| Bangladesh: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Budget Processes | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 37 | Can the legislature provide input to the national budget? | 75 |
| 38 | Can citizens access the national budgetary process? | 58 |
| 39 | In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | 100 |
| 40 | Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective? | 50 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 37 | Can the legislature provide input to the national budget? | |||||||
| 37a: In law, the legislature can amend the budget. | ||||||||
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Comments: Article 91 of the constitution states that if in respect of any financial year it is found----(a) that the amount authorized to be expended for a particular service for the current financial year is insufficient or that a need has arisen for expenditure upon some new service not included in the annual financial for that year; or (b) that any money has been spent on a service during a financial year in excess of the amount granted for that service for that year; the president shall have power to authorize expenditure from the Consolidated Fund whether or not it is charged by or under the Constitution upon that Fund and shall cause to be laid before Parliament a supplementary financial statement setting out the estimated amount of the expenditure or, as the case may be, an excess financial statement setting out the amount of the excess, and the provisions of article 87 to 90 shall (within the necessary adaptations) apply in relation to those statements as they apply in relation to the annual financial statement." References: Article 91 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
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| 37b: In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, Budget 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,[ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control . Dhaka, September 2000, P Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m.
Peer Review Comments: The total national budget, including that of the Defence, is approved by the Parliament.
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| 37c: In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes. | ||||||||
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Comments: Bangladesh budget formulation is highly influenced by bureaucrats. There is no formal mechanism for ensuring citizen participation in the budget process or for mechanisms of accountability to citizens. In ever fiscal year, the budget is presented by Finance minister to Parliament for discussion, although article 70 of the constitution prevents MPs from disagreeing with their own party. Growing civil society activism has created additional pressure on the government to be responsive after presenting the proposed/draft budget.(BRAC University, Dhaka, December, 2006, The State of Governance in Bangladesh).
References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, Budget 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,[ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Dhaka, September 2000, P . Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, Audit Report, [ LINK ] Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, The State of Governance in Bangladesh, Bangladesh, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report, Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin, 2006, National Integrity Systems in South Asia.
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| 38 | Can citizens access the national budgetary process? | |||||||
| 38a: In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval). | ||||||||
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Comments: Bangladesh budget formulation is highly influenced by bureaucrats. There is no formal mechanism for ensuring citizen participation in the budget process or for mechanisms of accountability to citizens. In ever fiscal year, the budget is presented by Finance minister to Parliament for discussion, although article 70 of the constitution prevents MPs from disagreeing with their own party. Growing civil society activism has created additional pressure on the government to be responsive after presenting the proposed/draft budget. (BRAC University, Dhaka, December, 2006, The State of Governance in Bangladesh).
References: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Dhaka, September 2000, P . Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, Audit Report, [ LINK ] Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, The State of Governance in Bangladesh, Bangladesh, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report, Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin, 2006, National Integrity Systems in South Asia.
Peer Review Comments: Lawmakers get little time to go through the budget documents before the formal discussion on the budgetary allocation begins. On the other hand, lawmakers try to potray the success story of their parties whether they are on the treasury bench or in the opposition. Usually, the Parliament has an average 40-hour discussion on the budget.
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| 38b: In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings. | ||||||||
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Comments: Bangladesh budget formulation is highly influenced by bureaucrats. There is no formal mechanism for ensuring citizen participation in the budget process or for mechanisms of accountability to citizens. In ever fiscal year, the budget is presented by Finance minister to Parliament for discussion, although article 70 of the constitution prevents MPs from disagreeing with their own party. Growing civil society activism has created additional pressure on the government to be responsive after presenting the proposed/draft budget. (BRAC University, Dhaka, December, 2006, The State of Governance in Bangladesh). References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, Budget 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,[ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Dhaka, September 2000, P . Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, Audit Report, [ LINK ] Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, The State of Governance in Bangladesh, Bangladesh, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report, Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin, 2006, National Integrity Systems in South Asia.
Peer Review Comments: Citizens have hardly any chance to provide input to the budget. The people's representatives concentrate more on their party-line instead of people's welfare.
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| 38c: In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, Budget 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,[ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Dhaka, September 2000, P . Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, Audit Report, [ LINK ] Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, The State of Governance in Bangladesh, Bangladesh, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report, Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin, 2006, National Integrity Systems in South Asia.
