References: - In law, there is no established public process for federal judicial appointments (nor are there, in law, public processes for the appointment of the heads or members of the many quasi-judicial, administrative tribunals, agencies, boards and commissions that enforce various specialized federal Canadian laws.)

- See details about some of these quasi-judicial entities further below:

- The Parliament of Canada has the power under Part VII of the The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 101 -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] ) to "provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada" and used this power to establish the Supreme Court of Canada (first established in 1875 by an Act of Parliament -- now under the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26), the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (first established as the Exchequer Court of Canada in 1871, then expanded in jurisdiction to become the Federal Court of Canada in 1971 -- now under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7), and the Tax Court of Canada (established in 1983 under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2)

- The federal Cabinet of ministers (legal name is the "Governor in Council" and Cabinet ministers (who are not required to be elected politicians) are appointed to Cabinet by the elected Prime Minister) has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ), justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ), and the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] )

- The Governor General of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 96 -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/Const/index.html ) to appoint the superior court judges in Canadian provinces (trial court and court of appeal) which are courts that have jurisdiction over any matter that is not specifically reserved for the Federal Court of Canada. The Governor General has this constitutional power as the representative in Canada of the British monarchy (currently Queen Elizabeth II) but, as with the other Governor General constitutional powers, this power is not used or exercised in any way at any time that defies the ruling party in Parliament (and has not been used or exercised in this way for decades) -- as a result, the federal Cabinet actually decides who is appointed to these provincial superior courts under the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

**********

- The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions that change the federal Salaries Act (R.S., 1985, c. S-3) -- [ LINK ] -- to give the Federal Cabinet the power to create a Public Appointments Commission (as of Nov. 1, 2008, the federal Cabinet had not created the Commission and the ruling Conservative Party of Canada had only promised during the September-October 2008 federal election to create the Commission (the Conservatives made the same promise during the December 2005-January 2006 election through which they became the ruling party); the Commission (if it is ever established) has the legal mandate under the Act to ensure that all Cabinet appointments are made through processes that are "widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit."

- On March 1, 2006, a new Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada (Marshall Rothstein) was appointed, and subsequently a parliamentary committee held a public hearing to ask Mr. Rothstein basic questions about his legal experience. This hearing resulted essentially from ongoing, and somewhat growing, pressure on the federal and provincial governments to make the judicial appointment process more transparent and public.

- After this appointment, the new Conservative federal government changed the membership of the advisory committee on Supreme Court appointments (a committee that does not exist in law, but simply at the whim of the Prime Minister) by removing the member of the legal community from the committee (including a retired judge, representatives from the lawyers' association, and representatives from the provincial government (all in the province from which the judge was selected) and two lay people selected by the Minister of Justice), leaving only members from all of the political parties with seats in the House of Commons (five members in total -- two from the ruling party, and one each from the other three parties with seats) which makes the panel much more politically partisan than before.

- Controversially, the Conservatives then appointed as its members of the committee two Cabinet ministers (who are members of the executive of the government whose actions potentially could be ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Canada.)

- At the end of June, a Justice of the Supreme Court (Michel Bastarache) resigned and so the advisory committee began meeting to screen candidates for the position. However, on Sept. 5, 2008, just before he called a snap election, Prime Minister Harper appointed the new Justice (Thomas Cromwell) without notice to anyone, including the advisory committee. The appointment was confirmed only after a hearing of a committee in the House of Commons similar to the hearing held in spring 2006, but the committee has no power of any kind to resist let alone reject the Prime Minister's appointment.

- See a summary of the Supreme Court appointment situation at: [ LINK ]

- In addition, the Conservatives changed the advisory committees for the other federal and provincial judicial appointments which are controlled by the federal Cabinet (Governor-in-Council) by appointing a police officer to each committee, who along with the three government-appointed people on the committee form a majority of the members of each committee. In effect, these changes reduce the independence of the committees from the Cabinet.

************

- Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges."

***********

- The provincial governments only have the power to appoint provincial court (trial court) judges.

*************

- The federal Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers also appoint the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment process for some of these tribunals is as follows: - Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives."

- The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions."

- The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] -- even though the Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labeling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food.

- The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal under sections 48.1 and 48.2, of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without an independent confirmation process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation."

- The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- the Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner."

- The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 153(4) of the Act, "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec."

