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2008 Assessment

Canada: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Canada: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement
Indicators   Score
83 Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? 58
84 Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? 58

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

83 Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?
 
  83a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - The head of the federal police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is appointed by the federal Cabinet (known as the "Governor in Council") and is not required under subsection 5(1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10) -- [ LINK ] -- to have experience as a law enforcement officer. However, the person must be sworn in as an officer before accepting the appointment.

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006; the Governor-in-Council (ie. federal Cabinet) appoints director of Public Prosecutions who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (ie. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (i.e. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

- The score of 75 is given because the current commissioner of the RCMP (appointed in spring 2007) does not have experience as a law enforcement officer, and as a result his appointment is controversial -- See "RCMP Bristles at Pick for Top Boss: Choice of 'Outsider' for New Commissioner Praised by Bureaucrats, Criticized by Force" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, July 7, 2007, p. A1; AND "Mounties' Policy Poobah: New Boss' Role Has Mostly Been in Backrooms" by Canadian Press, Ottawa Sun, July 7, 2007, p. 21

- There are provincial and municipal police forces in Canada, but this grade is given based only on the RCMP, as it is the federal police force in Canada.

  83b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - "RCMP Can't Probe All Organized Crime Cases, Chief Says: Limited Resources Hurt Investigations" by Jeff Sallot, Globe and Mail, May 9, 2006, p. A5 -- The article quotes Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli stating that "our best guess is we can tackle one-third or what's out there [in terms of organized crime]" and that "We know there are groups we can't go after."

- With regard to federal securities fraud law enforcement agency: - "The RCMP's IMET [Integrated Market Enforcement Team] Has Little To Show for Itself" by Globe and Mail editorial board, May, 22, 2006, p. A10

- "And Justice for Some: RCMP Market Enforcement Team" by John Gray, Canadian Business magazine, June 5-18, 2006 -- [ LINK ]

- "Review Planned for Crime Agency" by Karen Howlett, Globe and Mail, March 20, 2007 -- [ LINK ] -- The article notes that IMET budget increased from CA$30 million (US$24.3 million) in the 2006-2007 fiscal year to CA$40 million (US$32.4 million) in 2007-2008.

  83c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - The head of the federal police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is appointed by the federal Cabinet (known as the "Governor in Council") and is not required under subsection 5(1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10) -- [ LINK ] -- to have experience as a law enforcement officer. However, the person must be sworn in as an officer before accepting the appointment.

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006; the Governor-in-Council (ie. federal Cabinet) appoints director of Public Prosecutions who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (ie. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (ie. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

- The score of 75 is given because there is ongoing concern, based on several recent events, that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) is under political influence and subject to political interference -- See articles at: [ LINK ] AND [ LINK ] (which is a review of a book released in October 2008 about the RCMP entitled "Dispersing the Fog")

- In addition, two commissions have found serious problems with how the RCMP is investigating people alleged to have links to terrorist groups, including the RCMP's cooperation with police forces in the U.S. and other countries -- See some details about one of the commissions in following article: [ LINK ]

- As well, while the bribery measures in sections 119 to 121 of the Criminal Code of Canada ((R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- prohibit "corruptly" offering money or anything of value to a Member of the House of Commons (or other public official) in return for an action or decision by the Member, it should be noted that because of lack of enforcement, there is effectively an exemption from the bribery law when the Prime Minister of Canada or his/her representatives offer a reward to a Member, if the Member switches parties and joins the ruling party in between elections, or resigns from his/her seat in the House in order to allow another person the Prime Minister wants to have as a candidate to win that seat.

- Several examples of Prime Ministers offering rewards to Members if they switch parties have occurred in the past few years, as follows: - re: Belinda Stronach, see: [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] - re: David Emerson, see: http://www.dwatch.ca/camp/RelsApr2706.html - re: Chuck Cadman, see: [ LINK ] AND [ LINK ] - re: Gurmant Grewal, see: [ LINK ] - re: John Harvard see: [ LINK ]

84 Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?
 