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| 39 | In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | |||||||
| 39: In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds? | ||||||||
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Comments: Article 91 of the constitution states that Parliament shall appoint from among its members the following standing committees, that is to say------ (a) a Public Accounts Committee; (b) Committee of Privileges; and (c) such other standing committees as the rules of procedures of Parliament require." The Public Accounts Committee is a very important parliamentary standing committee, which is directly responsible and authorized to scrutinize the accounts of the government and the report of the comptroller and auditor-general. Article 233 of the Rule of Procedure of Parliament of the Peoples republic of Bangladesh states that : "(1) There shall be a Committee on Public Accounts for the examination of accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the House for the expenditure of the [government], the annual finance accounts of the 58[Government] and such other accounts laid before the House as the Committee may think fit. [Upon examination of irregularities and lapses of Institutions, the Committee shall report to Parliament with recommendations of remedial measures.] (2) In scrutinizing the Appropriation Accounts of the 2[Government] and the report of the comptroller and auditor-general thereon, it shall be the duty of the Committee to satisfy itself- (a) that the moneys shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for, and applicable to, the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged; (b) that the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it; and (c) that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules framed by competent authority. (3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee- (a) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of state corporations, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance-sheets and statements of profit and loss accounts which the president may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the provisions of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular corporation, trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project and the report of the comptroller and auditor-general thereon; (b) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the comptroller and auditor-general of Bangladesh either under the directions of the president or by a statute of Parliament; and (c) to consider the report of the comptroller and auditor-general in cases where the president may have required him to conduct an audit of any receipts or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks. (4) If any money has been spent on any service during a financial year in excess of the amount granted by the House for that purpose, the Committee shall examine with reference to the facts of each case the circumstances leading to such an excess and make such recommendation as it may deem fit." References: Arts. 76, 91 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. Art. 234 of the Rule of Procedure of Parliament of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh; [ LINK ]
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| 40 | Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective? | |||||||
| 40a: In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee. | ||||||||
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Comments: Bangladesh budget formulation is highly influenced by bureaucrats. There is no formal mechanism for ensuring citizen participation in the budget process or for mechanisms of accountability to citizens. In ever fiscal year, the budget is presented by Finance minister to Parliament for discussion, although article 70 of the constitution prevents MPs from disagreeing with their own party. Bureaucrats receive expenditure forecast from line ministries, prepare projects for approval by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC). Parliamentary standing committees have no opportunity to comment on the budget until it is presented in full before Parliament. Growing civil society activism has created additional pressure on the government to be responsive after presenting the proposed/draft budget. (Inserted from a study of BRAC University, Dhaka, December, 2006, The State of Governance in Bangladesh). References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, Budget 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,[ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2007, [ LINK ] Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Economic Review 2006. Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Dhaka, September 2000, P . Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, Audit Report, [ LINK ] Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, The State of Governance in Bangladesh, Bangladesh, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report, Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin, 2006, National Integrity Systems in South Asia.
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| 40b: In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion. | ||||||||
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Comments: As regards priority and urgency about the committees, the 1972 Constitution was very clear when the Article 76.1 provided that the committees be formed by the Parliament, at its first meeting in each session. This provision was later omitted under the Fourth Amendment Act of 195 Act II of 1975, s.11. Consequently, the time-bound nature of the Parliament's obligation was lost, as a result of which the formation of the committees has become a matter of goodwill, causing long delays, in some cases more than a year and a half. All standing committees are composed of 10 members, except for the Standing Committee on Public Accounts which has 15. There is no specific provision with regard to party-wise distribution in the composition, or about representation of the opposition in the committees, which is one of the most important means of making the committees vibrant and effective. The study shows the party-wise composition of the standing committees in the 8th Parliament, which may be justifiably argued to reflect the composition of the Parliament itself. However, there is no denying that such composition is not consistent with the underlying objective of ensuring lively, balanced and effective debate and investigation into allegations of corruption and other deviations from the rule. A TIB monitoring of the working of the 8th Bangladesh Parliament shows that most of committees were not able to meet the mandatory meeting requirement, which is a