disclosure forms and it constitutes an advance in the quality of auditing. However, there are no statistics on the follow up to asset disclosure forms through this system, although it represents a significant advance. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. Indice de Transparencia Nacional, Entidades públicas nacionales. 2006. Bogotá.
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| 31 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature? | |||||||
| 31a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature. | ||||||||
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Comments: The asset disclosure forms are only available for the general attorney's office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry's office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court, citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In sum, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of legisaltors. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa." Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 1. Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995.
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| 31b: In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: The asset disclosure forms are only available for the general attorney's office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry's office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court, citizens can authorize the use of information about them registed in databases of public institutions. In sum, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of legislators. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa." Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 15. Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá.
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| 31c: In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: The asset disclosure forms are only available for the general attorney's office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry's office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court, citizens can authorize the use of information about them registed in databases of public institutions. In sum, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of legislators. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa." Constitución Política de Colombia. art. 15 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamerican contra la corrupción. Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, head of the anticorruption program of the Presidency of the Republic. July 19, 2007. Bogotá.
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| 32 | Can citizens access legislative processes and documents? | |||||||
| 32a: In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the Law 5 of 1992 for all sessions of the congress there should be a record with a relation of the participants, the interventions, the propositions and the decisions made. There should be an official printed media called Gaceta del Congreso for the publicity of all legislative debates. There can be reserved sessions on decision taken by a fifth of the members of the respective chamber or commission. References: Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes. art. 35, 36.
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| 32b: In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: Records are available at the library of the congress and are published in the newspaper of the congress called Gaceta del Congreso. All records are available except those on reserved sessions. Records can be retrieved immediately from the library. Although citizens can have expedited access to legislative documents, both the senate and especially the lower chamber are perceived to have medium levels of transparency according to the most recent evaluation of transparency in public institutions made by the Corporation Transparency for Colombia. In general, citizens perceive that the most important negotiations on legislative decisions are made behind the scenes and are not transparent for the public. This perception is reflected in the fact that about 46 percent of citizens surveyed by Latinobarometro consider that democracy can exist without the congress. References: www.congreso.gov.co Programa Congreso Visible Universidad de los Andes. [ LINK ] Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2006. Indice de Transparencia Nacional Entidades Públicas Nacionales. Bogotá. Corporación Latinobarometro. 2005. Informe Latinobarometro 2005.
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| 32c: In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: Records are free to all citizens for recent sessions if there is availability of the gazzette of the congress, and at the cost of photocopying for old records. Although citizens can have access to legislative documents at a low cost, both the senate and especially the lower chamber are perceived to have medium levels of transparency according to the most recent evaluation of transparency in public institutions made by the Corporation Transparency for Colombia. In general, citizens perceive that the most important negotiations on legislative decisions are made behind the scenes and are not transparent for the public. This perception is reflected in the fact that about 46 percent of citizens surveyed by Latinobarometro consider that democracy can exist without the congress. References: Programa Congreso visible Universidad de los Andes. [ LINK ] www.congreso.gov.co Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2006. Indice de Transparencia Nacional Entidades Públicas Nacionales. Bogotá. Corporación Latinobarometro. 2005. Informe Latinobarometro 2005.
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