| Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Budget Processes | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 37 | Can the legislature provide input to the national budget? | 83 |
| 38 | Can citizens access the national budgetary process? | 67 |
| 39 | In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | 100 |
| 40 | Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective? | 56 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 37 | Can the legislature provide input to the national budget? | |||||||
| 37a: In law, the legislature can amend the budget. | ||||||||
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Comments: The legislature can amend the budget, but the initiative is exclusively in the hands of the executive. The congress can change but cannot increase the budget proposal (Art. 150 Constitution). In practice, congress members introduce budgetary allocations to specific projects (these allocations were called auxilios parlamentarios prior to 1991). The committees of the senate and the house examine jointly the budget proposal between July 20 and Sept. 15 each year. References: Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Art. 150. Cárdenas, Mauricio, Junguito, Roberto, Pachón, Mónica. 2006. Political Institutions, and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution Research Network Working Paper #R-508. Inter-American Development Bank. Ayala, Ulpiano and Perotti, Roberto. 2000. The Colombian Budget Process. Working paper series. Fedesarrollo.
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| 37b: In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval. | ||||||||
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Comments: The legislature does have power to approve significant expenditures and most expenditures are approved by the legislature. According to the Constitution, there cannot be any public expenditure not approved by congress. However, in practice, the biggest power in budget approval is in the hands of the executive, and thus the hierarchy in the process in not very clear. On the one hand, the executive can issue the budget without congressional approval under exceptional circumstances. The committees of the senate and the house examine jointly the budget proposal between July 20 and Sept. 15 each year and must reach a decision by Oct. 20. If no decision is made by that time, the budget has to be approved with the modifications made in the first debate. If congress does not approve the budget at all, the executive should issue a decree repeating the budget of the previous year. On the other hand, the congress practices the political control of the budget, and to meet this responsibility, it can call ministers and the heads of administrative departments and examine the reports produced by the president, ministers, and heads of the administrative departments. Thus, the congress exerts significant power during budget approval. In practice, congress members introduce budgetary allocations to specific projects (these allocations were called auxilios parlamentarios prior to 1991). However, the committees in congress need a written authorization by the Finance Minister to increase a "partida de gasto" or introduce a new one (Art. 351 Const.), while they can, with some exceptions, eliminate or reduce "partidas de gasto" by their own initiative (Art. 63 EOP and Art. 351 Const.). The score given to this indicators refers more to the preeminence of the executive than to the fact that formally major expenditures are excluded from open discussion with the legislature. It is important to note that proposals to increase the power of congress in budget proposal have met considerable opposition give the low reputation of congress. References: Constitución Política de Colombia. Cárdenas, Mauricio, Junguito, Roberto, Pachón, Mónica. 2006. Political Institutions, and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution Research Network Working Paper #R-508. Inter-American Development Bank. Ayala, Ulpiano and Perotti, Roberto. 2000. The Colombian Budget Process. Working paper series. Fedesarrollo. Cardenas, Mauricio, Mejia, Carolina and Olivera, Mauricio. 2006. La Economía Política del Proceso Presupuestal en Colombia. Fedesarrollo.
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| 37c: In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes. | ||||||||
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Comments: Legislators in the economic commissions of the congress are among the most professionalized legislators in congress. There is a restriction for legislators to change commission, and thus, there is some degree of professionalism and stability that is also promoted by the existence of re-election. The level of professionalism in congress is not equal for all commissions, but economic and budget commissions are usually those considered the place for natural leaders of congress with power and knowledge. As permanent constitutional commissions, economic commissions do have permanent administrative staff. Additionally, all legislators have the right to compose a unit of legislative work (Unidad de Trabajo Legislativo, UTL) composed by professionals who advise the legislators' daily work. Although UTLs are highly permeated by clientelism and political favors, they have contributed in many cases to make legislators' work more professional. References: Cardenas, Mauricio, Mejia, Carolina and Olivera, Mauricio. 2006. La Economía Política del Proceso Presupuestal en Colombia. Fedesarrollo. Pachón, Mónica. 2004. Congress and Political Parties in Colombia, in Fortalezas de Colombia edited by Fernando Cepeda. Ariel, Bogotá.
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| 38 | Can citizens access the national budgetary process? | |||||||
| 38a: In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval). | ||||||||
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Comments: According to Law 5 of 1992 (Statute of Congress), citizens can assist to any public session of the congress, unless there is a request to make it reserved (reserved sessions are requested by the Directorate of the Chamber or Commission, a minister, or a fifth of the members of the chamber or commission), and sessions are transparent. In practice, however, there is some substantial negotiation taking place in the preparation process and a good amount of informal negotiation between legislators and congress before the budget goes to discussions on plenary sessions. During the hearings and debates in congress, a lot of transactions take place, reflected in investment projects negotiated by the legislators with the government to approve the budget. The whereabouts of these negotiations are not totally transparent for the public. It has been identified that the decentralization in the preparation stage of the budget (in which each government agency provides input to the National Planning Department and the Finance Minister) makes the approval process less transparent and more difficult to understand. In the preparation stage there is a good amount of bargaining between each government entity and the National Planning Department and the Ministry of Finance to decide on investment budget. According to Art.13 of the General Budget Statute, the budget must be consistent with the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, the Plan Nacional de Inversiones, the Plan Financiero, and the Plan Operativo Anual de Inversiones, and this consistency can make the approval in congress more difficult to understand even though in the end the approved budget might not reflect those plans. References: Ayala, Ulpiano and Perotti, Roberto. 2000. The Colombian Budget Process. Working paper series. Fedesarrollo . Cardenas, Mauricio, Mejia, Carolina and Olivera, Mauricio. 2006. La Economía Política del Proceso Presupuestal en Colombia. Fedesarrollo.
