References: - All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

- Government assets (known in Canada as Crown assets), other than real estate, for sale can be found at: [ LINK ]

- Government real estate for sale can be found at: [ LINK ])=en

- Re: whistleblower protection - before the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet in March 2007 and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position created, an Internal Disclosure Policy had existed since November 2001, enforced by the Public Sector Integrity Officer (which was not a legislated position, and as a result lacked independence from the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and also lacked key powers) -- See problems with PSIO ruled on, for example, in case Chopra v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 595 (CanLII) -- [ LINK ]

- The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position was created in spring 2007, and the first Commissioner was appointed on July 9, 2007. Between November 2001 and spring 2007, there was a Public Sector Integrity Officer with limited independence and powers. As a result, while the protection processes exist, they are still not well-established or well-known, nor is their effectiveness determined in any way.

- Based upon the U.S. 20-year experience with a legislated whistleblower protection system (as documented in chapter entitled "Whistleblowing in the United State: The Gap Between Vision and Lessons Learned" by Tom Devine in the book "Whistleblowing Around the World" (ed. Richard Calland and Guy Dehn, pubs. ODAC & PCaW in partnership with the British Council: Southern Africa: 2004), the new Canadian Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act has several identifiable flaws, as follows: - not all whistleblowers all covered by the Act, not even all public servants; - whistleblowers are not allowed to disclose wrongdoing to any legal authority, they must follow the avenue established in the Act or they will likely not be protected; - whistleblowers must complain first to their bosses before they file a complaint with the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, unless they can prove "reasonable grounds" to believe that their bosses will retaliate or fail to take corrective action, but it is unclear whether proving reasonable grounds is on a "prima facie" basis or a more limited basis (whistleblowers should be allowed to complain directly to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner in any case, but is seems under the law that they can only do so if they file an anonymous complaint) - it is not clear that protection covers the full scope of reprisals (whistleblowers can file a complaint if they have "reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal has been taken" but it is not clear if they have to provide "prima facie" evidence of their belief (NOTE: full protection would entail shifting the burden of proof to the employer to prove that no reprisal took place); - the Act does not override other federal laws, and so the government may override the Act in some cases in order to hide wrongdoing or thwart an investigation; - whistleblowers have no right to a jury trial (they must file their submission re: wrongdoing or complaint about a reprisal with the Commissioner, who then designates an investigator, who then reports back to the Commissioner, who then files an application with the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (made up of three to seven judges chosen by the federal Cabinet from amongst the Federal Court justices); - whistleblowers do not have the right to determine who will arbitrate their case (if the Commissioner attempts to settle the case through arbitration). Tthe Commissioner appoints the "conciliator"; - whistleblowers only have 60 days to complain about a reprisal (should be at least one year limitation period); - no interim compensation (while a case is being investigated/heard by Tribunal) is available, and if there is undue delay in investigations/hearings whistleblowers will suffer; - the full scope of compensation is not available (pain and suffering is limited to $10,000 -US$10,266), and Tribunal rulings may limit compensation even further (as occurred in the U.S.); - if a whistleblowers has been fired, they cannot win preference in transferring to another government job, the Tribunal can only reinstate them in their position or compensate them financially; - it seems like anonymous disclosures are allowed, but it is not clear (NOTE: if a person blows the whistle, their identity must be kept secret by the Commissioner throughout the investigation to the extent possible); - there is no clearly defined right to refuse to violate a law, regulations, code, policy or guideline (although general rights under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - there is no clearly defined duty to disclose wrongdoing (although general duties under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - the Act seems to cover all types of wrongdoing, but Tribunal rulings may limit the definition significantly (as happened in the U.S.); - - the Commissioner can only provide up to $1,500 (US$1,520) in funding for legal advice for a whistleblower (in exceptional cases, up to $3,000-US$3,040) which will likely not be adequate, although it seems possible that the Tribunal could award full costs if a whistleblower wins their case; - it seems like the Tribunal can make orders for corrective action and penalties for those who have done wrong or retaliated against whistleblowers, but what will actually happen is unknown (NOTE: the penalties for retaliators are limited to $10,000 fine and maximum two years imprisonment) -- wrongdoing must be made public, but not necessarily identity of wrongdoer, and; - extensive education and training of employee rights under the Act is not required by the Act (but will hopefully occur).

