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2007 Assessment

Burundi: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Burundi: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Judicial Accountability
Indicators		Score
33	Are judges appointed fairly?	50
34	Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?	63
35	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?	0
36	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?	0

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are judges appointed fairly?

33a: In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Article 214 Dans leur carrière, les magistrats sont nommés par Décret du Président de la République sur proposition du Ministre ayant la justice dans ses attributions, après avis du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. Ceux des tribunaux de résidence sont nommés par ordonnance du Ministre ayant la justice dans ses attributions Article 218 Les membres du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature sont nommés par le Président de la République après approbation par le Sénat. Article 222 Les juges de la Cour Suprême sont nommés par le Président de la République sur proposition du Ministre ayant la justice dans ses attributions, après avis du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature et avec lapprobation du Sénat

Article 226 La Cour Constitutionnelle est composée de sept membres. Ils sont nommés par le Président de la République et après approbation par le Sénat. Ils ont un mandat de six ans non renouvelable.

suivant la même procédure.

33b: In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

Score:

100

Comments: The senate has recently refused to nominate one person at the the post of attorney general due to his lack of experience. That means at some points that there are some criteria required. But at the same time, the criteria of subordination to the party in power seems to be more important than competence and experience.

References: Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH). Rapport dactivités : exercice 2006.

Human Rights Watch. « Un lourd fardeau à porter : les violations des droits des enfants en détention au Burundi.» Mars 2007.

Ligue burundaise des droits de lhomme ITEKA. Rapport annuel sur la situation des droits de lhomme 2006

Interview with Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, president of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained People, July 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

33c: In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Article 218 Les membres du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature sont nommés par le Président de la République après approbation par le Sénat. Article 222 Les juges de la Cour Suprême sont nommés par le Président de la République sur proposition du Ministre ayant la justice dans ses attributions, après avis du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature et avec lapprobation du Sénat. Article 226 La Cour Constitutionnelle est composée de sept membres. Ils sont nommés par le Président de la République et après approbation par le Sénat. Ils ont un mandat de six ans non renouvelable.

Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

34a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Article 207 Toute décision judiciaire doit être motivée avant dêtre prononcée en audience publique.

34b: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

100

Comments: Judges always give reasons for their decisions as the law states. But in some cases the decisions are explained after the acts. For instance, some people have been arrested and moved directly to prison without any explanation. The decision was announced when the accused was already in prison.

References: Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH). Rapport dactivités : exercice 2006.

La Constitution post-transition de la République du Burundi

Human Rights Watch. On senfuit quand on les voit Exactions en toute impunité du service national de renseignement. Octobre 2006.

Human Rights Watch. « Un lourd fardeau à porter : les violations des droits des enfants en détention au Burundi.» Mars 2007.

International Crisis Group. « Burundi : la paix et la démocratie en danger »30 novembre 2006

Ligue burundaise des droits de lhomme ITEKA. Rapport annuel sur la situation des droits de lhomme 2006

Interview with Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, president of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained People, July 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

34c: In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: D E LOMBUDSMAN A rticle 2 37 LOmbudsman reçoit les plaintes et mène des enquêtes concernant des fautes de gestion et des violations des droits des citoyens commises par des agents de la fonction publique et du judiciaire et fait des recommandations à ce sujet aux autorités compétentes. Il assure également une médiation entre lAdministration et les citoyens et entre les ministères et lAdministration et joue le rôle dobservateur en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement de ladministration publique. Lorganisation et le fonctionnement de son service sont fixés par la loi. A rticle 2 38 LOmbudsman dispose des pouvoirs et des ressources nécessaires pour sacquitter de ses fonctions. Il présente chaque année un rapport à lAssemblée nationale et au Sénat. Son rapport est publié dans le Bulletin officiel du Burundi. A rticle 2 39 LOmbudsman est nommé par lAssemblée Nationale à la majorité des trois quarts de ses membres. Sa nomination est sujette à approbation par le Sénat à la majorité de deux-tiers de ses membres. Son mandat est de six ans non renouvelable.

34d: In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: A rticle 209 Le pouvoir judiciaire est impartial et indépendant du pouvoir législatif et du pouvoir exécutif. Dans lexercice de ses fonctions, le juge nest soumis quà la Constitution et à la loi. Le Président de la République, Chef de lEtat, est garant de lindépendance de la Magistrature. Il est assisté dans cette mission par le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.

Peer Review Comments: The coments given are about the judiciary itself- the Ombudsman is also supposed to be independent.

34e: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations -- or participates fully with cooperating agencies\' investigations -- into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power. <p>50 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power. <p>0 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies\' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.$

Comments:

References: In practice, these mechanisms don't exist.

Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

Peer Review Comments: The Ombudsman is not yet operational.

34f: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Score:

100

Comments:

References: These mechanims don't exist in practice.

Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

35a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: The post-transition constitution

35b: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: The post-transition constitution

35c: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: The post-transition constitution

35d: In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: The post-transition constitution

35e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: There are no regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges.

References: Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

35f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: No regulations govern gifts and hospitality to members of the national-level judiciary.

References: Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

35g: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Score:

100

Comments:

References: Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

36a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: There is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary.

References: The post-transition constitution

36b: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments: There is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary.

References: Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.

36c: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

Score:

100

Comments: There is no asset disclosure for members of the national-level judiciary.

References: Interview with Eugene Nindorera, former minister of human rights and institutional reforms, Aug. 25, 2007, in Bujumbura.