| China: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 26 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 63 |
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 100 |
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 31 |
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 0 |
| 31 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 0 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 26 | In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 26: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
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Comments: Citizens can use the Administrative Procedual Law of China to sue the government. References: Administrative Procedual Law of China
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| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 27a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
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Comments: There has been some improvement. In recent years, more and more officials are increasingly accountable for their decisions. Some of them even take a more active approach to explain policies. But there is still room for improvement, for example, by enhancing clarity. References: 1. Jiao Yang, "Establishing a Government News Briefing Mechanism," Center for International Communication Studies of Tsinghua University, 2007 2, "Officials talk about environmentally friendly car manufacturing policy," Renmin Wang, Aug. 27, 2009. [ LINK ] 3, "Ministry of Industry and Information officials talk about procuring Lvba firewall," CCTV, June 11, 2009. [ LINK ]
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| 27b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Administrative Procedure Law recognizes the right of the judiciary to review the actions of the executive. References: Administrative Procedure Law
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| 27c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no judiciary-review system or constitutional court, but this does not mean that the judiciary has no right to review actions of the executive. It is called "min gao guan" (citizens sue the officials). The Administrative Procedure Law of China recognizes the right of the judiciary to review actions of the executive, although in reality the judiciary is not independent. Usually, these cases are resolved by negotiation: the executive offices correct mistakes and citizens withdraw cases. The judiciary plays a mediator role. References: To understand the increase of min gao guan cases, see Liaowang Magazine, April 22, 2006. To have a thorough knowlege about related cases, see the special report of min gao guan. [ LINK ]
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| 27d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
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Comments: A recent example is that China's medical systemreform proposal doesn't go through the national People's Congress. But the trend is that the People's Congress is beginning to play a more and more active function. References: 1. "Abolishing Executive Orders to Establish Rule of Law in China," Xinhua News, March 27, 2007 2. "China Will Examine 'Red Head Documents,' " China Youth Daily, March 22, 2007 3, "Why Is Medical System Reform Bypassing the National People's Congress?" Xinhua News, March 13, 2009. [ LINK ]
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| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 28a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1. Article 5 of the Constitution. 2. Criminal Procedure Law of China
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| 28b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1. Article 5 of the Constitution 2. Criminal Procedure Law of China
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| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: This is an issue that the public has called for for many years. References: No such laws exist.
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| 29b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: In 1995, the Rule on Income Diclosures was enacted, but it deals only with salary and honorarium, which are already transparent because they are dependent on the ranks. However, the most important part is about officials' assets. There are no laws requiring officials to disclose their total assets. References: No such laws exist.
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| 29c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Rules about cadres accepting gifts, stocks and coupons were enacted by the Central Disciplinary Committee in 2001.
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| 29d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
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Comments: An auditing law exists, but ministers and heads of state and government are not subject to this law. References: No such requirements exist.
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| 29e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: The Civil Servants Law, effective since Jan. 1, 2006
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| 29f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: It's quite common for junior officials to join the private sector either after retirement or after quitting government positions. However,, it is not common for heads of state or ministry-level officials. This isn't because of relevant regulations; there are other reasons. First, ministry-level officials and heads of state are generally in their 50s or 60s when they take their job. After serving two terms (10 years), they are too old to take any private position. Second, retired government officials keep all welfare compensations provided by the government until their death, including almost all costs, such as medical care, housing, car, drivers, bodyguards, etc. They have little incentive to take private jobs. On the contrary, they may take quasi-government positions, such as some joining associations. Thus, although it's rare for heads of state and high rank officials to take private job, a 25 score is still merited. References: 1. Cui Jie, Xiao Shuijin, "Reemployment of retired government officials beget corruption," Jiancha Daily, Aug. 12, 2007 2. Li Mengjuan, "Shadow corruption of retired officials," Xinhua News, July 22, 2008
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| 29g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: Since China has no asset-disclosure requirements, it's hard to evaluate the regulation of gifts and hospitality. But we can have some rought idea by looking at the assets of corrupt officials who have been charged: the assets involved are generally huge. So we can say that this regulation is not effective. References: 1. Zhang Zhe, 2008, "Offering gifts? How much?" Nanfang Weekend, July 31 2. Wang Yuchu, 2008, "China should make paid lectures by government officials illegal," Xinhua News, July 3
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| 29h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1, "When will China adopt asset-disclosure systems?" Development Forum, March 14, 2008 2. Gao Yifei, "It's time to adopt an asset-disclosure system," Hua Shang News, March 4, 2008
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| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: No such laws exist.
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| 30b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1. "When will China adopt asset-disclosure systems?" Development Forum, March 14, 2008 2. Gao Yifei, "It's time to adopt an asset-disclosure system," Hua Shang News, March 4, 2008
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| 30c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1. "When will China adopt asset-disclosure systems?" Development Forum, March 14, 2008 2. Gao Yifei, "It's time to adopt an asset-disclosure system," Hua Shang News, March 4, 2008
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| 30d: In practice, the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government are of high quality. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: 1. "When will China adopt an asset-disclosure systems?" Development Forum, March 14, 2008 2. Gao Yifei, "It's time to adopt an asset-disclosure system," Hua Shang News, March 4, 2008
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| 31 | In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 31: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
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Comments: This is really a serious problem in China. The ruling party is not separated from government functions. All government functions are under the direct leadership of the ruling party and all important appointments are made by the ruling party. References: 1. Sun Guohua, "On the Relationship between the Party and Executive Branches," China Jurisdiction Research, August 2005 2. "Several Issues Concerning the Rule of Law," Study Times, October 2005
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