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| 38b: In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings. | ||||||||
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Comments: During the hearings for the approval of the budget, after it is sent by the government to the congress, citizens can participate under the rules provided by Law 5 of 1992 (Statute of the Congress). According to them, citizens can assist to any public session of the congress, unless there is a request to make it reserved (reserved sessions are requested by the Directorate of the Chamber or Commission, a minister, or a fifth of the members of the chamber or commission). The same law states that any citizen can express opinions about any law proposal, having registered previously with the respective commission, but in practice, there is no much change on the budget with inputs provided by citizens. Citizens provide input to the budget in the preparation process through the participation they have in the ellaboration of National Development Plan (NDP), which is ellaborated at the begining of each presidential term. The NDP includes a National Investment Plan for four years that has to be consistent with the budget. The plan is ellaborated by the government with "active participation of the planning authorities, the territorial entities, and the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura." The draft plan must be submitted to the Consejo Nacional de Planeacion, which is formed by "representatives of the territorial entities, and of the economic, social, ecological, community, and cultural sectors" (Art. 340 Const.). In this sense, there is an incidence of CSOs in the preparation process of the budget, however in practice, it is sometimes difficult to establish the link between the yearly budget and the four-year development plan. In general, the incidence of a significant number of actors in the budgetary process does not necessarily increase effective participation and sometimes can even be more harmful for the transparency of the process. It is necessary to note that after the budget law is approved by congress, the government can include modifications to the budget, and in practice, it is in this stage when most changes take place, rather than during the hearings. There are three mechanisms to change the budget once it is approved by congress. First, cuts can be introduced by decree by the government with previous authorization from the cabinet. Second, the government can change assignments for specific projects within institutions through decree with congress approval when money is allocated to items that differ from the initial allocation. Third, the government can ask for additions to the budget with congress approval, unless there is a state of economic emergency. References: Ayala, Ulpiano and Perotti, Roberto. 2000. The Colombian Budget Process. Working paper series. Fedesarrollo. Cardenas, Mauricio, Mejia, Carolina and Olivera, Mauricio. 2006. La Economía Política del Proceso Presupuestal en Colombia. Fedesarrollo.
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| 38c: In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations. | ||||||||
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Comments: Citizens can access the information and it is easily available online at the Web page of the Ministry of Finance. References: Presupuesto Nacional. [ LINK ]
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| 39 | In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | |||||||
| 39: In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | ||||||||
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Comments: In the senate and the lower chamber there are two permanent constitutional commissions that discuss economic issues (such as the approval of the budget). Their legal mandate is to give first debate to all the legislative proposals that relate to the issues of their concern, but they don't have specific mandate to oversee the expenditure; this is a mandate of the Supreme Audit Institution. Those commissions are the third and the fourth commission. By constitutional mandate, the Supreme Audit Institution (Contraloria) must present the general budget and treasury accounts to legislators. The National Accountant must present the General Consolidated Balance of the budget. Both reports are studied and comments are made by the Legal Accounting Commissions. In some cases, the commission calls managers and directors of institutions in order to clarify deficiencies reflected in the general balances and accounts. References: Corporacion Transparencia por Colombia. 2002. El Sistema Nacional de Integridad: Análisis y Resultados del estudio de caso. Cuadernos de Transparencia #4. Bogotá. Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes. Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. Title X Chapter 1.
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| 40 | Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective? | |||||||
| 40a: In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee. | ||||||||
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Comments: As the economic commissions are no formal oversight committee, heads of agencies do not send regular reports. However, the legislators have the legal power to call ministers, vice ministers, heads of agencies, the manager of the Central Bank, directors of decentralized entities and other functionaries of the execuive to discuss law projects or issued related to their functions. Additionally, most national institutions must present yearly reports of activities to congress, including budget and financial aspects. By constitutional mandate, the Supreme Audit Institution (Contraloria) must present the general budget and treasury accounts to legislators. The National Accountant must present the General Consolidated Balance of the budget. Both reports are studied and comments are made by the Legal Accounting Commissions. In some cases, the commission calls managers and directors of institutions in order to clarify deficiencies reflected in the general balances and accounts. References: Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes.
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| 40b: In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to law, all members of commissions are elected from lists proposed by parties by the electoral system. In practice, the most experienced legislators and those with more political power are the ones elected to the most important commissions, among them the economic commissions. Thus, it is common to see less presence from the opposition in these commissions. References: Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes.
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| 40c: In practice, this committee is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is a good amount of informal negotiation between legislators and government outside formal discussions in congress, and within these informal negotiations a lot of political bargaining takes place, hindering the independence of the committee. It is important to note, however, that as economic commissions are among the most professionalized in congress and are usually composed by powerful legislators with long traditions in congress, the room for manipulation is smaller than in other congressional commissions. References: Pachón, Mónica. 2004. Congress and Political Parties in Colombia, in Fortalezas de Colombia edited by Fernando Cepeda. Ariel, Bogotá.
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| 40d: In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities. | ||||||||
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Comments: The commitee does not have formal power to initiate investigations of financial irregularities. References: Ley 5 de 1992. (junio 17) Diario Oficial No. 40.483, de 18 de junio de 1992 Por la cual se expide el Reglamento del Congreso; el Senado y la Cámara de Representantes.
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