References: - Sections 118 to 125 (especially section 121) contained in Part IV)) of the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ]

- Section 42 (contained in Part III.1) of the Financial Administration Act (R.S., 1985, c. F-11) -- [ LINK ]

- Chapter 2 of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service -- [ LINK ]

- Generally, federal politicians are prohibited from being directly involved in contracting-out processes, but they do, of course, usually set the overall framework and terms of reference for spending programs and so are involved in this important way -- they are covered by the Criminal Code and Financial Administration Act measures set out above, as well as one or more of the following: - Sections 2, 4 and 14 of the Conflict of Interest Act (2006, c. 9, s. 2) -- [ LINK ]

- Sections 2, subsections 3(2) and (3), and sections 8, 11, 13 and 16 of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons -- [ LINK ]

- Sections 2, 10, 11, 13 and 18 of the Conflict of Interest Code for Senators -- [ LINK ]

- Whistleblower protection under Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]

- There is no independent enforcement of the Directive mentioned above, and in the past, when large-scale privatizations by the federal government of Canada have occurred, specific rules or laws have been passed concerning the privatization, and questions have been raised in specific cases (for example, the privatization of the government's oil company Petro Canada) about the fairness of the privatization process (specifically, the selection of the company that handled the sale on behalf of the government)

- The Values and Ethics Code is enforced only by the senior civil/public servants, who have a conflicted mandate (and lack incentives) to ensure that conflict of interest requirements are being complied with by people they oversee in the civil/public service (for example, they may be involved themselves in decisions that affect their own personal interests, and as a result may have no incentive to publicize or penalize a civil/public servant they oversee whom is discovered to be involved in decisions that affect their personal interests).

Re: whistleblower protection - before the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet in March 2007 and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position created, an Internal Disclosure Policy had existed since November 2001, enforced by the Public Sector Integrity Officer (which was not a legislated position, and as a result lacked independence from the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and also lacked key powers) -- See problems with PSIO ruled on, for example, in case Chopra v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 595 (CanLII) -- [ LINK ]

- The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position was created in spring 2007, and the first Commissioner was appointed on July 9, 2007. Between November 2001 and spring 2007, there was a Public Sector Integrity Officer with limited independence and powers. As a result, while the protection processes exist, they are still not well-established or well-known, nor is their effectiveness determined in any way.