- The newly created position (as of July 2, 2008) of Commissioner of Lobbying (replacing the position of Registrar of Lobbyists) under the amended and newly entitled Lobbying Act -- [ LINK ] -- is appointed under section 4.1 of the Act without a public process

- The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ]

- The new (as of July 2007) Public Sector Integrity Commissioner created under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-31.9 -- is appointed without a public process or required professional criteria even though the Commissioner is the appeal body for enforcement of the Values and Ethics Code of the Public Service

- The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) --[ LINK ]

- The members of the Public Service Labor Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labor matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labor Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labor relations."

- The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 3(1) of the Act, Members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction."

- The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act (1995, c. 18) -- [ LINK ]

- There are also many examples of non-qualified people appointed to these quasi-judicial entities mainly because there are no requirements in law that people appointed to head or be members of these entities have specific professional skills or knowledge.

- The Federal Accountability Act (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006) contains provisions that change the federal Salaries Act (R.S., 1985, c. S-3) -- [ LINK ] -- to give the Federal Cabinet the power to create a Public Appointments Commission (as of Nov. 1, 2008, the federal Cabinet had not created the Commission and the ruling Conservative Party of Canada had only promised during the September-October 2008 federal election to create the Commission (the Conservatives made the same promise during the December 2005-January 2006 election through which they became the ruling party); the Commission (if it is ever established) has the legal mandate under the Act to ensure that all Cabinet appointments are made through processes that are "widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit."

References: - The federal Cabinet (legal name is the "Governor in Council") has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ) but under section 5 to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already of a superior court of a province, or, for a period of 10 years, been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate).

- The federal Cabinet also has the power to appoint justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ) but under section 5.3 to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already, or, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature.

- The federal Cabinet also has the power to appoint justices to the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] ) but under subsection 4(3) to be eligible to be appointed you must be a judge already, or, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature.

- The federal Cabinet also decides who is appointed to provincial superior courts (trial courts and courts of appeal) but under section 3 of the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) to be eligible you must have, for a period of 10 years, have been a member of the bar in any province (a barrister or advocate) and/or a member of the bar who has held a full-time position exercising functions of a judicial nature -- [[ LINK ]

- Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defense Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges."

- An unpublished academic study found that, between 1989 and 2003, 30 per cent of judges appointed were very likely donors to the governing political party whose leader appointed them, while only five per cent were very likely donors to parties other than the governing party.

- These findings match the percentages found in an earlier academic study -- "Judicial Selection in Canada: A Look at Patronage in Federal Appointments since 1988" (2006) Troy Riddell (University of Guelph), Lori Hausegger (Boise State University) and Matthew Hennigar (Brock University) -- [ LINK ]

- The federal Cabinet also appoints the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment process for some of these tribunals is as follows:

- Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives."

- The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions."

- The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] -- even though the Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food.

- The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal under sections 48.1 and 48.2, of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without a public process or an independent confirmation process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation."

- The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- the Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner."

- The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 153(4) of the Act, "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec."

- The newly created position (as of July 2, 2008) of Commissioner of Lobbying (replacing the position of Registrar of Lobbyists) under the amended and newly entitled Lobbying Act -- [ LINK ] -- is appointed under section 4.1 of the Act without a public process or required professional criteria

- The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ]

- The new (as of July 2007) Public Sector Integrity Commissioner created under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-31.9 -- is appointed without a public process or required professional criteria even though the Commissioner is the appeal body for enforcement of the Values and Ethics Code of the Public Service.

- The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) --[ LINK ]

- The members of the Public Service Labor Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labor matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labor Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labor relations."

- The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 3(1) of the Act, Members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction."

- The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process or required professional criteria by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act (1995, c. 18) -- [ LINK ]

- On March 1, 2006, a new Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada (Marshall Rothstein) was appointed, and subsequently a parliamentary committee held a public hearing to ask Mr. Rothstein basic questions about his legal experience. This hearing resulted essentially from ongoing, and somewhat growing, pressure on the federal and provincial governments to make the judicial appointment process more transparent and public.

- After this appointment, the new Conservative federal government changed the membership of the advisory committee on Supreme Court appointments (a committee that does not exist in law, but simply at the whim of the Prime Minister) by removing the member of the legal community from the committee, leaving only members from all of the political parties with seats in the House of Commons (five members in total -- two from the ruling party, and one each from the other three parties with seats); controversially, the Conservatives then appointed as its members on the committee two Cabinet ministers (who are members of the executive of the government whose actions potentially could be ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Canada.)

