References: - The Constitution Act, 1867, sections 90 and 91 -- [ LINK ]

References: - All significant expenditures are required by law to be approved by the legislature, however, as was revealed by the Gomery Commission inquiry into the federal Liberal government's sponsorship scandal -- [ LINK ] -- the Liberals establish a secret $150 million (US$154 million) fund in violation of the Financial Administration Act (R.S., 1985, c. F-11) -- [ LINK ] -- requirement (subsection 24(2)) to disclose all government spending in the Public Accounts, and awarded contracts with the fund monies to various companies (mostly advertising agencies) who did little or nothing for the money and funnelled some of it back into the federal Liberal Party and the Quebec division of the federal Liberal Party, and the Quebec provincial Liberal Party - more than $40 million (US$41 million) of the fund is still unaccounted for. NOTE: the fund also violated Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat accounting policies for government employees -- [ LINK ]

- Bill C-2, the so-called "Federal Accountability Act" (2006, c. 9 (passed into law December 12, 2006)) -- [ LINK ] -- changed the Financial Administration Act by adding sections 16.3 to 16.5 which require each federal government department to appoint an "accounting officer" and requiring that accounting officer to file with the Auditor General a written notice if the officer disagrees with a Cabinet minister concerning whether spending complies with the Act and the Treasury Board policies.

- The Federal Accountability Act also includes the first statutory whistleblower protection measures for federal Canadian public servants, also aimed in part at ensuring that secret spending does not occur in the future.

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 -- [ LINK ]

- It is widely recognized that parliamentary committees often do not have the time or staff resources to fully review budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), nor sometimes interim or supplementary estimates. This lack of effective oversight occurs for the simple reason that federal parliamentary committees match federal government departments, and each committee reviews the estimates for its related department, but also reviews all proposed legislation introduced by that department's minister, as well as undertaking studies initiated by the minister or committee. If a bill or study is before a committee when the estimates are proposed, and the one legislative staff person that each member of the House of Commons is overwhelmed by work on the bill, then the estimates will often not receive the full review needed to ensure that proposed spending is proper.

- In its 2005-2006 federal election platform, the federal Conservative Party of Canada acknowledged this problem with its promise to: "Increase the power of Parliament and parliamentary committees to review the spending estimates of departments and hold ministers to account." However, as noted above, it is not so much a problem of power as it is a problem of lack of time (in some cases) and staff resources (in almost all cases).

References: - Since the mid-1990s, it has become normal practice that a parliamentary committee (the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance) travels across Canada between September and December holding hearings in "pre-budget" consultations and then produces a report which is tabled in federal Parliament (ie. made public) in December. See the Finance Committee Web page at: <[ LINK ]>

- The Main Estimates (the basis of the federal Canadian government budget) are made public with the tabling of the budget in the federal Parliament (usually in late February).

- The parliamentary committee hearings on the Main Estimates are held in public, as are debates in the "committee of the whole" (the House of Commons and the Senate).

- Budget items are categorized by federal government department, and so the "author" (ie. responsible Cabinet minister) is identifiable.

- The only ongoing flaw (and the reason for the score of 75) is that the federal government has for more than a decade greatly underestimated the federal government's budget surplus, and this lack of accuracy means that the budget debate, while public, is based upon false budget numbers, which of course fundementally undermines the meaningfulness of the debate.

See "Federal Surplus Larger than Estimated in Budget" Halifax Daily News, Aug. 25, 2007 [ LINK ]

"Ottawa's Annual Fiscal Follies" Michael Mendelson, Caledon Institute, 2004 [ LINK ]

- To address the problem of lack of truth in budgetting Bill C-2, the so-called "Federal Accountability Act" (2006, c. 9 (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006)) -- [ LINK ] -- changed the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- by adding sections 79.1 to 79.5 to create a Parliamentary Budget Officer whose mandate is to issue public reports on the economic and financial position of the federal government (as of Sept. 10, 2007, the first Officer had not been appointed).

References: - Since the mid-1990s, it has become normal practice that a parliamentary committee (the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance) travels across Canada between September and December holding hearings in "pre-budget" consultations (at which many citizens and citizen groups testify) and then produces a report which is tabled in federal Parliament (ie. made public) in December.

See the Finance Committee Web page at: <[ LINK ]>

- The Main Estimates (the basis of the federal Canadian government budget) are made public with the tabling of the budget in the federal Parliament (usually in late February).