  84a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments:

References: - Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP -- [ LINK ] -- established under sections 45.29 to 45.34 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10) -- [ LINK ]

- In a speech on June 24, 2007, Paul E. Kennedy, the chair of the Commission, set out several flaws and loopholes in the Commission's powers and effectiveness and proposals for correcting and closing them -- [ LINK ]

- Another speech by Mr. Kennedy, on May 9, 2007 summarized the situation in a similar way -- [ LINK ]

- "RCMP Often Rewrote Critical Rulings: Report -- Refusal of Commissioners To Accept Reviews 'Strikes at Core of Civilian Accountability'" by Tim Naumetz, Ottawa Citizen, July 20, 2007, p. A3

- "Force Needs Ombudsman: Top Mountie -- Commissioner Seeks Reform: Expert Warns Change Will Take Time" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 8, 2007, p. A4

- "RCMP's 'Paramilitary' Governance Model Needs Fixing" by Peter Kasurak, Hill Times, Sept. 10, 2007, p. 32

  84b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP -- [ LINK ] -- established under sections 45.29 to 45.34 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10) -- [ LINK ]

- According to the 2006-2007 fiscal year annual report of the Commission "The chronic backlog of review cases has been cleared for the first time in more than 15 years. In addition, the Commission met its commitment to complete 80 percent of final and interim review reports in less than 120 days. In fact, the average time for completing new review cases was reduced to just 91 days from the previous five-year average of 527 days." -- [ LINK ]

- However, as the Complaints Commissioner stated in his 2007-2008 Annual Report, he still lacks resources to fulfill his mandate and "I therefore recommend that the government enhance the Commission's legislative mandate and financial base as recommended in my reports of 2005-2006 and 2006-2007" -- See report at: [ LINK ]

- As well, in a speech on June 24, 2007, Paul E. Kennedy, the chair of the Commission, set out several flaws and loopholes in the Commission's powers and effectiveness and proposals for correcting and closing them -- [ LINK ]

- Another speech by Mr. Kennedy, on May 9, 2007 summarized the situation in a similar way -- [ LINK ]

- See proposals for new oversight RCMP legislation proposed by the Commissioner in his 2005-2006 report at: [ LINK ]

- "RCMP Often Rewrote Critical Rulings: Report -- Refusal of Commissioners To Accept Reviews 'Strikes at Core of Civilian Accountability'" by Tim Naumetz, Ottawa Citizen, July 20, 2007, p. A3

- "Force Needs Ombudsman: Top Mountie -- Commissioner Seeks Reform: Expert Warns Change Will Take Time" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 8, 2007, p. A4

- "RCMP's 'Paramilitary' Governance Model Needs Fixing" by Peter Kasurak, Hill Times, Sept. 10, 2007, p. 32

  84c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments:

References: - If an officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) is involved in a violation of the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- it is required that another police force (municipal or provincial) investigate the RCMP officer.

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006, the Governor-in-Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) appoints the director of Public Prosecutions, who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (i.e. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (i.e. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

- The RCMP also has an internal audit process, as do almost all federal government institutions, and an internal discipline process (under Part IV of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10)) -- [ LINK ] -- and a Public Complaints Commission under Parts VI and VII of the RCMP Act, and an External Review Committee under Part II of the RCMP Act

- However, during 2006-2007, it was revealed that more than CA$3 million (US$2.4 million) in funds had been removed from the RCMP's pension and internal insurance funds, and that internal whistleblowers had been demoted or transferred by Commissioner Guiliano Zaccardelli (who resigned over this scandal and other scandals involving law enforcement). As the sources set out below make clear, the situation raised serious questions about the effectiveness of internal RCMP accountability processes, and caused many (including new Commissioner William Elliott) to propose a comprehensive inquiry into the RCMP, and new institutional checks and accountability measures and institutions to ensure that the commissioner of the RCMP, and other senior officers, are not involved in corrupt activities:

- "RCMP Can't Probe All Organized Crime Cases, Chief Says: Limited Resources Hurt Investigations" by Jeff Sallot, Globe and Mail, May 9, 2006, p. A5

- "The RCMP's IMET [Integrated Market Enforcement Team] Has Little To Show for Itself" by Globe and Mail editorial board, May, 22, 2006, p. A10

- "Reticence and the RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board, July 19, 2006, p. A12

