| Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 75 |
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 100 |
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 50 |
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 0 |
| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 75 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 26: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There are different constitutional mechanisms to protect citizens from violations of civil rights. These are the "accion de tutela" (tutelage action or resource to defend basic rights), the "accion de cumplimiento" (observance action), which makes a law or administrative act effective; "derecho de petición" (right of petition to request information), and the "popular action", which protects collective rights. Article 89 of the constitution also expresses that the law should create other tools to protect individual and collective rights against state actions. The legal resources would be 1) recall mechanism for elected authorities, 2) nullity action and reposition of the rights, 3)action of reparation, and 4) electoral action of nullity. Some of those mechanisms, such as the "tutela" (tutelage action) are better known by citizens. In consequence, these and the rights of petition are more widely used by citizens to protect themselves from government actions. References: The Constitution of Colombia, 1991, articles 23, 86, 87, 88, 89
|
||||||||
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 27a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: According to the law, every decision of the executive has to be motivated follow the law and be limited in discretion. In practice, with some exceptions, the chief executive gives explanations for his policy decisions, and citizens are aware of the arguments the executive has for making decisions. Sometimes the executive makes surprising decisions that are explained after they're made. For example on May 13 2008, the government authorized - in a surprising decision - the extradition of 13 demobilized paramilitary leaders who were part of a negotiation process with the government. These leaders had extradition requests before the peace process. The government argued that they were extradited because they had continued criminal activities after their demobilization. The decision was explained by the president himself through an official president communication, but the surprise decision generated heated public debates. Since the beginning of his first mandate, President Alvaro Uribe created the "Consejos Comunitarios de Gobierno" (Communitarian Councils of Government). The Councils are weekly regional meetings moderated by Uribe himself to solve people´s problems. They have become a space for the president to explain his decisions. The councils have created a sense of efficiency highly valued by citizens, and at the same time reinforce Uribe´s unmediated approach to citizens. The downside of the openness of the government and cabinet members, is the fact that the president is not very keen on accepting questions from journalists or opponents in a regular manner. Although there is no official censorship, the government has accused some journalists of lack of patriotism when they report on corruption, violence and human rights. For example, in February, the president indicated that Carlos Lozano, author of the weekly communist newspaper Voz was paid by the FARC guerrillas. The president has also directly confronted Daniel Coronell, one of his most well-known opponents, and Gonzalo Guillen, from the newspaper El Nuevo Herald. References: Traslados desde Itagüí, Bogotá y Barranquilla Masiva extradición de jefes paramilitares. EL ESPECTADOR 13 de mayo de 2008 [ LINK ] Gobierno asegura que los 'paras' extraditados continuarán con el proceso de Justicia y Paz. El Espectador [ LINK ] Texto de la alocución presidencial con ocasión de la extradición de los jefes paramilitares. Mayo 13 de 2008 [ LINK ] Reporters without Borders, Colombia - Informe Anual 2008 [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 27b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality ex officio and ex ante of the most important statutes, treaties and bills issued by congress and proposed by the government. It can also review ex ante the declaration of any state of emergency. This is a legal period conferred by the congress to the president within which the president can issue decrees during periods of external war, economic crisis, or difficult public order situations. The Constitutional Court can also revoke decrees passed by the executive during periods of emergency if they are considered unconstitutional and any legislative decree issued by the government. The Council of the State reviews administrative actions of the government. References: The Constitution of Colombia 1991 articles 237 and 241