- The parliamentary committee hearings on the Main Estimates are held in public, as are debates in the "committee of the whole" (the House of Commons and the Senate), and citizens and citizen groups often testify before the committees.

Peer Review Comments: Citizens' "information is essential to the process of evaluating budget priorities." The government does not always allow the citizens' consultation to inform priorities, such as occurred with the prime minister's recent rejection of financial aid for cities, despite numerous campaigns on the issue. See: - Susan Delacourt, "Harper rejects financial aid for cities", Toronto Star, 9 November 2007, [ LINK ] - One Cent Now campaign, [ LINK ]

References: - "Federal Government Spending" by Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 [ LINK ]

- The Main Estimates (the basis of the federal Canadian government budget) are made public with the tabling of the budget in the federal Parliament (usually in late February), as are the interim and supplementary estimates (changes and special spending items proposed during the fiscal year).

- The only ongoing flaw (and the reason for the score of 75) is that the federal government has for more than a decade greatly underestimated the federal government's budget surplus, and this lack of accuracy means that the overall budget numbers presented to the public are false, which of course fundementally undermines the ability of the public to participate in the budget debate.

See "Federal Surplus Larger than Estimated in Budget" Halifax Daily News, Aug. 25, 2007 [ LINK ]

"Ottawa's Annual Fiscal Follies" Michael Mendelson, Caledon Institute, 2004 [ LINK ]

- To address the problem of lack of truth in budgetting Bill C-2, the so-called "Federal Accountability Act" (2006, c. 9 (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006)) -- [ LINK ] -- changed the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- by adding sections 79.1 to 79.5 to create a Parliamentary Budget Officer whose mandate is to issue public reports on the economic and financial position of the federal government (as of Sept. 10, 2007, the first Officer had not been appointed).

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 -- [ LINK ]

- Budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), and interim or supplementary estimates (changes made during the fiscal year) are reviewed by the federal parliamentary committee that matches the federal government department to which the section of estimates applies, so that each committee reviews the estimates for its related department.

- The Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts, and (to a lesser extent) the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance have within their primary mandates the overall oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

- Bill C-2, the so-called "Federal Accountability Act" (2006, c. 9 (passed into law on Dec. 12, 2006)) -- [ LINK ] -- changed the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- by adding sections 79.1 to 79.5 to create a Parliamentary Budget Officer whose mandate is to issue public reports on the economic and financial position of the federal government (as of September 10, 2007 the first Officer had not been appointed) -- section 79.2 of the Act designates the Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance, and the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts as the statutory committees to which the Officer reports (and each of these committees can order the Officer to produce reports).

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 [ LINK ]

- Budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), and interim or supplementary estimates (changes made during the fiscal year) are reviewed by the federal parliamentary committee that matches the federal government department to which the section of estimates applies, so that each committee reviews the estimates for its related department.

- The Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts, and (to a lesser extent) the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance have within their primary mandates the overall oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

- An ongoing problem is that each committee has a limited time period to review estimates (mainly because they also review proposed legislation and undertake studies of issues within their mandate) and, as a result, while the heads of government institutions regularly appear before the committees, if these officials do not supply adequate or accurate information, the committee often does not continue its scrutiny of the institution's spending simply because of lack of time (or, while the scrutiny may continue, it occurs after the spending has occurred).

See the reports and hearing testimony before the Public Accounts Committee at: <[ LINK ]> According to its Web page, in the past few years the Committee has spent 90-95 percent of its hearing time reviewing "after-the-spending-has-occurred" reports of the Auditor General of Canada.

- In part to solve this problem, Bill C-2, the so-called "Federal Accountability Act" (2006, c. 9 (passed into law December 12, 2006)) -- [ LINK ] -- changed the Parliament of Canada Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-1) -- [ LINK ] -- by adding sections 79.1 to 79.5 to create a Parliamentary Budget Officer whose mandate is to issue public reports on the economic and financial position of the federal government and its institutions (as of Sept. 10, 2007 the first Officer had not been appointed) -- section 79.2 of the Act designates the Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance, and the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts as the statutory committees to which the Officer reports (and each of these committees can order the Officer to produce reports).

