| Canada: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Judicial Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 33 | Are judges appointed fairly? | 17 |
| 34 | Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions? | 88 |
| 35 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary? | 11 |
| 36 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary? | 42 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 33 | Are judges appointed fairly? | |||||||
| 33a: In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - After the most recent appointment of a Justice to the Supreme Court of Canada (Marshall Rothstein was appointed on March 1, 2006) a parliamentary committee held a public hearing to ask Mr. Rothstein basic questions about his legal experience. Tthis hearing resulted essentially from ongoing, and somewhat growing, pressure on the federal and provincial governments to make the judicial appointment process more transparent and public. - The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions (which must be proclaimed into law by the Federal Cabinet (and as of Sept. 10, 2007 had not been proclaimed) that change the federal Lobbyists Registration Act (1985, c. 44 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] -- into the Lobbying Act and that establish a Commissioner of Lobbyists to replace the current Registrar of Lobbyists; the Registrar acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when enforcing the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct, but has no independence in law from the federal Cabinet (the Registrar can be dismissed at any time for any reason, has only delegated power over office budget and staff), whereas the Commissioner of Lobbyists (if established) will have independence through a fixed term of office (dismissal only for cause) and control over budget and staff, but will not have a public appointment process. Registrar's Web site -- [ LINK ] - The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions that change the federal Salaries Act (R.S., 1985, c. S-3) -- [ LINK ] -- to give the Federal Cabinet the power to create a Public Appointments Commission (as of Sept. 10, 2007, the federal Cabinet had not created the Commission and had given no indication that it ever intended to create the Commission); the Commission is given the legal mandate to ensure that all Cabinet appointments are made through processes that are "widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit". References: - In law, there is no established public process for federal judicial appointments (nor are there, in law, public processes for the appointment of the heads or members of the many quasi-judicial, administrative tribunals, agencies, boards and commissions that enforce various specialized federal Canadian laws. See details about some of these quasi-judicial entities further below: - The Parliament of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 101 -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] ) to "provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada" and used this power to establish the Supreme Court of Canada (first established in 1875 by an Act of Parliament -- now under the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26), the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (first established as the Exchequer Court of Canada in 1871, then expanded in jurisdiction to become the Federal Court of Canada in 1971 -- now under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7), and the Tax Court of Canada (established in 1983 under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2) - The federal Cabinet of ministers (legal name is the "Governor in Council" and Cabinet ministers (who are not required to be elected politicians) are appointed to Cabinet by the elected Prime Minister) has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ), justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ), and the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] ) - The Governor General of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 96 -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/Const/index.html ) to appoint the superior court judges in Canadian provinces (trial court and court of appeal) which are courts that have jurisdiction over any matter that is not specifically reserved for the Federal Court of Canada. The Governor General has this constitutional power as the representative in Canada of the British monarchy (currently Queen Elizabeth II) but, as with the other Governor General constitutional powers, this power is not used or exercised in any way at any time that defies the ruling party in Parliament (and has not been used or exercised in this way for decades) -- as a result, the federal Cabinet actually decides who is appointed to these provincial superior courts under the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ] - Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges." - The provincial governments only have the power to appoint provincial court (trial court) judges. - The federal Cabinet also appoints the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment process for some of these tribunals is as follows: - Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives." - The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions." - The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] -- The Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food. - The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal under sections 48.1 and 48.2, of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without an independent confirmation process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation." - The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 81 of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-1 -- The Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner." - The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 153(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/I-2.5 -- "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec." - The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labour matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] - Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labour relations" - The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 3(1) of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/T-18.5 -- Members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction." - The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act ( 1995, c. 18 ) -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 33b: In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - The score of 50 is given because for almost all national-level quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals) there are no specific required professional criteria for appointees, and even if there is in many cases whether someone fulfills the criteria is at the discretion of the federal Cabinet (of politicians, known as the "Governor in Council"). - There are also many examples of non-qualified people appointed to these quasi-judicial entities mainly because there are no requirements in law that people appointed to head or be members of these entities have specific professional skills or knowledge (for example, federal Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro (who was in the position between March 2004 and April 2007), and Registrar of Lobbyists Michael Nelson (who began serving in the position in March 2004 and was still serving as of September 10, 2007) both had no experience in ethics rules or law enforcement, even though they were appointed to quasi-judicial positions). For details, see Democracy Watch's April 5, 2007 news release about the Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ] -- Democracy Watch's Jan. 25, 2007 news release about the Registrar -- [ LINK ] - While under Bill C-2 (the so-called "Federal Accountability Act") the new position of Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (replacing the Ethics Commissioner position) does have professional criteria for the appointee, the yet to be proclaimed into law "Lobbying Act" creates the position of Commissioner of Lobbying (to replace the Registrar of Lobbyists) but does not require that appointees fulfill any specific professional criteria. - The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions that change the federal Salaries Act (R.S., 1985, c. S-3) -- [ LINK ] To give the Federal Cabinet the power to create a Public Appointments Commission (as of Sept. 10, 2007, the federal Cabinet had not created the Commission and had given no indication that it ever intended to create the Commission); the Commission is given the legal mandate to ensure that all Cabinet appointments are made through processes that are "widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit." References: - The federal Cabinet (legal name is the "Governor in Council") has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ) but under section 5 to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already of a superior court of a province, or, for a period of 10 years, been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate). - The federal Cabinet also has the power to appoint justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ) but under section 5.3 to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already, or, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature. - The federal Cabinet also has the power to appoint justices to the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] ) but under subsection 4(3) to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already, or, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature. - The federal Cabinet also decides who is appointed to provincial superior courts (trial courts and courts of appeal) but under section 3 of the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) to be eligible you must have, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature -- [ LINK ] - Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges." - The federal Cabinet also has the power to appoint the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment criteria (if any exists) for some of these tribunals is as follows: - Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process or required profession criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives" - The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions" - The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] The Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food. - The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the ), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal are appointed under sections 48.1 and 48.2 (with the requirement under subsection 48.1(2) that "Persons appointed as members of the Tribunal must have experience, expertise and interest in, and sensitivity to, human rights"), of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without a public process or independent confirmation process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation." - The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 81 of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-1 -- the Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner." - The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 153(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/I-2.5 -- "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec." - The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labour matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] - Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labour relations" - The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 3(1) of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/T-18.5 -- members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction." - The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act ( 1995, c. 18 ) -- [ LINK ] - An unpublished academic study found that, between 1989 and 2003, 30 per cent of judges appointed were very likely donors to the governing politicial party whose leader appointed them, while only five per cent were very likely donors to parties other than the governing party These findings match the percentages found in an earlier academic study -- "Judicial Selection in Canada: A Look at Patronage in Federal Appointments since 1988" (2006) Troy Riddell (University of Guelph), Lori Hausegger (Boise State University) and Matthew Hennigar (Brock University) -- [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: I totally agree with these comments. I should add that these nominations are mainly political; this is a fact well known by journalists and citizens, and unfortunately accepted by citizens.
|
||||||||
| 33c: In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body). | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - After the most recent appointment of a Justice to the Supreme Court of Canada (Marshall Rothstein was appointed on March 1, 2006) a parliamentary committee held a public hearing to ask Mr. Rothstein basic questions about his legal experience. This hearing resulted essentially from ongoing, and somewhat growing, pressure on the federal and provincial governments to make the judicial appointment process more transparent and public. - The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions (which must be proclaimed into law by the Federal Cabinet (and as of September 10, 2007 had not been proclaimed) that change the federal Lobbyists Registration Act (1985, c. 44 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] -- into the Lobbying Act and that establish a Commissioner of Lobbyists to replace the current Registrar of Lobbyists. The Registrar acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when enforcing the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct, but has no independence in law from the federal Cabinet (the Registrar can be dismissed at any time for any reason, has only delegated power over office budget and staff), whereas the Commissioner of Lobbyists (if established) will have independence through a fixed term of office (dismissal only for cause) and control over budget and staff, but will not have a public appointment process. Registrar's website -- [ LINK ] - The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions that change the federal Salaries Act (R.S., 1985, c. S-3) -- [ LINK ] -- to give the Federal Cabinet the power to create a Public Appointments Commission (as of Sept. 10, 2007, the federal Cabinet had not created the Commission and had given no indication that it ever intended to create the Commission). The Commission is given the legal mandate to ensure that all Cabinet appointments are made through processes that are "widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit." References: - In law, there is no established public process for federal judicial appointments (nor are there, in law, public processes for the appointment of the heads or members of the many quasi-judicial, administrative tribunals, agencies, boards and commissions that enforce various specialized federal Canadian laws. See details about some of these quasi-judicial entities further below: - The Parliament of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 101 -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] ) to "provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada" and used this power to establish the Supreme Court of Canada (first established in 1875 by an Act of Parliament -- now under the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26), the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (first established as the Exchequer Court of Canada in 1871, then expanded in jurisdiction to