| Bangladesh: Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Law Enforcement | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | 42 |
| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | 75 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 80 | Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective? | |||||||
| 80a: In practice, appointments to the law enforcement agency (or agencies) are made according to professional criteria. | ||||||||
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Comments: Politization has taken a heavy toll of our bureaucracy. Ministers try to influence the public officials to make administrative decisions in their favor. Even the ministers or MPs threat with awful consequence the officials if their demands are not met. Due to successive politization in public administration, the incompetent people have been placed in different key points in our administration. The "Bangladesh Governance Report 2007" conducted by PPRC states that various group of officers have been recruited into the civil service without meeting the criteria for entering the service (page-84). With the reference of the Bangladesh Observer the State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 report described the politization scenario in recruitment and promotion in civil administration. References: Power and Participation Research Center (PPRC), Bangladesh Governance Report 2007 Dhaka, 2007 BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60, Dhaka, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Bangladesh 2003. Transparency International, Berlin 2007 Bangladesh: Justice in disarray , Global Corruption Report 2007, [ LINK ]
Peer Review Comments: Recruitment for the police department has always been debatable. The previous political governments chose their men thinking that these people will serve their purpose whether the party remains in office or not. Irregularities take place in the appointment of non-commissioned personnel. The ministers and the senior officials informally consult before their appointment. The cadre service officials are recruited through competitive examinations by the Public Service Commission. Loopholes are also there.
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| 80b: In practice, the law enforcement agency (or agencies) has a budget sufficient to carry out its mandate. | ||||||||
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Comments: The operational allocation including vehicle, travel cost and stationary are not sufficient compared to actual costs, and thus unofficial transactions are encouraged. A research on Police Station by TIB revealed that in the metropolitan police stations, supplies of stationery covered about nine percent of the needs. References: UNDP, Bangladesh, External interference obstructs police performance: Public Attitude Baseline Survey Feb. 14, 2007, www.undp.org.bd Transparency International Bangladesh, Diagnostic Study on Police Station Dhaka 2004 Power and Participation Research Center (PPRC), Bangladesh Governance Report 2007 Dhaka, 2007 BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60, Dhaka, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com
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| 80c: In practice, the law enforcement agency is protected from political interference. | ||||||||
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Comments: Politization has taken a heavy toll of our bureaucracy. Ministers try to influence the public officials to make administrative decisions in their favor. Even the ministers or MPs threat with awful consequence the officials if their demands are not met. Due to successive politization in public administration, the incompetent people have been recruited in the police department. References: Transparency International Bangladesh, March 2007, Bangladesh Public Service Commission: A Diagnostic Study , www.ti-bangladesh.org UNDP, Bangladesh, External interference obstructs police performance: Public Attitude Baseline Survey Feb. 14, 2007, www.undp.org.bd Transparency International Bangladesh, Diagnostic Study on Police Station Dhaka 2004 Power and Participation Research Center (PPRC), Bangladesh Governance Report 2007 Dhaka, 2007 BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60, Dhaka, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com
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| 81 | Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions? | |||||||
| 81a: In law, there is an independent mechanism for citizens to complain about police action. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004 Ministry of Home Affairs, Bangladesh
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| 81b: In practice, the independent law enforcement complaint reporting mechanism responds to citizen's complaints within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Transparency International Bangladesh, March 2007, Bangladesh Public Service Commission: A Diagnostic Study , www.ti-bangladesh.org UNDP, Bangladesh, External interference obstructs police performance: Public Attitude Baseline Survey Feb. 14, 2007, www.undp.org.bd Transparency International Bangladesh, Diagnostic Study on Police Station Dhaka 2004 Power and Participation Research Center (PPRC), Bangladesh Governance Report 2007 Dhaka, 2007 BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60, Dhaka, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com
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| 81c: In law, there is an agency/entity to investigate and prosecute corruption committed by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: The Home Ministry preserves the power to issue administrative rules and regulations on police personnel and operations. Under this authority, in May 2007, Counter Intelligence Unit (CIU) has been established in Police Headquarters under the direct supervision of Inspector General of Police (IGP) in order to check corruption. The main task is to collect information against corrupt police officials across the country and to send that information to CIU. References: The Police Act of 1861. The Police Regulation of Bengal (PRB), 1943. Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004
Peer Review Comments: But the counter-intelligence unit is not that effective. Many police officials are being punished every year for their misdeeds, but those light punishments don't seem to be enough for their correction.
Peer Review Comments: Despite having provisions, the police department hardly took action against corrupt policemen during the rule of political governments in the past. In the last 10 months, since an interim government came to power under a state of emergency, many policemen have been charged with corruption and detained. In a recent speech, the police inspector general, Noor Mohammad, said that they had taken action against nearly 3,000 policemen on corruption charges during the last 10 months.
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| 81d: In practice, when necessary, the agency/entity independently initiates investigations into allegations of corruption by law enforcement officials. | ||||||||
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Comments: Politization has taken a heavy toll in our police department. Ministers try to influence the public officials to make administrative decisions in their favor. Even the ministers or MPs threat with awful consequences the officials if their demands are not met. But now the situation has changed, and some reform program have already been initiated. In May 2007, Counter Intelligence Unit (CIU) has been established in Police Headquarters under the direct supervision of Inspector General of Police (IGP) in order to check corruption. In 2007, within few months, about 1,500 police personnel have been punished for corruption and negligence to provide service(s). References: The Daily Manab Jamin, Dhaka, May 20, 2007. Transparency International, Berlin, 2004, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Bangladesh 2003. Interview with Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Farouque Khan, former member of Parliament (MP), Dhaka, Sept. 6, 2007, at 10.30 a.m. (over phone). Transparency International Bangladesh, March 2007, Bangladesh Public Service Commission: A Diagnostic Study , www.ti-bangladesh.org BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60, Dhaka, December 2006 www.cgs-bu.com
Peer Review Comments: Instead of 1,500, the figure should be near 3,000, as pointed out by the police inspector general in October.
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| 81e: In law, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: The Police Act of 1861. The Police Regulation of Bengal (PRB), 1943. The Penal Code 1868, GOB The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, GOB Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 200, GOB
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| 81f: In practice, law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings. | ||||||||
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Comments: Politization has taken a heavy toll in our police department. Ministers try to influence the public officials to make administrative decisions in their favor. Even the ministers or MPs threat with awful consequences the officials if their demands are not met. But now the situation has changed, and some reform program have already been initiated. In May 2007, Counter Intelligence Unit (CIU) has been established in Police Headquarters under the direct supervision of Inspector General of Police (IGP) in order to check corruption. In 2007, within few months, about 1,500 police personnel have been punished for corruption and negligence to provide service(s). References: BRAC University, Center for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, p-53-60 Dhaka, December 2006, www.cgs-bu.com UNDP, Bangladesh, External interference obstructs police performance: Public Attitude Baseline Survey, Feb. 14, 2007, www.undp.org.bd Transparency International Bangladesh, Dhaka 2004, Diagnostic Study on Police Station, www.ti-bangladesh.org The Daily Manab Jamin, Dhaka, May 20, 2007. Power and Participation Research Center (PPRC), Bangladesh Governance Report 2007 Dhaka, 2007,
Peer Review Comments: The researcher has given the same comments repeatedly.
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