- "The RCMP's 'Culture of Secrecy': Media Get the Silent Treatment on Killings of Six Mounties" by Katherine Harding and Dawn Walton, Globe and Mail, July 29, 2006, p. F2

- "Chief Feels Heat from His Force: Zaccardelli Grilled over Botched Internal Probe" by Don Martin, National Post, Sept. 30, 2006, p. A5

- "Our Lost Horseman" by Lawrence Martin, Globe and Mail, Dec. 7, 2006, p. A19

- "MPs Fear Cover-Up over RCMP Pension Fund: Attorney-General Report Says $3.1 Million Was Diverted to Other Mountie Accounts" by Jeff Sallot, Globe and Mail, Feb. 22, 2007, p. A8

- "Tales of Corruption Rock RCMP" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, March 29, 2007, p. A1

- "Inquiry Needed into RCMP" by Toronto Sun editorial board, Toronto Sun, April 19, 2007, p. 18

- "A Lament for the RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board May 16, 2007, p. A20

- "Federal Independent Investigator Releases Report on RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans" by Duncan Fulton, Marketwire, June 15, 2007 -- [ LINK ] - "RCMP 'Horribly Broken': Former Commissioner Zaccardelli Was 'Autocratic' Leader Who Punished Whistle-Blowers' Investigator Concludes" by Campbell Clark and Daniel Leblanc, Globe and Mail, June 16, 2007, p. A1

- "RCMP 'Institutionally Sick': Expert - Co-Author of Study into Force Found 'Betrayal of Trust' between Managers, Frontline Workers" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, June 15, 2007, p. A1

- "How to Restore a Broken RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board, Globe and Mail, June 16, 2007, p. A20

- Democracy Watch's news release June 19, 2007 [ LINK ]

- "RCMP Nab Alleged Mole: Longtime Mountie Employee Charged with Selling Police Secrets to Montreal Mobsters" by Michel Auger, Ottawa Sun, Aug. 4, 2007, p. 5

- "Force Needs Ombudsman: Top Mountie -- Commissioner Seeks Reform: Expert Warns Change Will Take Time" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 8, 2007, p. A4

- "RCMP's 'Paramilitary' Governance Model Needs Fixing" by Peter Kasurak, Hill Times, Sept. 10, 2007, p. 32

****************

- While there is no specific anti-corruption agency for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force), as with almost all federal government institutions, the RCMP is covered by the following government "watchdog" agencies which help ensure corruption does not occur: - Auditor General of Canada -- [ LINK ] -- serves a fixed term of 10 years and is always a fully qualified professional auditor appointed under the Auditor General Act R.S., 1985, c. A-17) -- [ LINK ] -- and is the front-line investigator helping ensure that the federal government complies with the Financial Administration Act and regulations -- [ LINK ] -- and its own spending codes, policies and guidelines, and receives value for money spent

- Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ] -- who enforces the Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) -- [ LINK ] -- and the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons -- [ LINK ]

- The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner office -- [ LINK ] -- under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- is newly created (first Commissioner appointed on July 9, 2007) with the mandate to investigate complaints from "whistleblowers" and resolve violations of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service -- [ LINK ] -- and also acts as a liaison to refer whistleblowers to the appropriate agency that enforces other federal government laws, regulations, codes, policies and guidelines

- The newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-31.9

- The Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) whose members are appointed without any public process or professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), as well as the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) whose members are appointed without any public process or professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) -- [ LINK ]

- Procurement Ombudsman (the first Ombudsman was appointed in September 2007, but whose office did not begin full operations until May 2008) -- [ LINK ]

- Commissioner of Lobbying who as of July 2, 2008 is the front-line enforcer (in cooperation with the RCMP) of the newly entitled Lobbying Act (replacing the Registrar of Lobbyists who was the front-line enforcer of the Lobbyists Registration Act (the old name of the Lobbying Act.) The Commissioner is the sole enforcer of the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct -- [ LINK ] -- which contains rules concerning the relationship between lobbyists and federal politicians and government officials

- Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) -- [ LINK ] -- which enforces the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (2000, c. 17) -- [ LINK ]

  84d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - If an officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) is involved in a violation of the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- it is required that another police force (municipal or provincial) investigate the RCMP officer.