become the Federal Court of Canada in 1971 -- now under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7), and the Tax Court of Canada (established in 1983 under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2) - The federal Cabinet of ministers (legal name is the "Governor in Council" and Cabinet ministers (who are not required to be elected politicians) are appointed to Cabinet by the elected Prime Minister) has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ), justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ), and the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] ) - The Governor General of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 96 -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/Const/index.html ) to appoint the superior court judges in Canadian provinces (trial court and court of appeal) which are courts that have jurisdiction over any matter that is not specifically reserved for the Federal Court of Canada. The Governor General has this constitutional power as the representative in Canada of the British monarchy (currently Queen Elizabeth II) but, as with the other Governor General constitutional powers, this power is not used or exercised in any way at any time that defies the ruling party in Parliament (and has not been used or exercised in this way for decades) -- as a result, the federal Cabinet actually decides who is appointed to these provincial superior courts under the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ] - Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges." - The provincial governments only have the power to appoint provincial court (trial court) judges. - The federal Cabinet also appoints the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment process for some of these tribunals is as follows: - Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives." - The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions." - The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] -- The Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food. - The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal under sections 48.1 and 48.2, of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without an independent confirmation process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] - Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation." - The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 81 of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-1 -- The Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner." - The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 153(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/I-2.5 -- "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec." - The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labour matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] - Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labour relations" - The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ] - The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - Under subsection 3(1) of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/T-18.5 -- Members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction." - The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act ( 1995, c. 18 ) -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 34 | Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 34a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - The statutes creating courts and administrative tribunals, as well as the common law rulings, require that national judges (including administrative tribunals) give reasons for their decisions (for example, section 15 of the Citizenship Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-29) -- [ LINK ] --states that there is an obligation to give reasons for a decision when a citizenship judge rejects an application). - The only exception is that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) does not give reasons when it refuses to hold a hearing on an appeal application (in which case, the ruling is essentially upheld by the SCC, without the SCC giving its own reasons for upholding the ruling)
|
||||||||
| 34b: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - The statutes creating courts and administrative tribunals, as well as the common law rulings, require that ntaional judges (including administrative tribunals) give reasons for their decisions (for example, section 15 of the Citizenship Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-29) -- [ LINK ] -- states that there is an obligation to give reasons for a decision when a citizenship judge rejects an application) - The only exception is that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) does not give reasons when it refuses to hold a hearing on an appeal application (in which case, the ruling is essentially upheld by the SCC, without the SCC giving its own reasons for upholding the ruling). However, at times administrative tribunals especially do not give reasons that adequately explain the basis of their decisions, and this failure to give adequate reasons is often the basis of applications to courts for a judicial review of the decision. For example, see Democracy Watch's September 2005 court challenge of the federal Ethics Commissioner and the federal Registrar of Lobbyists for their failure to give adequate reasons for their decisions -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 34c: In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Canadian Judicial Council -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 34d: In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - Some may claim that the right and power of the federal Attorney General or the attorney general of provinces to require that the CJC , under subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act, hold an inquiry into whether a superior court judge (or, under 69, into whether a Cabinet appointee) should be removed from office amounts to political interference. However, the attorney general cannot dictate the result of the inquiry. References: - Canadian Judicial Council -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ] - The CJC's membership is established under section 59 of the Act.
|
||||||||
| 34e: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - The score of 75 is given because the CJC is largely complaint-driven (and, therefore, not "aggressive"), has a membership that only includes justices (and, therefore, is structurally biased in favour of judges), and under section 65 of the Judges Act the CJC has only the choice, after an inquiry, to recommend or not recommend the dismissal of a judge (and this lack of a range of possible penalties (for example, reprimand, suspension or fine)) can constrain the CJC from launching inquiries. References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 34f: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - The score of 75 is given because the CJC is largely complaint-driven (and, therefore, not "aggressive"), has a membership that only includes justices (and, therefore, is structurally biased in favour of judges), and under section 65 of the Judges Act the CJC has only the choice, after an inquiry, to recommend or not recommend the dismissal of a judge (and this lack of a range of possible penalties (for example, reprimand, suspension or fine)) can constrain the CJC from launching inquiries and recommending the dismissal of judges. References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 35 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary? | |||||||
| 35a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirement of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to file an asset (and liability) disclosure form - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] -- Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to file a disclosure form.
