The Presidential Program for the Fight Against Corruption is a central government agency that specifically addresses corruption. In 1998, then President of the Republic Andres Pastrana created the program through Decree 2405 of November 30, 1998. It was modified with Decree 127 of January 19, 2001 and Decree 519 of March 5, 2003. Currently it is known as Presidential Anti-corruption Program. Its main function is to advise the President about anti-corruption policies.

References: Programa Presidencial Anticorrupción. [ LINK ] Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Art. 267, 275

Decreto 519 de 2003. DECRETO NUMERO 519 DE 2003. (marzo 5). por el cual se suprimen, se transforman y se crean unas consejerías y programas presidenciales.

References: Constitución Política de Colombia art. 267, 275.

Decreto 519 de 2003. DECRETO NUMERO 519 DE 2003. (marzo 5). por el cual se suprimen, se transforman y se crean unas consejerías y programas presidenciales.

Given the nature of the Presidential Anti-corruption Program, it is protected from some influences and vulnerable to others. In practice, the agency is a subordinate of the President. One of the vulnerabilities of the program is that its actions depend highly on the priorities set by the person heading the agency.

The General Attorney´s office and Supreme Audit Institution are formally independent but as the selection of the General Attorney is made by the Senate (Procurador-Attorney) and the Congress as a whole (General Auditor) there can be political commitments which are then reflected in the personnel structure, limiting independence from political influence. At the local level, political pressures and pressures derived from the armed conflict make it very difficult for local attorneys to conduct their jobs. However, it is important to note that the independence and importance of control organisms has been on the increase and the General Attorney´s Office at the national level is strengthening its position and influence.

References: Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Sellingson, Mitchell. 2007. La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia 2006. Vanderbilt University.

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El Sistema Nacional de Integridad: Análisis y Resultados del Estudio de Caso. Cuadernos de Transaprencia #. 4.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program . July 19, 2007. Bogotá

The Director of the Presidential Anti-corruption Program is a public employee, he or she can be removed at any time. However, since the creation of this type of agency (1998) no head has been removed because of their own actions, but because of conflicts about the extent, objective and orientation of the agency.

Both the General Attorney and the Supreme Auditor are elected for fixed terms and can only be removed if there is a formal disciplinary or penal accusation against them

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

Corporación Tranparencia por Colombia. 2002. El Sistema Nacional de Integridad en Colombia: Análisis y Resultados del Estudio de Caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia # 4. Bogotá.

In the case of the anticorruption agency, appointments are made on professional qualifications, however individuals may have clear party loyalties. Most posts are assigned as contracts and the control on merit is less rigid than when employees are civil servants.

According to the 2005 Institutional Performance Survey made within public servants, 36.3 percent of employees surveyed at the General Attorney´s Office feel that political criteria are significant in hiring decisions and 43.45 percent feel that appointments are made on the basis of professional qualifications and merit. These percentages are 36 percent and 60 percent for the Supreme Audit Institution.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Contraloria General de la República.

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Procuraduria General de la Nación.

The Supreme Audit Institution and General Attorney´s Office have sufficient full time staff which is regulated by independent civil service systems. About 60 percent of employees surveyed within the institutional performance survey consider that the professional profile and qualifications in the Supreme Audit Institution are pertinent for the fulfillment of its mandate. This percentage is 37.28 percent for the General Attorney´s Office.

For a long time there has been a huge controversy on the pertinence of municipal auditors as it is considered that their functions can be carried out by departmental auditors. A referendum conducted in 2003 proposed the elimination ot those municipal offices of the Supreme Audit Institution.

The Presidential Anti-corruption Program has limited staff (about 43 people), and most of it is not from civil service but independent contractors. The current director points out that it is possible to work with the current resources. The problem is that the continuity of the program is limited by these staff restrictions.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

Interview with Antonio Hernandez Gamarra. General Auditor. August 4, 2005. Bogotá.

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Contraloría General de la República.