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006, the Governor-in-Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) appoints the director of Public Prosecutions who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (i.e. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (i.e. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

- The RCMP also has an internal audit process, as do almost all federal government institutions, and an internal discipline process (under Part IV of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10)) -- [ LINK ] -- and a Public Complaints Commission under Parts VI and VII of the RCMP Act, and an External Review Committee under Part II of the RCMP Act

- However, during 2006-2007, it was revealed that more than CA$3 million (US$2.4 million) in funds had been removed from the RCMP's pension and internal insurance funds, and that internal whistleblowers had been demoted or transferred by Commissioner Guiliano Zaccardelli (who resigned over this scandal and other scandals involving law enforcement). As the sources set out below make clear, the situation raised serious questions about the effectiveness of internal RCMP accountability processes, and caused many (including new Commissioner William Elliott) to propose a comprehensive inquiry into the RCMP, and new institutional checks and accountability measures and institutions to ensure that the commissioner of the RCMP, and other senior officers, are not involved in corrupt activities:

- "RCMP Can't Probe All Organized Crime Cases, Chief Says: Limited Resources Hurt Investigations" by Jeff Sallot, Globe and Mail, May 9, 2006, p. A5

- "The RCMP's IMET [Integrated Market Enforcement Team] Has Little To Show for Itself" by Globe and Mail editorial board, May, 22, 2006, p. A10

- "Reticence and the RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board, July 19, 2006, p. A12

- "The RCMP's 'Culture of Secrecy': Media Get the Silent Treatment on Killings of Six Mounties" by Katherine Harding and Dawn Walton, Globe and Mail, July 29, 2006, p. F2

- "Chief Feels Heat from His Force: Zaccardelli Grilled over Botched Internal Probe" by Don Martin, National Post, Sept. 30, 2006, p. A5

- "Our Lost Horseman" by Lawrence Martin, Globe and Mail, Dec. 7, 2006, p. A19

- "MPs Fear Cover-Up over RCMP Pension Fund: Attorney-General Report Says $3.1 Million Was Diverted to Other Mountie Accounts" by Jeff Sallot, Globe and Mail, Feb. 22, 2007, p. A8

- "Tales of Corruption Rock RCMP" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, March 29, 2007, p. A1

- "Inquiry Needed into RCMP" by Toronto Sun editorial board, Toronto Sun, April 19, 2007, p. 18

- "A Lament for the RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board May 16, 2007, p. A20

- "Federal Independent Investigator Releases Report on RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans" by Duncan Fulton, Marketwire, June 15, 2007 -- [ LINK ] - "RCMP 'Horribly Broken': Former Commissioner Zaccardelli Was 'Autocratic' Leader Who Punished Whistle-Blowers' Investigator Concludes" by Campbell Clark and Daniel Leblanc, Globe and Mail, June 16, 2007, p. A1

- "RCMP 'Institutionally Sick': Expert - Co-Author of Study into Force Found 'Betrayal of Trust' between Managers, Frontline Workers" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, June 15, 2007, p. A1

- "How to Restore a Broken RCMP" by Globe and Mail editorial board, Globe and Mail, June 16, 2007, p. A20

- Democracy Watch's news release June 19, 2007 [ LINK ]

- "RCMP Nab Alleged Mole: Longtime Mountie Employee Charged with Selling Police Secrets to Montreal Mobsters" by Michel Auger, Ottawa Sun, Aug. 4, 2007, p. 5

- "Force Needs Ombudsman: Top Mountie -- Commissioner Seeks Reform: Expert Warns Change Will Take Time" by Kathryn May, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 8, 2007, p. A4

- "RCMP's 'Paramilitary' Governance Model Needs Fixing" by Peter Kasurak, Hill Times, Sept. 10, 2007, p. 32