|
||||||||
| 35b: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - The Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- prohibits, under section 119, the bribery of judicial officers (and the acceptance of bribes by judicial officers) - However, judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not set out any regulations concerning gifts and hospitality -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to follow the rules in the Code concerning gifts and hospitality (rules 3(6), 19 to 21 - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to comply with the Act, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to comply with the Act's general provisions concerning gifts and hospitality in sections 11 and 12. - The former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro did not define the limits on gifts or hospitality with public interpretation bulletins during his tenure between March 2004 and April 2007 -- hopefully the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (appointed on July 9, 2007) will very soon set out public, clear interpretations of the provisions in the Conflict of Interest Act.
|
||||||||
| 35c: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: -Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not set out any regulations concerning gifts and hospitality -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to follow the rules in the Code concerning gifts and hospitality (rules 3(6), 19 to 21 - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to comply with the Act, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to comply with the Act's general provisions concerning gifts and hospitality in sections 11 and 12. - The former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro did not define the limits on gifts or hospitality with public interpretation bulletins during his tenure between March 2004 and April 2007 -- hopefully the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (appointed on July 9, 2007) will very soon set out public, clear interpretations of the provisions in the Conflict of Interest Act.
|
||||||||
| 35d: In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not restrict entering the private sector after leaving their office -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore restricted from entering the private sector after leaving their office generally for a period of one year (except for becoming a lobbyist, in which case the cooling-off period (which has some exemptions) is five years) - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and restricted from entering the private sector after leaving their office generally for a period of one year (except for becoming a lobbyist, in which case the cooling-off period (which has some exemptions) is five years).
|
||||||||
| 35e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not restrict entering the private sector after leaving their office -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore restricted from entering the private sector after leaving their office generally for a period of one year (except for becoming a lobbyist, in which case the cooling-off period (which has some exemptions) is five years). - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and restricted from entering the private sector after leaving their office generally for a period of one year (except for becoming a lobbyist, in which case the cooling-off period (which has some exemptions) is five years). - The former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro demonstrated a very weak enforcement attitude and practice concerning post-employment restrictions. See details at: [ LINK ] ) Hopefully the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner will have a stronger enforcement attitude and practice.
Peer Review Comments: Indeed, no restrictions apply to judges' private sector employment. Judges can be hired in the private sector as soon as they cease their government function.
|
||||||||
| 35f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - The Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- prohibits, under section 119, the bribery of judicial officers (and the acceptance of bribes by judicial officers) - However, judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not set out any regulations concerning gifts and hospitality -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to follow the rules in the Code concerning gifts and hospitality (rules 3(6), 19 to 21 - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to comply with the Act, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to comply with the Act's general provisions concerning gifts and hospitality in sections 11 and 12. - The former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro did not define the limits on gifts or hospitality through a public interpretation bulletin during his tenure between March 2004 and April 2007 and as a result the limits were essentially not enforced. Hopefully the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (appointed on July 9, 2007) will very soon set out public, clear interpretations of the provisions in the Conflict of Interest Act.
|
||||||||
| 35g: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirements of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to file an asset (and liability) disclosure form - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to file a disclosure form. - No disclosure forms were audited by the former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro (as he believed that his general power to administer the Code did not include the power to conduct audits, and he publicly stated that conducting audits would create a "police state"). See some details in the materials filed in support of Democracy Watch's September 2005 court challenge of the Ethics Commissioner's failure to enforce the Code properly at: [ LINK ] - Hopefully the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner under the new Conflict of Interest Act will conduct at least random audits of the forms.
|
||||||||
| 36 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary? | |||||||
| 36a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirement of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to file an asset (and liability) disclosure form that is partially accessible to the public - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ]. Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to file a disclosure form that is partially accessible to the public.
|
||||||||
| 36b: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: - tTe Code and the Conflict of Interest Act give public office holders 120 days to file the disclosure form, which is then reviewed by staff of the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, and then finally partially made public (some details are not publicly disclosed). This unnecessarily long delay in public disclosure means that a person can often hold office for six months to a year before any disclosure of their assets and liabilities is made public. References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirement of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to file an asset (and liability) disclosure form - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to file a disclosure form.
|
||||||||
| 36c: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: - Judges are exempt under clause 4(1)(c)(iv) from the requirement of the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- and instead are covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ] - People appointed to administrative, quasi-judicial entities (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals) are covered by the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (the "Code")-- http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/tcp_2006.asp -- and are therefore required to file an asset (and liability) disclosure form - The Code was no longer in force as of July 9, 2007 when the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet -- [ LINK ] Under the Act, judges are still exempt under the subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are still not required to file a disclosure form, while Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are still covered and required to file a disclosure form. - The public portion of the forms appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are required to file are made available on the Internet at no cost in a searchable Public Registry -- [ LINK ]
|
||||||||