violation of Rules of Procedure. It was further observed that most of the standing committees (21) were formed after about 18 months of the first sitting of 8th parliament (May 12 and July 15, 2003). The committees were supposed to meet at least 41 and 39 times, respectively, according to the rules of procedure. Only about 13 percent or five out of 38 committees met 39 and more times, which means nearly 87 percent of the committees violated the rule. Also, in a meeting, the presence of the members of the standing committee was not satisfactory. The rate of attendance in meetings held were also not at par with the importance of the work of the Committees in the Committees on ministries the average number of members present was six persons, while in the public accounts committee, the average attendance of members were 8.73 (Inserted from a study of TIB, December 2006, [ LINK ]" target="_blank">[ LINK ] The chairmen of different standing committees identified a number of reasons that did not allow the committees to emerge as real agents of accountability. Speaking at an open discussion, the chairmen of different committees identified non-cooperation of the ministers and high officials of various ministries as the main impediment. The chairman of the Standing Committee on the Communication Ministry, for instance, informed that his committee came under pressure from the government high-ups when it began to probe irregularities and corruption of the ministry. Some senior ministers even met the prime minister to amend the rules of procedure 247, he added. The chairman of the Standing Committee on Defense told the meeting Even though the Comittee takes decisions and make recommendations in presence of ministers, the recommendation are not implemented. He termed the parliamentary committees as good-for-nothing. (Inserted from a study of TIB, December 2006, http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/Corruption&ParliamentaryOversight.pdf). References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, Corruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, P Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control . Dhaka, September 2000, Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, The State of Governance in Bangladesh Dhaka, Bangladesh, December 2006, www.cgs-bu.com
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| 40c: In practice, this committee is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: In the 8th Parliament, all standing committees are composed of 10 members, except the Standing Committee on Public Accounts which has 15. There is no specific provision with regard to party-wise distribution in the composition, or about representation of the opposition in the committees, which is one of the most important means of making the committees vibrant and effective. The study shows the party-wise composition of the standing committees in the 8th Parliament, which may be justifiably argued to reflect the composition of the Parliament itself. However, there is no denying that such composition is not consistent with the underlying objective of ensuring lively, balanced and effective debate and investigation into allegations of corruption and other deviations from the rule. A TIB monitoring of the working of the 8th Bangladesh Parliament shows that most of committees were not able to meet the mandatory meeting requirement, which is a violation of Rules of Procedure. The chairmen of different standing committee identified a number of reasons that did not allow the committees to emerge as real agents of accountability. SpeThe Chairman of the Standing Committee on the Communication Ministry, for instance, informed that his committee came under pressure from the government high-ups when it began to probe irregularities and corruption of the ministry. Some senior ministers even met the prime minister to amend the rules of procedure 247, he added. The Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence told the meeting Even though the Committee takes decisions and make recommendations in presence of ministers, the recommendation are not implemented. He termed the parliamentary committees as good-for-nothing. (Inserted from a study of TIB, December 2006, [ LINK ]). References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Prliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control . Dhaka, September 2000, Pa Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, The State of Governance in Bangladesh December 2006, www.cgs-bu.com
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| 40d: In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities. | ||||||||
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Comments: Available information and evidences on the work of the committees further reveals that most of the committees could not make any significant contribution in terms of investigation against corruption or other irregularities of different ministries under their jurisdiction. The chairmen of different standing committees identified a number of reasons that did not allow the committees to emerge as real agents of accountability. Speaking at an open discussion, the chairmen of different committees identified non- cooperation of the ministers and high officials of various ministries as the main impediment. The Chairman of the Standing Committee on the Communication Ministry, for instance, informed that his committee came under pressure from the government high-ups when it began to probe irregularities and corruption of the ministry. Some senior ministers even met the prime minister to amend the rules of procedure 247, he added. The Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defense told the meeting Even though the Committee takes decisions and make recommendations in presence of ministers, the recommendation are not implemented. He termed the parliamentary committees as good-for-nothing. (Inserted from a study of TIB, December 2006, [ LINK ]). References: Transparency International Bangladesh, December 2006, Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman, C orruption and Parliamentary Oversight: Primacy of the Political Will , [ LINK ] Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Prliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control . Dhaka, September 2000, Pa Transparency International Bangladesh, Parliament Watch 2001-2006, Feb. 12, 2007, [ LINK ] (available in Bengali) Interview with A K Azad Khan, deputy director, Local & Revenue Audit Directorate, Audit Complex, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Sept. 1, 2007, at 11.00 a.m. BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, The State of Governance in Bangladesh December 2006, www.cgs-bu.com
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