- At the end of June, a Justice of the Supreme Court (Michel Bastarache) resigned and so the advisory committee began meeting to screen candidates for the position. However, on Sept. 5, 2008, just before he called a snap election, Prime Minister Harper appointed the new Justice (Thomas Cromwell) without notice to anyone, including the advisory committee. The appointment was confirmed only after a hearing of a committee in the House of Commons similar to the hearing held in spring 2006, but the committee has no power of any kind to resist let alone reject the Prime Minister's appointment.

- In addition, the Conservatives changed the advisory committees for the other federal and provincial judicial appointments which are controlled by the federal Cabinet (Governor-in-Council) by appointing a police officer to each committee, who along with the three government-appointed people on the committee form a majority of the members of each committee. In effect, these changes reduce the independence of the committees from the Cabinet.

References: - In law, there is no established public process for federal judicial appointments (nor are there, in law, public processes for the appointment of the heads or members of the many quasi-judicial, administrative tribunals, agencies, boards and commissions that enforce various specialized federal Canadian laws.)

- In law, there is no established public process for federal judicial appointments (nor are there, in law, public processes for the appointment of the heads or members of the many quasi-judicial, administrative tribunals, agencies, boards and commissions that enforce various specialized federal Canadian laws.)

See details about some of these quasi-judicial entities further below:

- The Parliament of Canada has the power under Part VII of the The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 101 -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] ) to "provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada" and used this power to establish the Supreme Court of Canada (first established in 1875 by an Act of Parliament -- now under the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26), the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (first established as the Exchequer Court of Canada in 1871, then expanded in jurisdiction to become the Federal Court of Canada in 1971 -- now under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7), and the Tax Court of Canada (established in 1983 under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2)

- The federal Cabinet of ministers (legal name is the "Governor in Council" and Cabinet ministers (who are not required to be elected politicians) are appointed to Cabinet by the elected Prime Minister) has the power to appoint justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 -- [ LINK ] ), justices of the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal (section 5.2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 -- [ LINK ] ), and the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 4(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 -- [ LINK ] )

- The Governor General of Canada has the power under The Constitution Act, 1867 (section 96 -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/Const/index.html ) to appoint the superior court judges in Canadian provinces (trial court and court of appeal) which are courts that have jurisdiction over any matter that is not specifically reserved for the Federal Court of Canada. The Governor General has this constitutional power as the representative in Canada of the British monarchy (currently Queen Elizabeth II) but, as with the other Governor General constitutional powers, this power is not used or exercised in any way at any time that defies the ruling party in Parliament (and has not been used or exercised in this way for decades) -- as a result, the federal Cabinet actually decides who is appointed to these provincial superior courts under the federal Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

- Military judges are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under Part III, subsection 165.21(1) of the National Defense Act (R.S., 1985, c. N-5) -- [ LINK ] -- from amongst "officers who are barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province to be military judges."

- The provincial governments only have the power to appoint provincial court (trial court) judges.

- The federal Cabinet also appoints the members of many administrative tribunals (agencies, boards, commissions), and while they are not judges or courts, the members of the tribunals make legally binding rulings that interpret and apply Canadian federal laws. The appointment process for some of these tribunals is as follows: - Members of the board of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(2) of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004, c. 2) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 26(2) "The membership of the board of directors must reflect a range of backgrounds and disciplines relevant to the Agency's objectives."

- The President and Executive Vice-President of the Canada Border Services Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 7 of the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005, c. 38) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Board of Management of the Canada Revenue Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet from a list of nominees submitted by each province under section 15, and the Chair of the Board of Management and Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Agency also without any public process by the Cabinet under sections 25 and 26, of the Canada Revenue Agency Act ( 1999, c. 17 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 16(1) "The directors must be persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, have the experience and the capacity required for discharging their functions."

- The President and Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997, c. 6) -- [ LINK ] -- even though the Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders Rights Act, Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act, and Consumer Packaging and Labeling Act and the Food and Drugs Act as they relate to food.

- The members of the Canadian Human Rights Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 26(1), and the members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal under sections 48.1 and 48.2, of the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (1985, c. 47 (4th Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 10 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (1997, c. 9) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission are appointed without an independent confirmation process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-22) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board members are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(1) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989, c. 3) -- [ LINK ] -- Subsection 4(2) "The Governor in Council shall appoint as members persons who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are collectively knowledgeable about air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation."

- The members of the Competition Tribunal are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice under section 3 of the Competition Tribunal Act (1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 81(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- the Commissioner must be "(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province; (b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in one or more of the following: (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) financial arrangements, (iii) professional regulation and discipline, or (iv) ethics; or (c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner."

