| Angola : Integrity Scorecard Report > Sub-Category: Executive Accountability | ||
| Indicators | Score | |
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | 0 |
| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | 25 |
| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | 0 |
| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | 0 |
| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | 0 |
| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | 0 |
Indicator and sub-Indicator Details
| 26 | Can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | |||||||
| 26: In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights? | ||||||||
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Comments: This article stipulates that all citizens "have the right to contest and take legal action against any acts that violate their rights as set out in the present Constitutional Law and other legislation.".It does not, however, specify that citizens can sue the government. References: Lei Constitucional (Constitional law) art. 43.
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| 27 | Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? | |||||||
| 27a: In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions. | ||||||||
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Comments: Dos Santos seldom appears in public. When he addresses the nation, it is usually in speeches and there is no exposure to critical questions. References: Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
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| 27b: In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: N.º 1 do Art.º 121.º da Lei Constitucional.
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| 27c: In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. | ||||||||
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Comments: The judiciary does not act as an effective check on executive power, and the President retains, appoints and dismisses many members of the judiciary, including the power to appoint Supreme Court justices without National Assembly approval. Hence, there are often overlaps between membership of the politburo of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA -- Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and high-level positions in the judiciary. References: Freedomhouse 2007 - Countries at the Crossroads ([ LINK ]). Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
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| 27d: In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices. | ||||||||
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Comments: Political power is concentrated in the president and the Council of Ministers through which the president exercises executive power. The council can enact laws, decrees and resolutions, assuming most of the functions that are normally associated with the legislative branch. The legislature is extremely weak and never opposes the executive. It cannot remove the President or any government minister (except in exceptional cases). Angola is therefore practically governed by executive orders. References: Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda. Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]). Amundsen, Cesaltina Abreu and Laurinda Hoygaard, Accountability on the Move: The Parliament of Angola (Bergen: Christian Michelson Institute) [ LINK ].
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| 28 | Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? | |||||||
| 28a: In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: The President can only be prosecuted in cases of "bribing and treason." The prosecution is the responsibility of the national assembly (where the ruling party makes up an 82 percent majority). References: Lei Constitucional (Constititional law) Art.º 65.º and al. m) do 88.º .
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| 28b: In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. | ||||||||
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Comments: There is no specific reference to the prosecution of government. References: Lei Constitucional Chapter IV, art.º 105 and following.
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| 29 | Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch? | |||||||
| 29a: In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: The U.S. Department of State finds that "there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation. References: Not possible to find such legislation. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
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| 29b: In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. | ||||||||
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Comments: The U.S. Department of State finds that "there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation. References: Not possible to find such legislation. U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ])
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| 29c: In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch. | ||||||||
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Comments: The U.S. Department of State finds that "there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation. References: Not possible to find such legislation. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Rractices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
Peer Review Comments: Law 21-E/92 and Decrees 16-A/95 and 12/03 allow for officials to maintain ownership of private sector companies and interests while in office but prohibit active management of those companies. Violations can lead to two-year prison sentences, although the extent to which the active management prohibition is actually enforced is unknown. One could argue that these restrictions represent a sort of "conflict of interest" regulation but the very fact that simultaneous private sector investment and ownership arrangements are allowed for government officials, without any apparent process for recusal if a potential conflict arises, suggests they are not.
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| 29d: In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government). | ||||||||
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Comments: US Department of State finds that "there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation. References: Not possible to find such legislation. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ])
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| 29e: In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government. | ||||||||
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Comments: The U.S. Department of State finds that "there were no laws or regulations regarding conflict of interest." This corresponds with the outcome of the researcher's review of Angolan legislation. References: Not possible to find such legislation. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
Peer Review Comments: Law 21-E/92 and Decrees 16-A/95 and 12/03 allow for officials to maintain ownership of private sector companies and interests while in office but prohibit active management of those companies. Violations can lead to two-year prison sentences, although the extent to which the active management prohibition is actually enforced is unknown.
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| 29f: In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: "The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries." References: The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
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| 29g: In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective. | ||||||||
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Comments: "The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries." References: The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
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| 29h: In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited. | ||||||||
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Comments: "The business climate favored those connected to the government; government ministers and other high-level officials commonly and openly owned interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries." References: The U.S. Department of State, Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2008): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007 ([ LINK ]).
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| 30 | Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government? | |||||||
| 30a: In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: No such asset disclosures exist.
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| 30b: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: No such asset disclosures exist.
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| 30c: In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: No such asset disclosures exist.
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| 31 | Official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | |||||||
| 31: In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party. | ||||||||
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Comments: References: Bertelsmann foundation 2008 Angola Country report ([ LINK ]). Freedomhouse 2007 - Countries at the Crossroads ([ LINK ]). Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Director, UNDP Angola, Nov. 5, 2008, Luanda.
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