|
||||||||
| 27c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: During the last year, the Supreme Court has been very active in requesting explanations from the executive on certain controversial decisions. It was the case with the May 13 presidential decision that extradited to the United States, 14 paramilitary leaders who are part of a negotiation process with the government. Since the president argued that these leaders were extradited because they had continued committing criminal acts after their demobilization, the court asked why such behavior had not been reported by the government to judicial authorities. Despite the active role of the Supreme Court over the past year, it is important to note that the government has criticized this role and accused the court ot The reform also seeks to eliminate the responsibility of the Supreme Court to investigate legislators, something that is supported on the need to separate the investigation from judicial decisions. However it can affect the current process by which the Supreme Court is judging legislators involved in the para-politica scandal (links between politicians and paramilitaries). Such a proposal has been criticized by experts because it would reduce the independence of the high courts, and because they argue that this reform is not needed at this point, in which the major political reform is required in congress. As of July 2008, the Supreme Court decided that at least for now, they would not consider the executive´s reform proposal because it was not good timing for reform given that the Supreme Court is currently investigating and judging some legislators within the process known as para-política. The other courts decided to delay any opinion until a formal proposal is presented. Since its creation, the Constitutional Court has been very active in reviewing actions of the government and in voiding unconstitutional aspects of laws. In 2007, the court produced 195 sentences of constitutionality. The Constitutional Court has been characterized as been highly liberal and progressive and even criticized for excessive influence, by being fairly independent from the government, However, former magistrates and experts agree that the current court is losing independence from the government as well as the president has had a huge influence in recent selections of magistrates, putting forward a former secretary of the presidency as magistrate. References: Corte Suprema pide a Uribe explicaciones por extraditar a ex jefes paramilitares. EL TIEMPO [ LINK ] Corte Suprema cuestionó legitimidad de la reelección de Uribe en fallo contra Yidis Medina . [ LINK ] Referendo para que el pueblo ordene repetir elecciones del 2006 anunció el Presidente. [ LINK ] Desconcierto e incertidumbre por propuesta de referendo para repetir elecciones hecha por Uribe. EL TIEMPO 28 de junio de 2008 [ LINK ] Uribe vs. Corte Suprema: ¿qué salidas hay? SEMANA 27 DE JUNIO DE 2008 [ LINK ] No hay acuerdo con el Gobierno: Cortes . El Heraldo.Barranquilla, Sábado, 23 ago 2008 [ LINK ] "Reforma a la justicia es inoportuna": dice presidente de la Sala Administrativa de la Judicatura. EL TIEMPO 27 DE JULIO DE 2008 [ LINK ] 5 puntos clave de la reforma a la justicia. EL TIEMPO 30 DE JULIO DE 2008 [ LINK ] Presidente de la Corte Constitucional pidió más eficiencia para evitar proliferación de tutelas. El Tiempo. 23 de Agosto de 2008 [ LINK ] Corte Suprema Cerró La Puerta A Consenso Sobre Reforma A La Justicia. EL TIEMPO 1 DE AGOSTO DE 2008 [ LINK ] ANTE NUESTRO MAYOR MAL Justicia y narcotráfico Mauricio García Villegas. Columnista de EL TIEMPO. 21 DE MAYO DE 2008 [ LINK ] Tensión entre presidente Uribe y abogado Ramiro Bejarano en Comisión de Acusación. Abril 29 de 2008. EL TIEMPO [ LINK ] La otra guerra. Revista Semana 1366, Fecha: 07/05/2008 La noticia del rescate de Íngrid semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=113306 Retractación de 'Tasmania' cierra uno de los capítulos del enfrentamiento entre Gobierno y Corte. CAMBIO [ LINK ] Denuncia del Presidente Uribe contra el Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia: Un ataque más contra la independencia de la justicia . FEDERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [ LINK ] Corte Constitucional se uribizó: Carlos Gaviria. El Heraldo, Barranquilla, Agosto 2, 2008. [ LINK ] Polo: Los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional son "cortesanos" de Uribe . Caracol | Julio 25 de 2008 [ LINK ] Los hijos de la Constitución del 91 Por César Paredes Fecha: 07/08/2008. Semana.com. [ LINK ] Altas Cortes alzan la voz al Gobierno. EL HERALDO.COM 7 DE AGOSTO DE 2008 [ LINK ] La creciente influencia de Uribe en el Congreso, las Cortes, los medios y la opinión es un enorme desafío para la democracia colombiana. Fecha: 03/20/2008 Revista Semana 1351.
