Global Integrity Report

The Global Integrity Report (report.globalintegrity.org)

Bulgaria Home

Facts

Timeline

Notebook

Integrity Scorecard

2007 Assessment

Bulgaria: Integrity Indicators Scorecard

Bulgaria: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Judicial Accountability
Indicators		Score
33	Are judges appointed fairly?	100
34	Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?	92
35	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?	57
36	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?	92

Indicator and sub-Indicator Details

Are judges appointed fairly?

33a: In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting national-level judges.

Score:

YES

Comments: The Constitution Art. 129. (1) Judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be appointed, promoted, demoted, transferred and removed from office by the Supreme Judicial Council.

(2) The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General shall be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic upon a proposal from the Supreme Judicial Council for a period of seven years, and shall not be eligible for a second term in office. The President shall not deny an appointment or removal upon a repeated proposal.

(3) (amend., SG 85/03) Having completed a five year term of office as a judge, prosecutor or investigating magistrate, and upon attestation, followed by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council, the judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall become irremovable. They, including the persons referred to in para 2, shall be removed from office only upon:

1. completion of 65 years of age; 2. resignation; 3. entry into force of a final sentence imposing imprisonment for an intentional criminal offence; 4. permanent de facto inability to perform their duties for more than a year; 5. serious infringement or systematic neglect of their official duties, as well as actions undermining the prestige of the Judiciary. (4) (new, SG 85/03, declared unconstitutional by Constitutional Court Judgment No. 7/2006 - SG 78/ 2006)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the cases under para 3, item 5, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General shall be removed from office by the President of the Republic, also upon proposal of one-fourth of the Members of the National Assembly, adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the National Assembly. The President shall not deny the removal upon a repeated proposal. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (5) (new, SG 85/03, prev. para 4 SG 27/06) In cases of removal from office under para 3, items 2 and 4, the acquired irremovably shall be restored upon subsequent appointment to the office of a judge, prosecutor or investigating magistrate.

(6) (new, SG 85/03, in force from January 1, 2004, prev. para 5 SG 27/06)) The heads of the judicial bodies, except for those referred to in para 2, shall be appointed for a period of 5 years and are eligible for a second mandate.

References: Constitutional Regulation of the Supreme Judicial Council - an independent body appointing judges and prosecutors.

33b: In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of national-level judges.

Score:

100

Comments: Formal requirements are always met - it is virtually impossible to become a judge without certain professional qualifications. Chapter 10 of the Law on the Judiciary describes the necessary professional qualifications of the magistrates in detail. These include law degree and work experiences and vary depending on the specific position.

References: [ LINK ]

33c: In law, there is a confirmation process for national-level judges (i.e. conducted by the legislature or an independent body).

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Constitution, by the Supreme Judicial Council

Peer Review Comments: The Supreme Judicial Council elects all judges (including those in the Supreme Courts) and prosecutors in the country. These appointments are not contingent upon the approval of any other institution, except in the case of the chairmen of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Prosecutor General. The nominees for these positions are reviewed and finally approved by the president. The president can only veto these nominees once.

Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?

34a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Civil, Penal and Administrative Procedure Codes specify obligations for giving reasons.

34b: In practice, members of the national-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.

Score:

100

Comments: The reasons sometimes may be rather formalistic, referring to a specific article of the law. Often the reasons for judicial decisions are delayed months after the judgment has been issued.

References: The reasons sometimes may be rather formalistic, referring to a specific article of the law. Often the reasons for judicial decisions are delayed months after the judgment has been issued.

Peer Review Comments: Reasons sometimes may be rather formalistic, referring to a specific article of the law. Often, the reasons for judicial decisions are delayed months after the judgment has been issued.

34c: In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the national-level judicial system.

Score:

YES

Comments: Art. 130. (1) The Supreme Judicial Council shall consist of 25 members. Sitting on it ex officio shall be the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General. (2) Eligible for election to the Supreme Judicial Council besides its ex officio members shall be practising lawyers of high professional and moral integrity with at least 15 years of professional experience. (3) Eleven of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected by the National Assembly, and eleven shall be elected by the bodies of the judiciary. (4) The elected members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall serve terms of five years. They shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. (5) The meetings of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be chaired by the Minister of Justice, who shall not be entitled to a vote. (6) (new-SG 12/07)The Supreme Judicial Council shall: 1. appoint, promote, transfer and remove from office judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates; 2. impose the disciplinary sanctions "demotion" and "removal from office" to judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates; 3. organise the qualification of judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates; 4. adopt the draft budget of the judiciary; 5. determine the scope and the structure of the annual reports referred to in Article 84, point 16. (7) (New-SG 12/07)The Supreme Judicial Council shall hold a hearing and pass the annual reports of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General on the application of the law and on the activity of the courts, the prosecution office and the investigating bodies and shall submit them to the National Assembly. (8) (New-SG 12/07)The mandate of an elected member of the Supreme Judicial Council shall expire upon any of the following occurrences: 1. resignation; 2. final judicial act for a committed crime; 3. permanent de facto inability to perform his/her duties for more than one year; 4. disciplinary removal from office or deprival from the right to pursue legal profession or activity. (9) (New-SG 12/07)In case of termination of the mandate of an elected member of the Supreme Judicial Council, a new member from the same quota shall be elected, who shall hold the office until the expiry of the mandate.

References: Constitution: Supreme Judicial Council

Peer Review Comments: According to the new judiciary act, a specialized disciplinary body is created: the Supreme Judicial Council Inspectorate.

34d: In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from political interference.

Score:

YES

Comments: The Supreme Judicial Council members are given a fixed mandate and operational independence from both the judiciary and the political branches of power. In 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council was transformed into a permanently acting body, which presumably is strengthening its independence.