- The members of the Immigration and Refugee Board (which rules on whether immigration and refugee applications are valid) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 153 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001, c. 27) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 153(4) of the Act, "The Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division and a majority of the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of that Division and at least 10 per cent of the members of the Divisions referred to in subsection (1) must be members of at least five years standing at the bar of a province or notaries of at least five years standing at the Chambre des notaires du Québec."

- The newly created position (as of July 2, 2008) of Commissioner of Lobbying (replacing the position of Registrar of Lobbyists) under the amended and newly entitled Lobbying Act -- [ LINK ] -- is appointed under section 4.1 of the Act without a public process

- The members of the newly created Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (which rules on complaints about retaliation taken against public servant "whistleblowers" filed with the Tribunal by the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner) will be appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet, chosen from amongst members of the Federal Court of Canada, under section 20.7 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ]

- The new (as of July 2007) Public Sector Integrity Commissioner created under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-31.9 -- is appointed without a public process or required professional criteria even though the Commissioner is the appeal body for enforcement of the Values and Ethics Code of the Public Service

- The members of the Public Service Commission (which, in addition to making appointments and hirings itself, also conducts audits and also investigates and rules on complaints about non-merit-based appointments) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under subsection 4(5), and members of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (which hears and rules on appeals of the Commission's rulings) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 88 and 90 of the Public Service Employment Act (2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13) --[ LINK ]

- The members of the Public Service Labor Relations Board (which rules on various federal public service labor matters as set out in collective bargaining agreements) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 12 and 18 of the Public Service Labor Relations Act ( 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ) -- [ LINK ] -- Under clause 18(1)(e), members of the Board must "have knowledge of or experience in labor relations."

- The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (who has the power to make binding orders about financial institution's activities as they relate to overall solvency) is appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 5 of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)) -- [ LINK ]

- The members of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (which is the appeal body for rulings made under six different federal transportation laws) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under section 3 of the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act (2001, c. 29) -- [ LINK ] -- Under subsection 3(1) of the Act, Members of the Tribunal must "in the opinion of the Governor in Council, collectively have expertise in the transportation sectors in respect of which the federal government has jurisdiction."

- The members (full-time and temporary) of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (which is the appeal body under the Pension Act or the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act) are appointed without any public process by the federal Cabinet under sections 4 to 6 of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act (1995, c. 18) -- [ LINK ]

References: - The statutes creating courts and administrative tribunals, as well as the common law rulings, require that national judges (including administrative tribunals) give reasons for their decisions (for example, section 15 of the Citizenship Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-29) -- [ LINK ] -- states that there is an obligation to give reasons for a decision when a citizenship judge rejects an application.)

- The only exception is that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) does not give reasons when it refuses to hold a hearing on an appeal application (in which case, the ruling is essentially upheld by the SCC, without the SCC giving its own reasons for upholding the ruling.)

References: - The statutes creating courts and administrative tribunals, as well as the common law rulings, require that national judges (including administrative tribunals) give reasons for their decisions (for example, section 15 of the Citizenship Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-29) -- [ LINK ] -- states that there is an obligation to give reasons for a decision when a citizenship judge rejects an application.)

- The only exception is that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) does not give reasons when it refuses to hold a hearing on an appeal application (in which case, the ruling is essentially upheld by the SCC, without the SCC giving its own reasons for upholding the ruling.)

- However, at times administrative tribunals especially do not give reasons that adequately explain the basis of their decisions, and this failure to give adequate reasons is often the basis of applications to courts for a judicial review of the decision. For example, see Democracy Watch's September 2005 court challenge of the federal Ethics Commissioner and the federal Registrar of Lobbyists for their failure to give adequate reasons for their decisions -- [ LINK ]

References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

- The CJC's membership is established under section 59 of the Act and the members are the Chief Justice of Canada and the chief justices and senior judges from the 10 Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories.

References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

- The CJC's membership is established under section 59 of the Act and the members are the Chief Justice of Canada and the chief justices and senior judges from the 10 Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories.

- Some may claim that the right and power of the federal Attorney General or the attorney general of provinces to require that the CJC , under subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act, hold an inquiry into whether a superior court judge (or, under 69, into whether a Cabinet appointee) should be removed from office amounts to political interference. However, the attorney general cannot dictate the result of the inquiry.

References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

- The CJC's membership is established under section 59 of the Act and the members are the Chief Justice of Canada and the chief justices and senior judges from the 10 Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories.