|
||||||||
| 27d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Executive orders are the norm in Colombia´s presidential system, but it is not a contravention to legal requirements, even by Latin American standards. The Colombian president is very powerful. The president has veto powers on legislative decisions, decree power, and gate-keeping powers on adding onto budgets. He can also use an "urgency petition" to prioritize bills in the legislative agenda. The 1991 constitution created some checks on presidential actions, and as a consequence the president today has lost power on agenda setting and is more accountable for his actions than before 1991. According to Cardenas et al., after 1991 the president has more difficulties in passing laws. However, the president is still the main agenda setter in most policy areas and this tendency has been strengthened given the high popularity of the current President Alvaro Uribe and his tendency to centralize orders into his hands. References: La recentralización en el Gobierno Uribe Martha Yaneth Sandoval Asesora del equipo económico y social Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía. [ LINK ] Cárdenas, Mauricio, Junguito, Roberto, Pachón, Mónica. 2006. Political Institutions, and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution Research Network Working Paper #R-508. Inter-American Development Bank. Shugart, Mattew Soberg. 1999. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries. In: Constitutional Political Economy, 10:1, March, 1999
|
||||||||
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 28a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The president can be investigated and accused by the head of the Procuraduria (Public Ministry or General Protector) or by the Accusations Commission of the Lower Chamber and the sanction power is in the hands of the Senate. In case of penal charges, the president can be investigated by the Supreme Court of Justice. Despite the existence of these mechanisms, in practice accusations of the president are highly political. On May 2008, the Accusations Commision of the Lower Chamber decided to archive 10 processes that had been initiated against the president over the past year because it did not find any reason to follow the demands. On July 2008, the commission opened preliminary investigation and called the president to give testimony on the "yidispolitica" scandal. This scandal dealt with the accusations that the government and the president offered gifts and public posts to two members of congress in order to get a reelection approved. This accusation was initiated by two legislators from the opposition party Polo Democratico. The Accusations Commission of the Lower Chamber does not have a good reputation given the lack of transparency in its procedures and the fact that it is highly politicized: currently 11 out of 15 legislators in the commission belong to the government´s coalition. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 178, 235 Archivan diez procesos en contra del Presidente. 21 mayo 2008 [ LINK ] Por cohecho, presidente Uribe rendirá declaración ante la Comisión de Acusaciones Julio 31 de 2008 CARACOL [ LINK ] El rey de burlas del Congreso. Revista Semana. 05/11/2008 [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 28b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: All ministerial level officials can be investigated, prosecuted and charged for criminal allegations by the Procuraduria (General Protector´s Office) for offenses related to the responsibilities of their position. The Supreme Court of Justice investigates ministerial-level officials in case of criminal and penal allegations after accusation of the General Prosecutor. For example, in June 2008, the General Attorney´s Office (Procuraduria General) opened an investigation against the Ministry of Social Protection for violating the secrecy of a judicial process. The process referred to a legislator who sold her vote for the constitutional reform that approved presidential reelection in 2004. The minister revealed in public some information that had been given by the accused legislator in her declarations. This minister as well as a former the Minister of Interior were also investigated for their supposed participation in providing favors to legislators in exchange of their favorable vote for reelections. In some cases, however, political criteria seem to shelter ministerial level officials from investigation. This is the case of the current director of the Institute for Roads, who had an investigation launched against him for using false documents and changing rules in public institutions on his favor. Although the investigation is in the hands if the General Prosecutor Daniel Arizabaleta, the director is still in office. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art. 234, 277, 251 el olvido Por Daniel Coronell. Revista Semana 12 de Julio de 2008 Esperando Fecha: 07/12/2008 -1367 [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: According to the Law 190 of 1995 (articles 13,14) , all public servants before taking office, when leaving, and when requested by relevant authorities have to declare the amount of their income and rents. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". art. 13,14
|
||||||||
| 29b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: According to the Law 190 of 1995 (art. 13,14) , all public servants before taking office, when leaving, and when requested by relevant authorities have to declare, the amount of their income and rents. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". art. 13,14
|
||||||||
