| Colombia: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | 58 |
| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | 71 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | |||||||
| 80a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to the most recent survey of institutional performance made among 147 police employees, only 18 percent feel that appointments are made on the base of political connections and about 40 percent feel that personal considerations have an influence on appointment decisions. In general, about 42 percent feel the professional profiles in the institution are adequate to fulfill the police´s mandate. Within the plan to improve the police, there have been programs and decisions oriented to professionalize and better organize the institution such as the creation of a new disciplinary statute, the separation of the disciplinary from the operational functions, and the improvement in personnel selection processes. References: DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Policia Nacional de Colombia. Pablo Casas Dupuy. REFORMAS Y CONTRARREFORMAS EN LA POLICÍA COLOMBIANA. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia.
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| 80b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: On average, the police budget increased 20 percent annually between 2000 and 2006. According to the survey on institutional performance made among police employees, about 50 percent feel that the institution's budget is enough to carry out its mandate. Although there might not be budgetary problems, when the institution has faced big internal corruption scandals, it has been noted that there is a problem with the salary structure, which might create an incentive for officers to engage in corruption. However, as a whole, the institution does not face budgetary problems. References: DANE. 2006. Encuesta Ambiente y Desempeño Institucional Policia Nacional. [ LINK ] CEJA. 2006. III. Descripción Institucional y Organización del Sistema de Justicia [ LINK ]
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| 80c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: By law, the police are an armed civil institution and, as such, independent to act. Law enforcement has an independent career system for its employees. However, the police are a subordinate of the executive (the president at the national level, and mayors and governors at the local level), and can be influenced by political incentives. It is precisely the dual nature of the police, as a civilian institution but with the structure and organization of an armed institution (such as the National Army), that makes it more difficult to operate. On one hand, it can be immune from political control, but on the other, it is a subordinate of the executive. References: Policia Nacional de Colombia. [ LINK ] Pablo Casas Dupuy. REFORMAS Y CONTRARREFORMAS EN LA POLICÍA COLOMBIANA. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia
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| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 81a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to law, the disciplinary power over police is in the hands of the institution itself, even though the general attorney´s office (Procuraduría General de la Nación) has disciplinary power in the state. It means that the attorney general can request information on disciplinary processes conducted against police members. The Ombudsman (Defensor del pueblo) receives and follows up citizen complaints related to human rights violations by police members. References: REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL DECRETO 1798 DE 2000 (Septiembre 14) Por el cual se modifican las Normas de Disciplina y Etica para la Policía Nacional Constitución Política de Colombia 1991. art. 275, 277, 282
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| 81b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: In general, although complaints can be acknowledged and acted upon quickly, it is not clear how long it will take for a case to be solved, and the perception is that there are high rates of impunity regarding police action. The police itself have implemented a citizen complaint mechanism and the response to complaints can be checked online or through phone lines. The ombudsman is the most trusted institution for complaining about human rights, as reflected in a recent survey made among citizens about perceptions on democracy, and has invested resources on training and personnel to strengthen the responses to claims and complaints made by citizens. In 2005, the ombudsman received 52 complaints against police officers regarding violations to international humanitarian law. All of them were sent for investigation. However, it is not clear how long it takes to investigate and solve a complaint against a police officer. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia the "fuero militar" is irregularly applied to protect police (and army) officers in cases of human rights violations, and in these cases there can be substantial delays in the investigation of cases. References: Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario en Colombia, Año 2006 Procuraduria General de la Nación. 2006. Balance Social de la Procuraduria. XIII Reporte del Defensor del Pueblo al Congreso de la República 2005 Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Sellingson, Mitchelll. 2007. La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia 2006. Vanderbilt University.