- The score of 75 is given because the CJC is largely complaint-driven (and, therefore, not "aggressive"), has a membership that only includes justices (and, therefore, is structurally biased in favor of judges), and under section 65 of the Judges Act the CJC has only the choice, after an inquiry, to recommend or not recommend the dismissal of a judge (and this lack of a range of possible penalties (for example, reprimand, suspension or fine)) can constrain the CJC from launching inquiries.

References: - Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) -- [ LINK ] -- established under Part II of the Judges Act (R.S., 1985, c. J-1) -- [ LINK ]

- The CJC's membership is established under section 59 of the Act and the members are the Chief Justice of Canada and the chief justices and senior judges from the 10 Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories.

- The score of 75 is given because the CJC is largely complaint-driven (and, therefore, not "aggressive"), has a membership that only includes justices (and, therefore, is structurally biased in favor of judges), and under section 65 of the Judges Act the CJC has only the choice, after an inquiry, to recommend or not recommend the dismissal of a judge (and this lack of a range of possible penalties (for example, reprimand, suspension or fine)) can constrain the CJC from launching inquiries.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of the executive to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of the Executive.

References: - The Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- prohibits, under Part IV, section 119, the bribery of judicial officers (and the acceptance of bribes by judicial officers.)

- Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not covered by the Act's measures concerning gifts and hospitality, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered by the measures.

- In an important step forward during the study period of July 2007 to June 2008, the federal Canadian Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner released the first interpretation bulletin concerning the measures that govern gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch (even though the measures have existed since 1986 in some form or another) -- See the link to the "Guideline on Gifts (including Invitations, Fund Raisers and Business Lunches)" at: [ LINK ]/Default.aspx?pid=36&lang=en" target="_blank">[ LINK ]

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not contain regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public, and most gifts are also required to be disclosed to the Commissioner.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- http://ciec-ccie.gc.ca

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of quasi-judicial administrative tribunals to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of any quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form (however, there is no auditing by the federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner of these forms.)

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of the executive to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of the executive.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so face no restrictions on entering the private sector after leaving office, and while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered by the Act, they are exempted from the restrictions on entering the private sector in the Act.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not contain any restrictions on entering the private sector after they leave office -- [ LINK ]

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so face no restrictions on entering the private sector after leaving office, and while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered by the Act, they are exempted from the restrictions on entering the private sector in the Act.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not contain any restrictions on entering the private sector after they leave office -- [ LINK ]

- However, while they may have to be careful, they do not have to be too careful given that they do not have to disclose assets, and therefore can easily hide any gifts they receive.

References: - The Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ] -- prohibits, under Part IV, section 119, the bribery of judicial officers (and the acceptance of bribes by judicial officers.)

- In an important step forward during the study period of July 2007 to June 2008, the federal Canadian Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner released the first interpretation bulletin concerning the measures that govern gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch (even though the measures have existed since 1986 in some form or another) -- See the link to the "Guideline on Gifts (including Invitations, Fund Raisers and Business Lunches)" at: [ LINK ]/Default.aspx?pid=36&lang=en" target="_blank">[ LINK ]

- Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not covered by the Act's measures concerning gifts and hospitality, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered by the measures.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not contain regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public, and most gifts are also required to be disclosed to the Commissioner.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- http://ciec-ccie.gc.ca

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of quasi-judicial administrative tribunals to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of any quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form (however, there is no auditing by the federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner of these forms.)

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of the executive to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of the executive.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of quasi-judicial administrative tribunals to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of any quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of quasi-judicial administrative tribunals to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of any quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.

References: - Judges are exempt under the new Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2 -- which became law July 9, 2007) -- [ LINK ] -- subsection 2(1) definition of "public office holder" and so are not required to file an asset disclosure form, while some Cabinet appointees to administrative, quasi-judicial entities are covered and required to file an asset disclosure form.

- Judges are instead covered by the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical Principles for Judges" which does not require filing of an asset (and liability) disclosure form -- [ LINK ]

- For those members of the quasi-judicial administrative tribunals covered by the Conflict of Interest Act, most assets worth more than CA$10,000 (US$7,869) must be disclosed to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with a partial list of assets made public.

- Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner -- [ LINK ]

- The CA$10,000 threshold for the disclosure of assets is much too high, as it effectively allows members of quasi-judicial administrative tribunals to hide gifts they receive that are worth less than CA$10,000 (although receiving some of these gifts (for example, from a lobbyist) is technically illegal under the Act). The gap in disclosure of assets worth less than CA$10,000 is especially serious because the Ethics Commissioner between March 2004 and April 2007 did not audit even one of the statement of assets of any member of any quasi-judicial administrative tribunal.