| 29c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The constitution states that public servants cannot accept gifts, hospitality and honors from foreign governments or international institutions without previous authorization from the government. The Law 734 of 2002, which refers to the disciplinary code for public servants, forbids them to receive or ask gifts from users or employees who may have an interest on their performance. The Law 190 of 1995 introduces influence peddling as a criminal offense. References: Ley 734 de 2002. (febrero 5) Diario Oficial No. 44.708 de 13 de febrero de 2002 "Por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico" art. 35. The Constitution of Colombia 1991, article 129
|
||||||||
| 29d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There is no formal requirement for the independent audit of asset disclosure forms. The Law 190 of 1995 only states that this information has to always be in the personnel offices of each entity and is a requirement for public servants to fill this form in order to take office. The Decree 2232 of 1995 establishes that it is a responsibility to review asset disclosure forms is in the hands of the Chief of Personnel in each government entity. But there is no specific regulation for high ranking executive officials. It is stated that every six months the Chief of Personnel has to review the veracity of declarations using a random selection method. The Administrative Department for Civil Service has created a software named SIDEC to file and monitor asset disclosure forms but there are no statistics on the follow up to the asset disclosure forms. References: DECRETO NUMERO 2232 DE 1995. DIARIO OFICIAL. AÑO CXXXI. N. 42152. 18, DICIEMBRE, 1995 "por medio del cual se reglamenta la Ley 190 de 1995 en materia de declaración de bienes y rentas e informe de actividad económica y así como el sistema de quejas y reclamos"
|
||||||||
| 29e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The law of inabilities and incompatibilities for public servants, which covers the president and ministers, does not mention any restriction on private sector employment after leaving the government. Article 207 of the constitution states that in order to be a minister it is necessary to have the same qualifications as a legislator and it includes the inability to have private posts while being in office, but does not refer any restriction after leaving office. However, the Law 734 of 2002 prohibits former public servants to give advice or representation on matters related to their previous responsibility within one year after leaving office. It also prohibits influence or participation directly or indirectly on matters that used to be under their responsibility. Yet it is not clear that this rule refers to employment after leaving office. Although there is no formal regulation about post-public sector employment, some people consider that the problem is not the lack of an specific regulation, but the lack of enforcement of the existing regulations. In any case, the "revolving door" of employees moving from the public to the private sector is seen as one of the core problems of public administration in the country. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art. 207 LEY 734 DE 2002 (febrero 5) Diario Oficial No. 44.708 de 13 de febrero de 2002 "Por la cual se expide el Código Disciplinario Unico".
|
||||||||
| 29f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There is no system to monitor the activities of public servants after leaving office. In fact, there is a widespread perception that there is a "revolving door" between the public and the private sector. During 2007 some notable cases relating to high level officials in the Ministry of Commerce and agencies dealing with the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement were taking positions with transnational companies right after leaving their public positions. Media criticism can sometimes act as a limitation for the most visible officials to take private positions after leaving office. References: The Constitution of Colombia, 1991 Misas Arango, Gabriel. 2005. La Lucha Anticorrupción en Colombia, teorías, prácticas y estrategias Contraloría General de la República, Bogotá. Puerta giratoria de representantes del pais a funcionarios privados. Nov 25 2007. [ LINK ] PROYECTO DE LEY PARA CERRAR LA PUERTA GIRATORIA PRESENTA EL SENADOR ROBLEDO. [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 29g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Regulations are enforced, and when scandals arise they are prosecuted. Over the last year there has been no serious accusation of ministers receiving gifts and hospitality. However, the perception is that it is still frequent for members of the executive branch to receive gifts and hospitality in order to disclose important information or to facilitate administrative or political procedures, especially those related to procurement processes. In general, although there are legal frameworks to prevent conflicts of interest, there are still weaknesses in the detection of those conflicts and in the coordination of the institutions that have a responsibility in controlling and preventing conflicts of interest. There is a widespread perception that most irregularities in procurement processes take place through the executive branch. It is important to note that there is a perception that in recent years the extent of petty corruption has decreased in Colombia. References: Revista Portafolio. Escándalos de Marca Mayor. Bogotá, Miércoles 11 de abril de 2007 Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia. Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 4. Bogotá. Transparency International. Integridad Pública en América Latina: ¿Contribuye el marco legal latinoamericano a que los funcionarios sean íntegros? ¿Coincide la práctica con la ley?. www.transparency.org/content/download/17926/242560
|
||||||||