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 [ LINK ]

- Budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), and interim or supplementary estimates (changes made during the fiscal year) are reviewed by the federal parliamentary committee that matches the federal government department to which the section of estimates applies, so that each committee reviews the estimates for its related department.

- The Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts, the House of Commons Committee on Government Operations and Estimates and (to a lesser extent) the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance have within their primary mandates the overall oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

- While it is established within the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Chapter XIII that a proportionate number of the Chairs of committees will be from each party (based on the proportion of seats each party holds in the House of Commons) and that, as a result, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee usually is from an opposition party, if a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House of Commons, members from that party will hold a majority of seats on every House committee. Therefore, when a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House, many committees often do not play their proper role of holding the government accountable, as the members on each committee from the ruling party use their majority to block efforts (such as proposals to hold hearings, conduct studies etc.) by opposition party members on the committee to hold the government accountable.

See "Parliamentary Oversight: Committees and Relationships" CCAF-FCVI, April 2006-- [ LINK ]

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 [ LINK ]

- Budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), and interim or supplementary estimates (changes made during the fiscal year) are reviewed by the federal parliamentary committee that matches the federal government department to which the section of estimates applies, so that each committee reviews the estimates for its related department.

- The Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts, the House of Commons Committee on Government Operations and Estimates and (to a lesser extent) the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance have within their primary mandates the overall oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

- While it is established within the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Chapter XIII that a proportionate number of the Chairs of committees will be from each party (based on the proportion of seats each party holds in the House of Commons) and that, as a result, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee usually is from an opposition party, if a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House of Commons, members from that party will hold a majority of seats on every House committee. Therefore, when a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House, many committees often do not play their proper role of holding the government accountable, as the members on each committee from the ruling party use their majority to block efforts (such as proposals to hold hearings, conduct studies etc.) by opposition party members on the committee to hold the government accountable.

- The main reason members from the ruling party use their majority on committees to block efforts to hold the government accountable is that they are members of the ruling party, but there are also many examples of members being removed from committees (or temporarily replaced, even if only for one hearing) if they do not tow the party line, or members not promoted for the same reasons. Members have no control over which committtees they serve on, this is determined by the House Leader of every party. See the Webp ages of the committees listed above for details concerning how committee memberships change over time or in particular circumstances -- [ LINK ]

- See "Parliamentary Oversight: Committees and Relationships" CCAF-FCVI, April 2006 -- [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: Although this example does not apply directly to federal parliamentary committees, it is worth noting. Questions have been raised on whether standing committees at the municipal level are free from political interference. These supposedly independent administrative entities consist of appointed citizens, but also elected officials. For instance, the mayor of the largest Montreal borough (population of 170,000) is also heading the district's urban planning committee, which studies everything from rezoning issues to construction permit requests before making recommendations to council.

References: - "Federal Government Spending" Odette Madore: Library of Parliament, February 2006 [ LINK ]

- Budget proposals (known as the Main Estimates), and interim or supplementary estimates (changes made during the fiscal year) are reviewed by the federal parliamentary committee that matches the federal government department to which the section of estimates applies, so that each committee reviews the estimates for its related department.

- The Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Public Accounts, the House of Commons Committee on Government Operations and Estimates and (to a lesser extent) the House of Commons Standing Commitee on Finance have within their primary mandates the overall oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

- While it is established within the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Chapter XIII that a proportionate number of the Chairs of committees will be from each party (based on the proportion of seats each party holds in the House of Commons) and that, as a result, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee usually is from an opposition party, if a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House of Commons, members from that party will hold a majority of seats on every House committee. Therefore, when a ruling party holds a majority of seats in the House, many committees often do not play their proper role of holding the government accountable, as the members on each committee from the ruling party use their majority to block efforts (such as proposals to hold hearings, conduct studies etc.) by opposition party members on the committee to hold the government accountable.

- The main reason members from the ruling party use their majority on committees to block efforts to hold the government accountable is that they are members of the ruling party, but there are also many examples of members being removed from committees (or temporarily replaced, even if only for one hearing) if they do not tow the party line, or members not promoted for the same reasons. Members have no control over which committtees they serve on, this is determined by the House Leader of every party. See the Webp ages of the committees listed above for details concerning how committee memberships change over time or in particular circumstances -- [ LINK ]

- See "Parliamentary Oversight: Committees and Relationships" CCAF-FCVI, April 2006 -- [ LINK ]