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| 81c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: According to law, the National Police Commissioner is responsible for overseeing the operational and disciplinary actions of the police, without being inhibited by organizations such as the General Attorney´s Office (Procuraduria General de la Nación). References: LEY Nº 62 DEL 12-AGO-93 POLICIA NACIONAL GERENCIA PROYECTO DE REESTRUCTURACION Y MODERNIZACION "POR LA CUAL SE EXPIDEN NORMAS SOBRE LA POLICIA NACIONAL, SE CREA UN ESTABLECIMIENTO PUBLICO DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y BIENESTAR PARA LA POLICIA NACIONAL, SE CREA LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DE VIGILANCIA Y SEGURIDAD PRIVADA Y SE REVISTE DE FACULTADES EXTRAORDINARIAS AL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA." MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL DECRETO 1798 DE 2000 (Septiembre 14) "Por el cual se modifican las Normas de Disciplina y Etica para la Policía Nacional"
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| 81d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: In general, and given the big corruption scandals that surround police action, the internal control mechanism of the police has to be strengthened and the control of high government officials over the institution must increase. In practice, the police function more as a military unit than as a police institution, but by law it is an armed civilian institution.This double condition has been used by the institution to favor its own interests. According to an evaluation of the police conducted in 2003 after a big corruption scandal, the national police commissioner, who is supposedly responsible for conducting the internal and external control of the police, has not performed any function of internal or external control. The commissioner's responsibilities are unclear, and have been subject to multiple changes and restructuring since the position was created in 1993. According to the United Nations high commissioner for human rights in Colombia, there are high rates of impunity in cases involving police, as the system to judge and investigate is independent. The responsibilities of the attorney general and the prosecutor general regarding police are not completely clear and generate confusion during case investigations. However, in 2006 there was a 7 percent increase in the number of disciplinary administrative processes against police officers, compared to 2004. Of all these processes, 5.5 percent resulted in expulsion. References: Pablo Casas Dupuy. REFORMAS Y CONTRARREFORMAS EN LA POLICÍA COLOMBIANA. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia. Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario en Colombia, Año 2006 CEJA. Reporte de la Justicia 2006-2007. Colombia. [ LINK ]
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| 81e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: Police can be prosecuted for criminal actions, however they are subject to an independent system that is primarily in the hands of the police itself and the minister of defense. According to law, higher ranking officers must know about the disciplinary faults of other officers, and a special military corps is in charge of knowing about the crimes committed by police on active duty. References: LEY Nº 62 DEL 12-AGO-93 POLICIA NACIONAL GERENCIA PROYECTO DE REESTRUCTURACION Y MODERNIZACION "POR LA CUAL SE EXPIDEN NORMAS SOBRE LA POLICIA NACIONAL, SE CREA UN ESTABLECIMIENTO PUBLICO DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y BIENESTAR PARA LA POLICIA NACIONAL, SE CREA LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DE VIGILANCIA Y SEGURIDAD PRIVADA Y SE REVISTE DE FACULTADES EXTRAORDINARIAS AL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA." MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL DECRETO 1798 DE 2000 (Septiembre 14) "Por el cual se modifican las Normas de Disciplina y Etica para la Policía Nacional" Constituci´ón Política de Colombia 1991. Art. 221
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| 81f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: In general, and given the big corruption scandals that surround police action, it has been stated on several occasions that the internal control mechanisms of the police have to be strengthened and that the control of the high government over them has to increase. In practice, the police work more as a military than as a police institution, but by law it is an armed civilian institution. This double condition has been used by the institution to favor its own interests. According to the United Nations high commissioner for human rights in Colombia, there are high rates of impunity in cases involving police, as the system to judge and investigate police is independent. The responsibilities of the attorney general and the prosecutor general regarding police are not completely clear and generate confusion when cases have to be investigated. It is even more complicated to prosecute the police for criminal offenses. It is important to note that in 2007, 85 police officers were separated from duty and criminally prosecuted because of abuses against civilians. This demonstrates that police can be prosecuted. However, it is not always clear where civilians should report abuses. References: Pablo Casas Dupuy. REFORMAS Y CONTRARREFORMAS EN LA POLICÍA COLOMBIANA. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia. Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario en Colombia, Año 2006 Revista Semana. 2007. La dirección de la Policía Metropolitana destituyó a efectivos que agredieron a taxista en Bogotá. 08/13/2007
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