****************

- While there is no specific anti-corruption agency for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force), as with almost all federal government institutions, the RCMP is covered by the following government "watchdog" agencies which help ensure corruption does not occur: - Auditor General of Canada -- [ LINK ] -- serves a fixed term of 10 years and is always a fully qualified professional auditor appointed under the Auditor General Act R.S., 1985, c. A-17) -- [ LINK ] -- and is the front-line investigator helping ensure that the federal government complies with the Financial Administration Act and regulations -- [ LINK ] -- and its own spending codes, policies and guidelines, and receives value for money spent

- Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ] -- who enforces the Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) -- [ LINK ] -- and the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons -- [ LINK ]

- The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner office -- [ LINK ] -- under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] -- is newly created (first Commissioner was appointed on July 9, 2007) with the mandate to investigate complaints from "whistleblowers" and resolve violations of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service -- [ LINK ] -- He also acts as a liaison to refer whistleblowers to the appropriate agency that enforces other federal government laws, regulations, codes, policies and guidelines.

- The newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-31.9

- The Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) whose members are appointed without any public process or professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), as well as the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) whose members are appointed without any public process or professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) -- [ LINK ]

- Procurement Ombudsman (the first Ombudsman was appointed in September 2007, but whose office did not begin full operations until May 2008) -- [ LINK ]

- Commissioner of Lobbying who as of July 2, 2008 is the front-line enforcer (in cooperation with the RCMP) of the newly entitled Lobbying Act (replacing the Registrar of Lobbyists who was the front-line enforcer of the Lobbyists Registration Act (the old name of the Lobbying Act) and -- the Commissioner is the sole enforcer of the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct -- [ LINK ] -- which contains rules concerning the relationship between lobbyists and federal politicians and government officials

- Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) -- [ LINK ] -- which enforces the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (2000, c. 17) -- [ LINK ]

***********

- These problems of enforcement within police forces also exist in Canadian provinces -- See for example the following article about misconduct in the British Columbia provincial and municipal police forces: [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: One example is the arrest of two Toronto police officers in connection with a series of raids on marijuana grow-ops last summer. Eighteen other suspects were also arrested, including three corrections officers, according to a CBCNews report.

  84e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.
 
Score: YES  NO score
  Comments:

References: - All officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) are required to comply with the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46 -- [ LINK ] ) provisions concerning corruption (in Part IV, section 128 especially, and also sections 119 to 122, and 124 to 127)

- However, under sections 25 to 33 of Part I of the Criminal Code, RCMP and all other "peace officers" are immune from prosecution when they are enforcing the law (with some limits).

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006; the Governor-in-Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) appoints the director of Public Prosecutions who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (i.e. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (i.e. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

  84f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings.
 
Score: 100  75  50  25  0  score
  Comments:

References: - All officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP - Canada's federal police force) are required to comply with the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46 -- [ LINK ] ) provisions concerning corruption (in Part IV, section 128 especially, and also sections 119 to 122, and 124 to 127)

- However, under sections 25 to 33 of Part I of the Criminal Code, RCMP and all other "peace officers" are immune from prosecution when they are enforcing the law (with some limits).

- Under subsection 3(1) and 4 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act (2006, c. 9, s. 121) -- [ LINK ] -- first in force in December 2006; the Governor-in-Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) appoints the director of Public Prosecutions who has the power to initiate prosecutions in "the general and public interest" (i.e. when the elected attorney general may be reluctant to prosecute because of political considerations); the director of Public Prosecutions "must be a member of at least 10 years standing at the bar of any province" (i.e. a lawyer (the "bar" is the lawyers' association (known as a "Law Society") in each Canadian province, as must be any deputy directors appointed under section 6 of the Act -- [ LINK ]

***************

- The most prominent issue in 2007-2008 was the use of "taser" stun guns by the RCMP and other police forces in Canada, which resulted in several deaths -- See article at: [ LINK ] - Also, see section on use of tasers in the 2007-2008 Annual Report of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP -- [ LINK ] -- established under sections 45.29 to 45.34 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act (R.S., 1985, c. R-10) -- [ LINK ] -- See the Annual Report at: [ LINK ]

*************

Peer Review Comments: Excessive use of force by law enforcement officials is a systematic problem in Canada that continued to make headlines during the study period. For example, a Calgary police officer was suspended with pay in July 2007 after being charged with aggravated assault in the arrest of a bar patron. He was later acquitted.

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