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Procuraduria General de la Nación.

The Presidential Anti-corruption Program does not have a predictable source of funding, the budget may change yearly and as it is a small program, the budget is limited. The current director says that it is possible to do things with the current budget. With more resources it will be possible to do more. A previous director said on the contrary, it is necessary to obtain more resources in order to do more.

For the Supreme Audit Institution and the General Attorney´s Office, funding sources are reliable and consistent from year to year, however according to the 2005 Institutional Performance Survey made within public servants, 37.4 percent of employees surveyed at the General Attorney´s Office consider that resources are the weakest component of institutional performance and that resources are not enough to fulfill the mandate of the institution. In the Audit Institution, about 59.77 percent of employees feel that the budget and physical resources are not enough to carry out the mandate of the Supreme Audit Institution.

References: DANE. 2006. AMBIENTE Y DESEMPEÑO INSTITUCIONAL 2005.CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA.

DANE. 2006. AMBIENTE Y DESEMPEÑO INSTITUCIONAL 2005.PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, head of the anticorruption program of the Presidency. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

Often the most important decisions made by the Presidential Anti-corruption Program are publicized, but there is no periodic reporting mechanism. Currently the Vice-presidency of the Republic is working on a strategy to make the program's Web page more accessible and interactive for citizens.

The General Attorney and the Supreme Audit Institution must make a yearly report of its activities to the Congress. These reports are available on agencies' Web sites. Although reports usually are comprehensive, statistics are not very detailed. According to the most recent institutional performance survey made by DANE among public servants, about 83.05 percent of employees at the General Attorney´s Office and 82.71 percent of employees at the Supreme Audit Institution say that managers make their decisions public. According to the Transparency Index of Transparency from Colombia, the Procuraduria is located in the medium range in reference to visibilty of its decisions and the Contraloria (Supreme Audit institution) has the second best score in terms of visibility of information.

References: DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño institucional Procuraduria General de la Nación 2005.

DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño institucional Contraloria General de la República 2005.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la organización de Estados Americanos: Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

Corporación Transparencia por Colombia. 2006. Indice de Transparencia Nacional Entidades Públicas Nacionales. Bogotá.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá.

Both internal and external observers say the orientation of the anti-corruption program and the activities carried out by it depend basically on the political will of its head. One of the functions created by decree for the program is to receive denouncements, give them direction and follow them up. Under the previous Director, the Program did not focus in prosecution of corruption cases, whereas currently the focus has been on following up cases, not just in submitting denouncements to the sanctioning agencies. Thus, the current director states that even though the agency does not have the formal power to gather information he can rely on the relevant agencies to conduct such work. The current work of the agency has been more that of coordinating or acting as a bridge between the agencies that can investigate and sanction (especially the anti-corruption units of the intelligence agency and the police, the General Attorney) and follow up on important cases. By initiative of the director, the agency has gathered information that facilitates the work of other institutions with a formal power to investigate once the agency sends a specific case for investigation. As a program that is directly attached to the executive, the agency has a more moral than formal capacity to gather information, given the high power held by the President in Colombia and his levels of popularity.

The Contraloria and the Procuraduria have the legal power to initiate investigations and to gather information. In recent years, and specially at the national level, both institutions have increasing credibility, which facilitates the fulfillment of their responsibilities. At the local level, given the armed conflict and the higher influence that corrupt individuals may have, the scope of the work of anticorruption agencies is more limited.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

Interview with Edgardo Maya Villazón. General Attorney. August 3, 2005. Bogotá.

Peer Review Comments: The anti-corruption agencies have most of the powers needed to carry out there mandate, with some exceptions.