| 29h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Asset disclosure forms of the executive and high level officials might be audited defacto, but there is no mechanism or procedure to ensure regular auditing. The problem is that there is no formal requirement for the independent audit of asset disclosure forms. Law 190 of 1995 only states that this information has to be always on the personnel offices of each entity and is a requirement for taking office. Decree 2232 of 1995 establishes that the responsibility to review asset disclosure forms is in the hands of the Chief of Personnel in each government entity, but there is no specific regulation for high ranking executive officials. It is stated that the Chief of Personnel has to review every six months the veracity of declarations using a random selection method but the process is still not regularized. According to the OAS, it is expected that the creation of a new system of Information and Managemente of Public employment SIGEP could improve the registry and auditing of asset disclosure forms. References: Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El sistema nacional de integridad en Colombia. Análisis y resultados del estudio de caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 4. Bogotá. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamerican contra la corrupción. DECRETO NUMERO 2232 DE 1995. por medio del cual se reglamenta la Ley 190 de 1995 en materia de declaración de bienes y rentas e informe de actividad económica y así como el sistema de quejas y reclamos. Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2006. Indice de Transparencia Nacional, Entidades públicas nacionales. Bogotá OEA INFORME sobre la implementación de las disposiciones de la Convención seleccionadas para ser analizadas en el marco de la Segunda Ronda 7 DIC 2007 [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: Asset disclosure forms are only available for the General Prosecutor´s Office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry´s Office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. According to the constitution, the rulings of the Constitutional Court, and the new habeas data law, only citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In conclusion, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of heads of government and ministerial level officials. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". The Constitution of Colombia 1991, article 1 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. [ LINK ]. Estado Actual de la Ley.
|
||||||||
| 30b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The asset disclosure forms are only available for the General Protector´s Office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry´s Office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. According to the constitution, the new habeas data law, and the rulings of the Constitutional Court citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In conclusion, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of heads of government and ministerial level officials. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". Constitution of Colombia 1991, article 15 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamerican contra la corrupción. [ LINK ]. Estado Actual de la Ley
|
||||||||
| 30c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The asset disclosure forms are only available for the General Attorney´s Office, the heads of personnel offices in each entity, and the National Registry´s Office. Asset disclosure records are not easily available for citizens and there is no specific provision to make asset disclosure forms available for the public. Although any citizen can request information through rights of petition, the nature of asset disclosure forms might be reserved as it refers to personal information. Although there is no habeas data law, according to the constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court citizens can authorize the use of information about them registered in databases of public institutions. In conclusion, common citizens might not be able to access asset disclosure forms of heads of government and ministerial level officials. References: Ley 190 de 1995 (junio 6) Diario Oficial No. 41.878, de 6 de junio de 1995 "Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a preservar la moralidad en la administración pública y se fijan disposiciones con el fin de erradicar la corrupción administrativa". Constitution of Colombia 1991, article 15 Sentencia de Unificación de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia SU-082/95, del 1 de marzo de 1995. Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos a la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamerican contra la corrupción. [ LINK ]. Estado Actual de la Ley
|
||||||||
| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 31: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: There are distinctions between state functions and party activities. According to Law 734 of 2002, public servants with civil and political authority and those in managerial posts are forbidden from participating in the activities of political parties and in political controversies. Doing so would be the causel for a disciplinary sanction. Although there can be clear political party influences in civil service or in independent government institutions, resources and personnel are formally separated. However, during election times, elected officials can use official funds to promote campaigns for the candidates or parties of their preference. Reports of this kind of irregularities appeared for the 2007 local elections. References: Ley 734 de 2002, publicada en el Diario Oficial No 44.708, de 13 de febrero de 2002, por la cual se reforma el Código Disciplinario Único RESPUESTA A TRIBUNAL DE GARANTÍAS ELECTORALES: [ LINK ]|lang_fr|lang_en ENTRE LAS CAMPAÑAS, LA CENSURA Y LA PAUTA PUBLICITARIA: BALANCE DE LA ACTIVIDAD PERIODÍSTICA EN LAS ELECCIONES DE 2007 Por Carlos Cortés Castillo* [ LINK ] 05-Dec-2007 17:05
|
||||||||