References: The Supreme Judicial Council members are given a fixed mandate and operational independence from both the judiciary and the political branches of power. In 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council was transformed into a permanently acting body, which presumably is strengthening its independence.

34e: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) initiates investigations.

Score:

100

$Scoring Criteria :: 100 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) aggressively starts investigations -- or participates fully with cooperating agencies\' investigations -- into judicial misconduct. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is fair in its application of this power. <p>50 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) will start or cooperate in investigations, but often relies on external pressure to set priorities, or has limited effectiveness when investigating. The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism), though limited in effectiveness, is still fair in its application of power. <p>0 Score Criteria: The judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) rarely investigates on its own or cooperates in other agencies\' investigations, or the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is partisan in its application of this power.$

Comments: The SJC has carried out a number of disciplinary proceedings this year. Even the head of the Investigators was dismissed because of allegations of corruption.

References: Interviews with senior prosecutors and judges, and Ionko Grozev (CLS)

Peer Review Comments: There is a positive practice, but still a lot should be done.

34f: In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.

Score:

100

Comments: There have been certain allegations that sometimes the SJC is too lenient in its scrutiny and disciplinary measures. A case in point was the re-employment of Deyan Peevski as a magistrate - a former deputy minister dismissed for allegations (unproven in court) of corruption.

References: There have been certain allegations that sometimes the SJC is too lenient in its scrutiny and disciplinary measures. A case in point was the re-employment of Deyan Peevski as a magistrate - a former deputy minister dismissed for allegations (unproven in court) of corruption.

Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?

35a: In law, members of the national-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure form.

Score:

YES

Comments: There is a law which provides for a voluntary asset declaration of senior magistrates.

References: Web site of the Supreme Judicial Council, description of the rules of declaration, [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: See the Register of Senior Public Officials and Public Registry at [ LINK ].

Peer Review Comments: The High-Ranking State Officials Personal Assets Disclosure Act prescribes that politicians, magistrates, mayors and another 26 categories of persons occupying high offices should submit a declaration to the National Audit Office.

Peer Review Comments: In law, all members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation are required to file an asset disclosure form. See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 2.4-5 [ LINK ]

35b: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: Anti-bribery laws, Law on Judicial Power

Code of ethics elaborated by the Supreme Judicial Council. [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: The main regulations are included in different codes of ethics. Their violation is subject to disciplinary procedures under the Law on Judiciary.

35c: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure forms of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments: If a magistrate fails to submit a declaration, he or she is liable to pay a fine up to 2500 leva (US$1875).

If the State Audit Office finds a discrepancy between the asset declaration and other public registers, it informs the Tax Authorities, which carry out an official revision of the assets of the person in question.

Not all magistrates are covered by this law, however - only the most senior ones.

References: There is a law on the disclosure of the assets of all public officials, which law requires magistrates to disclose their assets. Available online at the site of the State Audit Office, [ LINK ]

35d: In law, there are restrictions for national-level judges entering the private sector after leaving the government.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: There are no such restrictions.

35e: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for national-level judges are effective.

Score:

100

Comments:

References: There are no such restrictions.

35f: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the national-level judiciary are effective.

Score:

100

Comments: The second source indicates that studies of the CSD show that perception of corruption among the judiciary is quite high.

References: There are no reports of excessive abuses in this area. However, the system of control appears to be lenient.

www.csd.bg

35g: In practice, national-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.

Score:

100

Comments: The Supreme Judicial Council checks these assets and could initiate investigations in cases of irregularities. It is difficult to assess to what extent this system is working. On the one hand, it is very new. On the other hand, there have been dismissals of magistrates by the SJC, but it is not clear to what extent the asset declarations have played a role in that.

References: There is no independent audit.

Peer Review Comments: In practice, there is no information on whether high-level-magistrates' assets declarations have been regularly audited. The National Audit Office has stated in numerous interviews that it does not have the administrative capacity to audit all declarations.

Peer Review Comments: See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 7 [ LINK ]

Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?

36a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary.

Score:

YES

Comments:

References: [ LINK ]

Peer Review Comments: They can be seen on the Web site of the National Audit Office: [ LINK ].

Peer Review Comments: Under the High-Ranking State Officials Personal Assets Disclosure Act, the declarations of high-level officials, including high-ranking magistrates, are public. Not all can assess the information, but it can be made public through the media. Representatives of different institutions (including the media) can assess the declarations.

Peer Review Comments: Citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of national-level judiciary as provided in the Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials. See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6 [ LINK ]

36b: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.

Score:

100

Comments:

References: See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6 ([ LINK ]/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc" target="_blank">[ LINK ]); Web site of the National Audit Office: http://www.bulnao.government.bg

Peer Review Comments: They can be seen on the Web site of the National Audit Office: [ LINK ].

Peer Review Comments: Under the High-Ranking State Officials' Personal Assets Disclosure Act, a specialized public register is created.

Peer Review Comments: In law, records should be available on-line but they are not available yet. However, they can be obtained within a week. See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6 [ LINK ]/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc" target="_blank">[ LINK ];

Web Site of the National Audit Office: http://www.bulnao.government.bg

36c: In practice, citizens can access judicial asset disclosure records at a reasonable cost.

Score:

100

Comments:

Peer Review Comments: They can be seen on the site of the National Audit Office: [ LINK ].

Peer Review Comments: In practice, this is only the cost for paper, printing etc.

Peer Review Comments: In law, records should be available on-line but they are still not. However, they can be obtained at a reasonable cost. See: Law on Public Disclosure of Assets of High-Ranking State Officials, Article 6 [ LINK ]/files/_bg/ZpubImust050906_010107new.doc" target="_blank">[ LINK ];

Web Site of the National Audit Office: http://www.bulnao.government.bg