The Presidential Anti-corruption Program does not have legal power to initiate investigations, its role is to submit reports on abuses to the relevant institutions. Such reports are received through a phone line or directly to the office, however the most significant investigations are received directly by the Director. Between January and March 2007, the agency received 1,493 reports. They submitted 738 to the relevant institutions and filed the rest because they were minor issues unrelated to corruption. When the agency feels a case is relevant, the case is submitted immediately to the relevant agency. For the most relevant cases submitted by the agency there is a sustained interest in the follow-up of the investigation. Under current direction, the agency has been very active in initiating investigations unveiling high level corruption scandals, especially in procurement processes. During the past year the program has unveiled three high level corruption scandals and pushed for the cancellation of at least 67 irregular procurement processes.

The General Attorney has the mandate and starts investigations aggressively. According to the most recent report of the General Attorney, in 2006 the agency received 41,568 new processes and acted on 48,212 from a total of 76,066 files. These results show that the number of processes has increased over the past five years and that there has been an effort in reducing the number of unsolved cases, which, at 28,007, is still a high number. Most of these processes refer to territorial institutions and on managerial levels. According to the Constitution, the Supreme Audit Institution can promote investigations on fiscal responsibility before the competent authorities. It can request immediate suspension of public servants while penal or disciplinary investigations are underway. Every three months the Audit Institution publishes the names of all the servants convicted for fiscal irresponsibility. Between April and June 2007 4,413 people were sanctioned with fiscal responsibility, which inhibits future appointments as civil servants.

The score presented on this indicator shows the effectiveness of the agencies in initiating investigations at the national level but also the limitations that their functions face at local levels of government, many of them related to the armed conflict. The difficulties to investigate corruption at the local level is the main reason for a medium score in this indicator.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program July 18 2007. Bogotá

Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

When the Presidential Anti-corruption Program feels a complaint is relevant it acts quickly in submitting it to the agency that has the mandate to investigate and sanction the case. In that case it is not clear how much time it may take the respective institution to complete an investigation.

Although most institutions have made efforts in recent years to act quickly on complaints, there are delays and backlog. The Director of the Anti-corruption Program reports that most of the complaints made by citizens are not relevant for the interests of the agency.

In regards to Procuradyria, the perception is that when relevant denouncements are made, they are quickly directed into investigation. What is more difficult to determine in a reliable way is how much time it takes to solve cases. The Procuraduria has relieved the congestion of processes over the past five years, which means that there is more efficiency in acting on complaints. However it is important to note that available statistics do not show the average time it takes to process a case by type of offense. The number of files under process went from 63,688 in 2000 to 34,498 in 2006, showing the advances made in acting upon cases.

It is also important to note that according to a recent survey on perception of democracy in Colombia, the Procuraduria, with an specific mandate to investigate corruption, is better perceived by citizens than the judiciary. In general, however, citizens feel that the main obstacle to protect rights is the fact that investigations are too slow.

References: Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo. Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program July 18 2007. Bogotá

Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria.

Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Sellingson, Mitchell. 2007. La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia. Vanderbilt University.

Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos: Implementacion en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción.

Peer Review Comments: The anti-corruption agencies cannot resolve complaints quickly. Complaints can be unacknowledged for more than a month, and simple issues can take more than three months to resolve. Serious abuses are not investigated with any urgency.

Usually reports on corruption come from particulars and not from public servants, but according to a survey conducted in 2002 among public servants, 40 percent of respondents reported that they do not denounce because they fear negative consequences or because they don´t trust the efficiency of public institutions. The Director of the Presidential Anti-corruption Program reports that there is total discretion when a whistle blower makes such a request, but it is not part of an official protection policy. Finally, it is important to note that whistle blowers are usually concerned more about their personal security rather than job security.

References: Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario en Colombia, Año 2006 Organización de Estados Americanos. 2004. Informe del Comité de Expertos de la Organización de Estados Americanos. Implementación en Colombia de las disposiciones de la Convención Interamericana contra la corrupción. Bogotá.

Interview with Rodrigo Lara Restrepo, Director of the Presidential Anticorruption Program. July 19, 2007. Bogotá

Peer Review Comments: Whistle-blowers often face substantial negative consequences, such as losing a job, relocating to a less prominent position, some form of harassment, or even being killed.