| Bosnia and Herzegovina: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 100 |
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 50 |
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 100 |
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 41 |
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 83 |
| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 25 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 26: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law on Civil Procedure before the Court of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH, No.36/04
|
||||||||
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 27a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: At meetings organized by High Representative, leaders of the six ruling Bosnian parties create the political agenda in BiH. The chief executive (chair of Council of Ministers) has only formal power to influence policies decisions.
References: "Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads: EU Accession or a Failed State?" Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007, Sarajevo Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina: Improving National Integrity System Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007
Peer Review Comments: In Bosnia, the situation is complicated by the existence of the High Representative's "Bonn Powers," which give him de jure and de facto supreme executive powers. When making executive decisions, the High Representative has always given detailed justification for his actions.
Peer Review Comments: At the moment, six ruling parties do make policies, and the council of ministers is not as powerful. An additional complicating factor is the Office of the High Representative, which does have power to overrule or to impose any decision through use of its Bonn Powers. This makes even political parties impotent because of the existence of a supreme body.
|
||||||||
| 27b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law on Administrative Procedure of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.19/02 Law on the Court of BiH arts.14, 19, Official Gazette of BiH No. 29/00
Peer Review Comments: The judiciary has been unable to review Bonn Power actions of the High Representative.
|
||||||||
| 27c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: "The Constitutional Court of BiH is the highest judiciary authority in the country. It is responsible for upholding the constitution and protecting the human rights it guarantees. BiH, however, is the only country in the world to have a Constitutional Court without having a unified Supreme Court. That, and the fact that the Constitutional Court has been given the authority of an appeals court has resulted in such a burden of cases that citizens are waiting increasingly long times for justice. Many experts also worry that the political independence of the Constitutional Court is endangered by the possibility of Parliament ignoring professional qualifications and appointing judges on the basis of political affiliations." From CIN. Please see for more information, see [ LINK ] References: "Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads: EU Accession or a Failed State?" Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007, Sarajevo Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina: Improving National Integrity System Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 The Center for Investigative Reporting in Sarajevo (CIN), [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: Once again, a caveat is applicable to actions taken by the High Representative, who is above the Constitutional Court.
|
||||||||
| 27d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: "[T]he authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not demonstrated the capacity to take further political ownership and responsibility over reform. Due to the tense political situation and the lack of reform, the High Representative has continued to play an important role in facilitating reform and governance issues. Between Jan. 1, and Sept. 30, 2007, the High Representative used his executive powers on 31 occasions, which included the imposition of legislation and the removal of officials. This suggests that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) may play an important role both as a policy leader and as a constraint on executive branch excess. However, with the envisaged transformation of the OHR into the Office of the EU Special Representative and the ensuing implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), it is generally expected that the EU will become the leading pull factor for Bosnia and Herzegovinas policy decisions in the future." From Commission on the European Communities
References: "Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads: EU Accession or a Failed State?"Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007, Sarajevo Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina: Improving National Integrity System Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Commission of the European Communities, Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report 2007, Brussels, Nov. 6, 2007, SEC(2007)
Peer Review Comments: Since the beginning of 2006, the High Representatives have all but stopped using their executive powers.
Peer Review Comments: Despite the fact that Bonn Powers have not been used frequently (since the new High Representative last used them at the very beginning of his mandate), the existence of the mechanism has created a high level of non-accountability among local politicians, and also the international community. The final result is imposed laws and decisions with zero implementation.
|
||||||||
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 28a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law on Immunity of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.32/02
|
||||||||
| 28b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law on Immunity of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.32/02
|
||||||||
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.23/01 Laws on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 77/05, 24/06 Correction of the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.25/02
|
||||||||
| 29b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.23/01 Laws on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 77/05, 24/06 Correction of the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.25/02
|
||||||||
| 29c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Law on Conflict of Interest in Governmental Institutions of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No. 16/02, 12/04
|
||||||||
| 29d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: There is no legal ground.
|
||||||||
| 29e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: The only restrictions are with regard to entering public enterprise. References: There is no legal ground.
|
||||||||
| 29f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: There is no legal ground.
|
||||||||
| 29g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: "The law provides for criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt actions with impunity. The World Bank's worldwide governance indicators reflected that corruption was a serious problem. There is no government agency with a mandate to combat government corruption. "While the law bars citizens from holding positions of public responsibility if they have pending criminal indictments against them, this prohibition was not always observed in practice. For example, Mato Tadic, whom authorities charged with accepting bribes in the tax evasion and bribery case involving former BiH presidency member and current Croatian Democratic Union President Dragan Covic, continued to serve as president of the Constitutional Court while the trial against him was underway. Tadic was later acquitted of all charges. In November 2006, the court convicted Covic of one count of abuse of office and sentenced him to five years in prison. In September, the Appellate Panel ordered a retrial in the Covic case. "Only candidates for certain public offices were subject to financial disclosure laws" From Bosnia and Herzegovina, Country Reports References: "Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads: EU Accession or a Failed State?"Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007, Sarajevo Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina: Improving National Integrity System Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2007, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 11, 2008, [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 29h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: There is no legal ground.
|
||||||||
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.23/01 Laws on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 77/05, 24/06 Correction of the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH No.25/02
|
||||||||
| 30b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Official website of Central Election Commission Bosnia and Herzegovina: [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 30c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: References: Official website of Central Election Commission Bosnia and Herzegovina: [ LINK ]
|
||||||||
| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 31: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
|
||||||||
|
Comments: "Political parties could operate without restriction or outside influence. While political parties did not compel individuals to become members, many viewed membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way of obtaining and retaining jobs in government-owned companies and, especially, positions on steering boards of profitable, public companies, including in the electric, telecom and media industries. Nevertheless, opposition parties were not excluded from participation in political life. Membership in large, well-funded parties conferred formal advantages, as nonparty members were often excluded from appointment to many key government positions." From Bosnia and Herzegovina, Country Reports. References: "Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads: EU Accession or a Failed State?"Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007, Sarajevo Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina: Improving National Integrity System Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2007, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 11, 2008 [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: In practice, Bosnia's political system bears many of the hallmarks of a single-party system that has had multiple parties imposed on it. In instances where a coalition government is formed, each party gets its "own" ministries, which it treats as its individual party fiefdoms.
|
||||||||