- Based upon the U.S. 20-year experience with a legislated whistleblower protection system (as documented in chapter entitled "Whistleblowing in the United State: The Gap Between Vision and Lessons Learned" by Tom Devine in the book "Whistleblowing Around the World" (ed. Richard Calland and Guy Dehn, pubs. ODAC & PCaW in partnership with the British Council: Southern Africa: 2004), the new Canadian Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act has several identifiable flaws, as follows: - not all whistleblowers all covered by the Act, not even all public servants; - whistleblowers are not allowed to disclose wrongdoing to any legal authority, they must follow the avenue established in the Act or they will likely not be protected; - whistleblowers must complain first to their bosses before they file a complaint with the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, unless they can prove "reasonable grounds" to believe that their bosses will retaliate or fail to take corrective action, but it is unclear whether proving reasonable grounds is on a "prima facie" basis or a more limited basis (whistleblowers should be allowed to complain directly to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner in any case, but is seems under the law that they can only do so if they file an anonymous complaint) - it is not clear that protection covers the full scope of reprisals (whistleblowers can file a complaint if they have "reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal has been taken" but it is not clear if they have to provide "prima facie" evidence of their belief (NOTE: full protection would entail shifting the burden of proof to the employer to prove that no reprisal took place); - the Act does not override other federal laws, and so the government may override the Act in some cases in order to hide wrongdoing or thwart an investigation; - whistleblowers have no right to a jury trial (they must file their submission re: wrongdoing or complaint about a reprisal with the Commissioner, who then designates an investigator, who then reports back to the Commissioner, who then files an application with the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (made up of three to seven judges chosen by the federal Cabinet from amongst the Federal Court justices); - whistleblowers do not have the right to determine who will arbitrate their case (if the Commissioner attempts to settle the case through arbitration). Tthe Commissioner appoints the "conciliator"; - whistleblowers only have 60 days to complain about a reprisal (should be at least one year limitation period); - no interim compensation (while a case is being investigated/heard by Tribunal) is available, and if there is undue delay in investigations/hearings whistleblowers will suffer; - the full scope of compensation is not available (pain and suffering is limited to $10,000 -US$10,266), and Tribunal rulings may limit compensation even further (as occurred in the U.S.); - if a whistleblowers has been fired, they cannot win preference in transferring to another government job, the Tribunal can only reinstate them in their position or compensate them financially; - it seems like anonymous disclosures are allowed, but it is not clear (NOTE: if a person blows the whistle, their identity must be kept secret by the Commissioner throughout the investigation to the extent possible); - there is no clearly defined right to refuse to violate a law, regulations, code, policy or guideline (although general rights under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - there is no clearly defined duty to disclose wrongdoing (although general duties under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - the Act seems to cover all types of wrongdoing, but Tribunal rulings may limit the definition significantly (as happened in the U.S.); - - the Commissioner can only provide up to $1,500 (US$1,520) in funding for legal advice for a whistleblower (in exceptional cases, up to $3,000-US$3,040) which will likely not be adequate, although it seems possible that the Tribunal could award full costs if a whistleblower wins their case; - it seems like the Tribunal can make orders for corrective action and penalties for those who have done wrong or retaliated against whistleblowers, but what will actually happen is unknown (NOTE: the penalties for retaliators are limited to $10,000 fine and maximum two years imprisonment) -- wrongdoing must be made public, but not necessarily identity of wrongdoer, and; - extensive education and training of employee rights under the Act is not required by the Act (but will hopefully occur).

References: - Legal requirements to prevent conflicts of interest in: - Sections 118 to 125 (especially section 121) contained in Part IV)) of the Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) -- [ LINK ]

- Section 42 (contained in Part III.1) of the Financial Administration Act (R.S., 1985, c. F-11) -- [ LINK ] -- and the Government Contracts Regulations -- [ LINK ]

- All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

- iI Chapter 2 of the 2003 Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service -- [ LINK ]

- Whistleblower protection under Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ]

References: - All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

- Government assets (known in Canada as Crown assets), other than real estate, for sale can be found at: [ LINK ]

- Government real estate for sale can be found at: [ LINK ])=en

- In addition, - whistleblower protection under Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (2005, c. 46) -- [ LINK ] -- was proclaimed into law by the federal Cabinet only in March 2007 and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position created; before the Act became law, an Internal Disclosure Policy had existed since November 2001, enforced by the Public Sector Integrity Officer (which was not a legislated position, and as a result lacked independence from the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and also lacked key powers). See problems with PSIO ruled on, for example, in case Chopra v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 595 (CanLII) -- [ LINK ]

- The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner position was created in spring 2007, and the first Commissioner was appointed on July 9, 2007. Between November 2001 and spring 2007, there was a Public Sector Integrity Officer with limited independence and powers. As a result, while the protection processes exist, they are still not well-established or well-known, nor is their effectiveness determined in any way.

