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2007 Assessment

Cameroon: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Cameroon: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Budget Processes
Indicators		Score
37	Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?	50
38	Can citizens access the national budgetary process?	17
39	In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?	100
40	Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?	50

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?

37a: In law, the legislature can amend the budget.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: - In accordance with Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of 18 January 1996 (www.camlaw.org).

37b: In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: All significant government expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget), must be approved by the legislature. This includes defense and secret programs, which may be debated in closed hearings. 50 Score Criteria: Most significant government expenditures (as defined) are approved by the legislature, but some exceptions to this rule exist. This may include defense programs, an executive\'s personal budget, or other expenses. 0 Score Criteria: The legislature does not have the power to approve or disapprove large portions of the government budget, or the legislature does not exercise this power in a meaningful way.$

Comments:

References: - Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et lexercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980. - Efoua Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999. - Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de lhistoire dun contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999. - Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002.

Peer Review Comments: The ruling party has the majority at the Assembly, and they receive legislative approval.

37c: In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.

Score:

100

Comments:

Can citizens access the national budgetary process?

38a: In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).

Score:

100

Comments:

38b: In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.

Score:

100

Comments:

38c: In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.

Score:

100

Comments:

In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

39: In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: In accordance with Article 16 of the Law N° 73/1 of 8 June 1973 concerning rules of procedure of the National Assembly of Cameroun, modified by the laws n° 89/13 of 28 July 1989 and n° 92/003 of 14 August 1992.

Peer Review Comments: It has never been effective.

Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?

40a: In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.

Score:

100

Comments:

Peer Review Comments: Cette démarche n'est pas systématique. De plus, les rapports généralement présentés ne suscitent pas l'adhésion totale des membres de l'opposition.

Peer Review Comments: Only when they defend their budgets.

40b: In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties in a roughly equitable distribution. All members of the committee -- including opposition party members -- are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence the committee\'s work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee. 50 Score Criteria: The committee is comprised of legislators from both the ruling party (or parties) and opposition parties although the ruling party has a disproportionate share of committee seats. The chairperson of the committee may be overly influential and curb other members\' ability to shape the committee's activities. 0 Score Criteria: The committee is dominated by legislators of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition legislators serving on the committee have in practice no way to influence the work of the committee.$

Comments:

References: - Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et lexercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980. - Efoua Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999 - Aboya Endong Manassé, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de lhistoire dun contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999. - Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, Janvier-Juin 2002. - Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de lUcac, 2001.

Peer Review Comments: There is the so-called 'party discipline' to be adhered to!

40c: In practice, this committee is protected from political interference.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: This committee operates independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favorable judgments on politically sensitive issues. Investigations are rarely praised or criticized by political figures. 50 Score Criteria: This committee is usually independent but is sometimes influenced by negative or positive political incentives. This may include public praise or criticism by the government. 0 Score Criteria: This committee is commonly influenced by personal or political forces or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties that ultimately influence the committee\'s behavior and decision-making. Negative incentives may include threats, harassment or other abuses of power by the government.$

Comments:

References: - Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et lexercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980. - Efoua Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999. - Manasse Aboya Endong, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de lhistoire dun contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999. - Manasse Aboya Endong, Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone, in Solon, N°3, January 2007. - Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002. - Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé., Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de lUcac, 2001.

Peer Review Comments: The members of the committee are also members of political parties; they're not free.

40d: In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.

Score:

100

Comments:

References: - Dzukou Tahouo Michel, La nature et lexercice de la fonction législative au Cameroun. Essai sur la notion de législation gouvernementale, Thèse de doctorat en droit, Paris 1, 1980. - Efoua Mbozoo Samuel, Pratiques et procédures parlementaires, Yaoundé, éditions Hérodote, 1999. - Manasse Aboya Endong, « Parlement et parlementaire au Cameroun : compte-rendu de lhistoire dun contenant sans contenu ? » in Solon, vol.1, n°1, 2nd semestre 1999. - Manasse Aboya Endong, Parti administratif, transitions démocratiques et patrimonialisme en Afrique noire francophone, in Solon, N°3, January 2007 - Abiabag Issa, « Le Droit damendement dans le droit parlementaire Camerounais », in Annales de FSJP-UD, January-June 2002. - Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé., Député de la nation, Yaoundé, Presses de lUcac, 2001.

Peer Review Comments: Quand les enquêtes parlementaires sont initiées, le public n'est jamais informé quant au déroulement des travaux des commissions concernées et des résultats attendus.