- Based upon the U.S. 20-year experience with a legislated whistleblower protection system (as documented in chapter entitled "Whistleblowing in the United State: The Gap Between Vision and Lessons Learned" by Tom Devine in the book "Whistleblowing Around the World" (ed. Richard Calland and Guy Dehn, pubs. ODAC & PCaW in partnership with the British Council: Southern Africa: 2004), the new Canadian Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act has several identifiable flaws, as follows: - not all whistleblowers all covered by the Act, not even all public servants; - whistleblowers are not allowed to disclose wrongdoing to any legal authority, they must follow the avenue established in the Act or they will likely not be protected; - whistleblowers must complain first to their bosses before they file a complaint with the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, unless they can prove "reasonable grounds" to believe that their bosses will retaliate or fail to take corrective action, but it is unclear whether proving reasonable grounds is on a "prima facie" basis or a more limited basis (whistleblowers should be allowed to complain directly to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner in any case, but is seems under the law that they can only do so if they file an anonymous complaint) - it is not clear that protection covers the full scope of reprisals (whistleblowers can file a complaint if they have "reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal has been taken" but it is not clear if they have to provide "prima facie" evidence of their belief (NOTE: full protection would entail shifting the burden of proof to the employer to prove that no reprisal took place); - the Act does not override other federal laws, and so the government may override the Act in some cases in order to hide wrongdoing or thwart an investigation; - whistleblowers have no right to a jury trial (they must file their submission re: wrongdoing or complaint about a reprisal with the Commissioner, who then designates an investigator, who then reports back to the Commissioner, who then files an application with the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (made up of three to seven judges chosen by the federal Cabinet from amongst the Federal Court justices); - whistleblowers do not have the right to determine who will arbitrate their case (if the Commissioner attempts to settle the case through arbitration). Tthe Commissioner appoints the "conciliator"; - whistleblowers only have 60 days to complain about a reprisal (should be at least one year limitation period); - no interim compensation (while a case is being investigated/heard by Tribunal) is available, and if there is undue delay in investigations/hearings whistleblowers will suffer; - the full scope of compensation is not available (pain and suffering is limited to $10,000 -US$10,266), and Tribunal rulings may limit compensation even further (as occurred in the U.S.); - if a whistleblowers has been fired, they cannot win preference in transferring to another government job, the Tribunal can only reinstate them in their position or compensate them financially; - it seems like anonymous disclosures are allowed, but it is not clear (NOTE: if a person blows the whistle, their identity must be kept secret by the Commissioner throughout the investigation to the extent possible); - there is no clearly defined right to refuse to violate a law, regulations, code, policy or guideline (although general rights under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - there is no clearly defined duty to disclose wrongdoing (although general duties under the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service may apply); - the Act seems to cover all types of wrongdoing, but Tribunal rulings may limit the definition significantly (as happened in the U.S.); - - the Commissioner can only provide up to $1,500 (US$1,520) in funding for legal advice for a whistleblower (in exceptional cases, up to $3,000-US$3,040) which will likely not be adequate, although it seems possible that the Tribunal could award full costs if a whistleblower wins their case; - it seems like the Tribunal can make orders for corrective action and penalties for those who have done wrong or retaliated against whistleblowers, but what will actually happen is unknown (NOTE: the penalties for retaliators are limited to $10,000 fine and maximum two years imprisonment) -- wrongdoing must be made public, but not necessarily identity of wrongdoer, and; - extensive education and training of employee rights under the Act is not required by the Act (but will hopefully occur).

References: - All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ] -- which includes requirements concerning advertising privatizations

- Government assets (known in Canada as Crown assets), other than real estate, for sale can be found at: [ LINK ]

- Government real estate for sale can be found at: [ LINK ])=en

References: - The legal requirements are set out under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

References: - All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

- Government assets (known in Canada as Crown assets), other than real estate, for sale can be found at: [ LINK ]

- Government real estate for sale can be found at: [ LINK ])=en

References: - All businesses are equally eligible to compete for privatized assets under the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's "Directive on the Sale or Transfer of Surplus Real Property" -- [ LINK ]

- Government assets (known in Canada as Crown assets), other than real estate, for sale can be found at: [ LINK ]

- Government real estate for sale can be found at: [ LINK ])=en